1. Where improper evidence has been suffered by the court to get
before the jury, it is properly afterwards withdrawn from it.
2. On a suit by the endorsee of a negotiable note which has no
place of payment specified in it against the endorser who relied on
a confessedly defective demand on the maker, of payment -- that is
to say, on a fruitless effort at demand, in the place where the
note was dated, but in which place the maker did not live, parol
evidence that at the time when the note was drawn, it was agreed
between the maker and the endorsee that it should be made payable
in the place where the effort to demand payment had been made, and
that this place of payment had been omitted
Page 83 U. S. 565
by the mistake of the draughtsman -- being evidence to vary or
qualify the absolute terms of the written contract -- would be
improperly let in to the jury and would be properly withdrawn.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE stated the case, and delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The defendants in error were the plaintiffs in the court below.
The action was upon a promissory note made by Jehl & Brother to
Specht, and by him endorsed to How. Sanger & Co., the
plaintiffs. The makers and endorser lived in Memphis. The endorsees
lived in the City of New York, and the note was made and endorsed
there. No place of payment was mentioned in the note. At its
maturity the makers were sought in the City of New York, and not
being found, the note was protested for nonpayment, and notice was
given by mail to the endorser. Upon the trial, after proof of the
protest and notice, the plaintiffs offered to prove that at the
time the note was drawn, it was agreed between the makers, and
Howard Sanger & Co., that it should be made payable in the City
of New York, and that the place of payment was omitted by the
mistake of the draughtsman. Specht objected to the admission of the
testimony. The objection was overruled and he excepted. The
agreement and mistake were proved. Specht then offered to prove
that he had not consented that the note should be made payable in
New York. The testimony was rejected and he excepted. He then asked
the court to rule that the plaintiffs' evidence showed such a
change in his contract of endorsement as discharged him from
liability. The court refused so to rule, and he excepted. The court
then withdrew from the jury the evidence relating to the parol
agreement, and ruled that the proof of demand and notice was
insufficient to create any liability on the part of the
defendant.
Page 83 U. S. 566
Specht excepted to the withdrawal of the evidence as to the
parol agreement. The plaintiffs then proved that, after the
maturity of the note, Specht, with a full knowledge of the
defective demand and notice, promised to pay the note. No objection
was made to the admission of this testimony, nor to the charge of
the court upon the subject. The jury found for the plaintiffs and
judgment was rendered accordingly.
The error complained of is, that the court withdrew from the
jury the evidence touching the parol agreement as to the place of
payment made contemporaneously with the drawing and execution of
the note. The plaintiff in error insists that, being a surety, it
altered and discharged his contract.
The evidence was improperly admitted and was properly withdrawn.
The agreement was a nullity and could not in any wise affect the
rights of either of the parties.
"It is a firmly settled principle that parol evidence of an oral
agreement alleged to have been made at the time of the drawing,
making, or endorsing of a bill or note, cannot be permitted to
vary, qualify, or contradict, to add to or subtract from the
absolute terms of the written contract. [
Footnote 1]"
An agreement between the creditor and principal must, to
exonerate the surety, be one "binding in law upon the parties."
[
Footnote 2]
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Parsons on Notes and Bills 501.
[
Footnote 2]
McLemore v.
Powell, 12 Wheat. 554.