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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–158
_________________
CAROL ANNE BOND, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit
[June 2, 2014]
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The horrors of chemical
warfare were vividly captured by John Singer Sargent in his 1919
painting Gassed. The nearly life-sized work depicts two lines of
soldiers, blinded by mustard gas, clinging single file to orderlies
guiding them to an improvised aid station. There they would receive
little treatment and no relief; many suffered for weeks only to
have the gas claim their lives. The soldiers were shown staggering
through piles of comrades too seriously burned to even join the
procession.
The painting reflects
the devastation that Sargent witnessed in the aftermath of the
Second Battle of Arras during World War I. That battle and others
like it led to an overwhelming consensus in the international
commu-nity that toxic chemicals should never again be used as
weapons against human beings. Today that objective is reflected in
the international Convention on Chemical Weapons, which has been
ratified or acceded to by 190 countries. The United States,
pursuant to the Federal Government’s constitutionally
enumerated power to make treaties, ratified the treaty in 1997. To
fulfill the United States’ obligations under the Convention,
Congress en-acted the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act of 1998. The Act makes it a federal crime for a person to use
or possess any chemical weapon, and it punishes violators with
severe penalties. It is a statute that, like the Convention it
implements, deals with crimes of deadly seriousness.
The question presented
by this case is whether the Implementation Act also reaches a
purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure
her husband’s lover, which ended up causing only a minor
thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with water. Because our
constitutional structure leaves local criminal activity primarily
to the States, we have generally declined to read federal law as
intruding on that responsibility, unless Congress has clearly
indicated that the law should have such reach. The Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act contains no such clear indication,
and we accordingly conclude that it does not cover the unremarkable
local offense at issue here.
I
A
In 1997, the
President of the United States, upon the advice and consent of the
Senate, ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–21, 1974 U.
N. T. S. 317. The nations that ratified the Convention (State
Parties) had bold aspirations for it: “general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons
of mass destruction.” Convention Preamble, ibid. This purpose
traces its origin to World War I, when “[o]ver a million
casualties, up to 100,000 of them fatal, are estimated to have been
caused by chemicals . . . , a large part following the
introduction of mustard gas in 1917.” Kenyon, Why We Need a
Chemical Weapons Convention and an OPCW, in The Creation of the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 1, 4 (I.
Kenyon & D. Feakes eds. 2007) (Kenyon & Feakes). The
atrocities of that war led the community of nations to adopt the
1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemicals as a
method of warfare. Id., at 5.
Up to the 1990s,
however, chemical weapons remained in use both in and out of
wartime, with devastating consequences. Iraq’s use of nerve
agents and mustard gas during its war with Iran in the 1980s
contributed to international support for a renewed, more effective
chemical weapons ban. Id., at 6, 10–11. In 1994 and 1995,
long-held fears of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists were
realized when Japanese extremists carried out two attacks using
sarin gas. Id., at 6. The Convention was conceived as an effort to
update the Geneva Protocol’s protections and to expand the
prohibition on chemical weapons beyond state actors in wartime.
Convention Preamble, 1974 U. N. T. S. 318 (the State Parties are
“[d]etermined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons,
. . . thereby complementing the obligations assumed under
the Geneva Protocol of 1925”). The Convention aimed to
achieve that objective by prohibiting the development, stockpiling,
or use of chemical weapons by any State Party or person within a
State Party’s jurisdiction. Arts. I, II, VII. It also
established an elaborate reporting process requiring State Parties
to destroy chemical weapons under their control and submit to
inspection and monitoring by an international organization based in
The Hague, Netherlands. Arts. VIII, IX.
The Convention
provides:
“(1) Each State Party to this Convention
undertakes never under any
circumstances:
“(a)
To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
“(b)
To use chemical weapons;
“(c)
To engage in any military preparations to
use chemical weapons;
“(d)
To assist, encourage or induce, in any
way, any-one to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention.” Art. I, id., at 319.
“Chemical Weapons” are defined in
relevant part as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with
such purposes.” Art. II(1)(a), ibid. “Toxic
Chemical,” in turn, is defined as “Any chemical which
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.
This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of
their method of production, and regardless of whether they are
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”
Art. II(2), id., at 320. “Purposes Not Prohibited Under
this Convention” means “[i]ndustrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful
purposes,” Art. II(9)(a), id., at 322, and other
specific purposes not at issue here, Arts. II(9)(b)–(d).
Although the Convention
is a binding international agreement, it is “not
self-executing.” W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Commentary on
the Chemical Weapons Convention 109 (1994). That is, the Convention
creates obligations only for State Parties and “does not by
itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law”
absent “implementing legislation passed by Congress.”
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491 , n. 2 (2008). It
instead provides that “[e]ach State Party shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary
measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.”
Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331. “In
particular,” each State Party shall “[p]rohibit natural
and legal persons anywhere . . . under its jurisdiction
. . . from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation
with respect to such activity.” Art. VII (1)(a), id., at
331–332.
Congress gave the
Convention domestic effect in 1998 when it passed the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act. See 112Stat. 2681–856.
The Act closely tracks the text of the treaty: It forbids any
person knowingly “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,
possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.” 18
U. S. C. §229(a)(1). It defines “chemical
weapon” in relevant part as “[a] toxic chemical and its
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited
under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent
with such a purpose.” §229F(1)(A). “Toxic
chemical,” in turn, is defined in general as “any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans
or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of
their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of
whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or
elsewhere.” §229F(8)(A). Finally, “purposes not
prohibited by this chapter” is defined as “[a]ny
peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and
other specific purposes. §229F(7). A person who violates
section 229 may be subject to severe punishment: imprisonment
“for any term of years,” or if a victim’s death
results, the death penalty or imprisonment “for life.”
§229A(a).
B
Petitioner Carol Anne
Bond is a microbiologist from Lansdale, Pennsylvania. In 2006,
Bond’s closest friend, Myrlinda Haynes, announced that she
was pregnant. When Bond discovered that her husband was the
child’s father, she sought revenge against Haynes. Bond stole
a quantity of 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine (an arsenic-based
compound) from her employer, a chemical manufacturer. She also
ordered a vial of potassium dichromate (a chemical commonly used in
printing photographs or cleaning laboratory equipment) on
Amazon.com. Both chemicals are toxic to humans and, in high enough
doses, potentially lethal. It is undisputed, however, that Bond did
not intend to kill Haynes. She instead hoped that Haynes would
touch the chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.
Between November 2006
and June 2007, Bond went to Haynes’s home on at least 24
occasions and spread the chemicals on her car door, mailbox, and
door knob. These attempted assaults were almost entirely
unsuccessful. The chemicals that Bond used are easy to see, and
Haynes was able to avoid them all but once. On that occasion,
Haynes suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb, which she
treated by rinsing with water. Haynes repeatedly called the local
police to report the suspicious substances, but they took no
action. When Haynes found powder on her mailbox, she called the
police again, who told her to call the post office. Haynes did so,
and postal inspectors placed surveillance cameras around her home.
The cameras caught Bond opening Haynes’s mailbox, stealing an
envelope, and stuffing potassium dichromate inside the muffler of
Haynes’s car.
Federal prosecutors
naturally charged Bond with two counts of mail theft, in violation
of 18 U. S. C. §1708. More surprising, they also
charged her with two countsof possessing and using a chemical
weapon, in violationof section 229(a). Bond moved to dismiss the
chemical weapon counts on the ground that section 229 exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to
the States by the Tenth Amendment. The District Court denied
Bond’s motion. She then entered a conditional guilty plea
that reserved her right to appeal. The District Court sentenced
Bond to six years in federal prison plus five years of supervised
release, and ordered her to pay a $2,000 fine and $9,902.79 in
restitution.
Bond appealed, raising
a Tenth Amendment challenge to her conviction. The Government
contended that Bond lacked standing to bring such a challenge. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. We granted
certiorari, the Government confessed error, and we reversed. We
held that, in a proper case, an individual may “assert injury
from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that
federalism defines.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S.
___, ___ (2011) (Bond I) (slip op., at 8). We “expresse[d] no
view on the merits” of Bond’s constitutional challenge.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).
On remand, Bond renewed
her constitutional argument. She also argued that section 229 does
not reach her conduct because the statute’s exception for the
use of chemicals for “peaceful purposes” should be
understood in contradistinction to the “warlike”
activities that the Convention was primarily designed to prohibit.
Bond argued that her conduct, though reprehensible, was not at all
“warlike.” The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
681 F. 3d 149 (CA3 2012). The court acknowledged that the
Government’s reading of section 229 would render the statute
“striking” in its “breadth” and turn every
“kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a
potential chemical weapons cache.” Id., at 154, n. 7.
But the court nevertheless held that Bond’s use of
“ ‘highly toxic chemicals with the intent of
harming Haynes’ can hardly be characterized as
‘peaceful’ under that word’s commonly understood
meaning.” Id., at 154 (citation omitted).
The Third Circuit also
rejected Bond’s constitutional challenge to her conviction,
holding that section 229 was “necessary and proper to carry
the Convention into effect.” Id., at 162. The Court of
Appeals relied on this Court’s opinion in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920) , which stated that “[i]f
the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of
the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and
proper means to execute the powers of the Government,” id.,
at 432.
We again granted
certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2013).
II
In our federal
system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the
States and the people retain the remainder. The States have broad
authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we
have often called a “police power.” United States v.
Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 567 (1995) . The Federal Government, by
contrast, has no such authority and “can exercise only the
powers granted to it,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
405 (1819), including the power to make “all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the
enumerated powers, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18.
For nearly two centuries it has been “clear” that,
lacking a police power, “Congress cannot punish felonies
generally.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 428 (1821). A
criminal act committed wholly within a State “cannot be made
an offence against the United States, unless it have some relation
to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within
the jurisdiction of the United States.” United States v. Fox,
95 U. S. 670, 672 (1878) .
The Government
frequently defends federal criminal legislation on the ground that
the legislation is authorized pursuant to Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce. In this case, however, the Court of
Appeals held that the Government had explicitly disavowed that
argument before the District Court. 681 F. 3d, at 151, n. 1. As a
result, in this Court the parties have devoted significant effort
to arguing whether section 229, as applied to Bond’s offense,
is a necessary and proper means of executing the National
Government’s power to make treaties. U. S. Const.,
Art. II, §2, cl. 2. Bond argues that the lower
court’s reading of Missouri v. Holland would remove all
limits on federal authority, so long as the Federal Government
ratifies a treaty first. She insists that to effectively afford the
Government a police power whenever it implements a treaty would be
contrary to the Framers’ careful decision to divide power
between the States and the National Government as a means of
preserving liberty. To the extent that Holland authorizes such
usurpation of traditional state authority, Bond says, it must be
either limited or overruled.
The Government replies
that this Court has never held that a statute implementing a valid
treaty exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers. To do so here,
the Government says, would contravene another deliberate choice of
the Framers: to avoid placing subject matter limitations on the
National Government’s power to make treaties. And it might
also undermine confidence in the United States as an international
treaty partner.
Notwithstanding this
debate, it is “a well-established principle governing the
prudent exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction that normally
the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is
some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”
Escambia County v. Mc-Millan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Bond argues that section 229 does not
cover her conduct. So we consider that argument first.
III
Section 229 exists to
implement the Convention, so we begin with that international
agreement. As explained, the Convention’s drafters intended
for it to be a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. But even with
its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a treaty about
chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s conduct. The
Convention, a product of years of worldwide study, analysis, and
multinational negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts
of terrorism. See Kenyon & Feakes 6. There is no reason to
think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were
interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault.
Even if the treaty does
reach that far, nothing prevents Congress from implementing the
Convention in the same manner it legislates with respect to
innumerable other matters—observing the Constitution’s
division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving the
prosecution of purely local crimes to the States. The Convention,
after all, is agnostic between enforcement at the state versus
federal level: It provides that “[e]ach State Party shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary
measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.”
Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331 (emphasis added); see also
Tabassi, National Implementation: Article VII, in Kenyon &
Feakes 205, 207 (“Since the creation of national law, the
enforcement of it and the structure and administration of
government are all sovereign acts reserved exclusively for [State
Parties], it is not surprising that the Convention is so vague on
the critical matter of national implementation.”).
Fortunately, we have no
need to interpret the scope of the Convention in this case. Bond
was prosecuted under section 229, and the statute—unlike the
Convention—must be read consistent with principles of
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.
A
In the
Government’s view, the conclusion that Bond
“knowingly” “use[d]” a “chemical
weapon” in violation of section 229(a) is simple: The
chemicals that Bond placed on Haynes’s home and car are
“toxic chemical[s]” as defined by the statute, and
Bond’s attempt to assault Haynes was not a “peaceful
purpose.” §§229F(1), (8), (7). The problem with
this interpretation is that it would “dramatically
intrude[ ] upon traditional state criminal
jurisdiction,” and we avoid reading statutes to have such
reach in the absence of a clear indication that they do. United
States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350 (1971) .
Part of a fair reading
of statutory text is recognizing that “Congress legislates
against the backdrop” of certain unexpressed presumptions.
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) .
As Justice Frankfurter put it in his famous essay on statutory
interpretation, correctly reading a statute “demands
awareness of certain presuppositions.” Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947).
For example, we presume that a criminal statute derived from the
common law carries with it the requirement of a culpable mental
state—even if no such limitation appears in the
text—unless it is clear that the Legislature intended to
impose strict liability. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U. S. 422, 437 (1978) . To take another example, we
presume, absent a clear statement from Congress, that federal
statutes do not apply outside the United States. Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010) . So
even though section 229, read on its face, would cover a chemical
weapons crime if committed by a U. S. citizen in Australia, we
would not apply the statute to such conduct absent a plain
statement from Congress.[
1] The
notion that some things “go without saying” applies to
legislation just as it does to everyday life.
Among the background
principles of construction that our cases have recognized are those
grounded in the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States under our Constitution. It has long been settled, for
example, that we presume federal statutes do not abrogate state
sovereign immunity, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U. S. 234, 243 (1985) , impose obligations on the States
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 –17
(1981), or preempt state law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U. S. 218, 230 (1947) .
Closely related to
these is the well-established principle that “ ‘it
is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
overrides’ ” the “usual constitutional
balance of federal and state powers.” Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 243).
To quote Frankfurter again, if the Federal Government would
“ ‘radically readjust[ ] the balance of state
and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating
[must be] reasonably explicit’ ” about it. BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 544 (1994)
(quoting Some Reflections, supra, at 539–540; second
alteration in original). Or as explained by Justice Marshall, when
legislation “affect[s] the federal balance, the requirement
of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced,
and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in
the judicial decision.” Bass, supra, at 349.
We have applied this
background principle when construing federal statutes that touched
on several areas of traditional state responsibility. See Gregory,
supra, at 460 (qualifications for state officers); BFP, supra, at
544 (titles to real estate); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 174 (2001)
(land and water use). Perhaps the clearest example of traditional
state authority is the punishment of local criminal activity.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 618 (2000) . Thus,
“we will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to
effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between
federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” Bass, 404
U. S., at 349.
In Bass, we interpreted
a statute that prohibited any convicted felon from
“ ‘receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in
commerce or affecting commerce . . . any
firearm.’ ” Id., at 337. The Government argued
that the statute barred felons from possessing all firearms and
that it was not necessary to demonstrate a connection to interstate
commerce. We rejected that reading, which would
“render[ ] traditionally local criminal conduct a matter
for federal enforcement and would also involve a substantial
extension of federal police resources.” Id., at 350. We
instead read the statute more narrowly to require proof of a
connection to interstate commerce in every case, thereby
“preserv[ing] as an element of all the of-fenses a
requirement suited to federal criminal jurisdiction alone.”
Id., at 351.
Similarly, in Jones v.
United States, 529 U. S. 848, 850 (2000) , we confronted the
question whether the federal arson statute, which prohibited
burning “ ‘any . . . property used in
interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce,’ ” reached an
owner-occupied private residence. Once again we rejected the
Government’s “expansive interpretation,” under
which “hardly a building in the land would fall outside the
fed-eral statute’s domain.” Id., at 857. We instead
held that the statute was “most sensibly read” more
narrowly to reach only buildings used in “active employment
for commercial purposes.” Id., at 855. We noted that
“arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime,” id.,
at 858, and that the Government’s proposed broad reading
would “ ‘significantly change[ ] the
federal-state balance,’ ” ibid. (quoting Bass, 404
U. S., at 349), “mak[ing] virtually every arson in the
country a federal offense,” 529 U. S., at 859.
These precedents make
clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of
federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a
federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the
improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the
term—“chemical weapon”—being defined; the
deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading;
and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context
from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare
and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can
insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely
local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive
language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.
See Bass, supra, at 349.[
2]
B
We do not find any
such clear indication in section 229. “Chemical weapon”
is the key term that defines the statute’s reach, and it is
defined extremely broadly. But that general definition does not
constitute a clear statement that Congress meant the statute to
reach local criminal conduct.
In fact, a fair reading
of section 229 suggests that it does not have as expansive a scope
as might at first appear. To begin, as a matter of natural meaning,
an educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime
as involving a “chemical weapon.” Saying that a person
“used a chemical weapon” conveys a very different idea
than saying the person “used a chemical in a way that caused
some harm.” The natural meaning of “chemical
weapon” takes account of both the particular chemicals that
the defendant used and the circumstances in which she used
them.
When used in the manner
here, the chemicals in this case are not of the sort that an
ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical
warfare. The substances that Bond used bear little resemblance to
the deadly toxins that are “of particular danger to the
objectives of the Convention.” Why We Need a Chemical Weapons
Convention and an OPCW, in Kenyon & Feakes 17 (describing the
Convention’s Annex on Chemicals, a nonexhaustive list of
covered substances that are subject to special regulation). More to
the point, the use of something as a “weapon” typically
connotes “[a]n instrument of offensive or defensive
combat,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
2589 (2002), or “[a]n instrument of attack or defense in
combat, as a gun, missile, or sword,” American Heritage
Dictionary 2022 (3d ed. 1992). But no speaker in natural parlance
would describe Bond’s feud-driven act of spreading irritating
chemicals on Haynes’s door knob and mailbox as
“combat.” Nor do the other circumstances of
Bond’s offense—an act of revenge born of romantic
jealousy, meant to cause discomfort, that produced nothing more
than a minor thumb burn—suggest that a chemical weapon was
deployed in Norristown, Pennsylvania. Potassium dichromate and
10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine might be chemical weapons if used, say,
to poison a city’s water supply. But Bond’s crime is
worlds apart from such hypotheticals, and covering it would give
the statute a reach exceeding the ordinary meaning of the words
Congress wrote.
In settling on a fair
reading of a statute, it is not un-usual to consider the ordinary
meaning of a defined term, particularly when there is dissonance
between that ordinary meaning and the reach of the definition. In
Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 136 (2010) , for
example, we considered the statutory term
“ ‘violent felony,’ ” which the
Armed Career Criminal Act defined in relevant part as an offense
that “ ‘has as an element the use . . .
of physical force against the person of
another.’ ” Although “physical force against
. . . another” might have meant any force, however
slight, we thought it “clear that in the context of a
statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ the phrase
‘physical force’ means violent force—that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person.” Id., at 140. The ordinary meaning of “chemical
weapon” plays a similar limiting role here.
The Government would
have us brush aside the ordinary meaning and adopt a reading of
section 229 that would sweep in everything from the detergent under
the kitchen sink to the stain remover in the laundry room. Yet no
one would ordinarily describe those substances as “chemical
weapons.” The Government responds that because Bond used
“specialized, highly toxic” (though legal) chemicals,
“this case presents no occasion to address whether Congress
intended [section 229] to apply to common household
substances.” Brief for United States 13, n. 3. That the
statute would apply so broadly, however, is the inescapable
conclusion of the Government’s position: Any parent would be
guilty of a serious federal offense—possession of a chemical
weapon—when, exasperated by the children’s repeated
failure to clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish
with a few drops of vinegar. We are reluctant to ignore the
ordinary meaning of “chemical weapon” when doing so
would transform a statute passed to implement the international
Convention on Chemical Weapons into one that also makes it a
federal offense to poison goldfish. That would not be a
“realistic assessment[ ] of congressional intent.”
Post, at 6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
In light of all of
this, it is fully appropriate to apply the background assumption
that Congress normally preserves “the constitutional balance
between the National Government and the States.” Bond I, 564
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). That assumption is grounded
in the very structure of the Constitution. And as we explained when
this case was first before us, maintaining that constitutional
balance is not merely an end unto itself. Rather, “[b]y
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the
concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the
individual from arbitrary power.” Ibid.
The Government’s
reading of section 229 would “ ‘alter sensitive
federal-state relationships,’ ” convert an
astonishing amount of “traditionally local criminal
conduct” into “a matter for federal enforcement,”
and “involve a substantial extension of federal police
resources.” Bass, 404 U. S., at 349–350. It would
transform the statute from one whose core concerns are acts of war,
assassination, and terrorism into a massive federal anti-poisoning
regime that reaches the simplest of assaults. As the Government
reads section 229, “hardly” a poisoning “in the
land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.”
Jones, 529 U. S., at 857. Of course Bond’s conduct is
serious and unacceptable—and against the laws of
Pennsylvania. But the background principle that Congress does not
normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically
important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude
that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal
prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.
In fact, with the
exception of this unusual case, the Federal Government itself has
not looked to section 229 to reach purely local crimes. The
Government has identified only a handful of prosecutions that have
been brought under this section. Brief in Opposition 27, n. 5.
Most of those involved either terrorist plots or the possession of
extremely dangerous substances with the potential to cause severe
harm to many people. See United States v. Ghane, 673 F. 3d 771
(CA8 2012) (defendant possessed enough potassium cyanide to kill
450 people); United States v. Crocker, 260 Fed. Appx. 794 (CA6
2008) (defendant attempted to acquire VX nerve gas and chlorine gas
as part of a plot to attack a federal courthouse); United States v.
Krar, 134 Fed. Appx. 662 (CA5 2005) (per curiam) (defendant
possessed sodium cyanide); United States v. Fries, 2012 WL 689157
(D Ariz., Feb. 28, 2012) (defendant set off a homemade chlorine
bomb in the victim’s driveway, requiring evacuation of a
residential neighborhood). The Federal Government undoubtedly has a
substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws against
assassination, terrorism, and acts with the potential to cause mass
suffering. Those crimes have not traditionally been left
predominantly to the States, and nothing we have said here will
disrupt the Government’s authority to prosecute such
offenses.
It is also clear that
the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every other
State) are sufficient to prosecute Bond. Pennsylvania has several
statutes that would likely cover her assault. See 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. §§2701 (2012) (simple assault), 2705 (reckless
endangerment), 2709 (harassment).[
3] And state authorities regularly enforce these laws in
poisoning cases. See, e.g., Gamiz, Family Survives Poisoned
Burritos, Allentown, Pa., Morning Call, May 18, 2013 (defendant
charged with assault, reckless endangerment, and harassment for
feeding burritos poisoned with prescription medication to her
husband and daughter); Cops: Man Was Poisoned Over 3 Years,
Harrisburg, Pa., Patriot News, Aug. 12, 2012, p. A11 (defendant
charged with assault and reckless endangerment for poisoning a man
with eye drops over three years so that “he would pay more
attention to her”).
The Government objects
that Pennsylvania authorities charged Bond with only a minor
offense based on her “harassing telephone calls and
letters,” Bond I, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2),
and declined to prosecute her for assault. But we have
traditionally viewed the exercise of state officials’
prosecutorial discretion as a valuable feature of our
constitutional system. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S.
357, 364 (1978) . And nothing in the Convention shows a clear
intent to abrogate that feature. Prosecutorial discretion involves
carefully weighing the benefits of a prosecution against the
evidence needed to convict, the resources of the public fisc, and
the public policy of the State. Here, in its zeal to prosecute
Bond, the Federal Government has “displaced” the
“public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted
in its capacity as sovereign,” that Bond does not belong in
prison for a chemical weapons offense. Bond I, supra, at ___ (slip
op., at 12); see also Jones, supra, at 859 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (federal prosecution of a traditionally local crime
“illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively
displace a policy choice made by the State”).
As we have explained,
“Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a
federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the
States.” Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. There is no clear
indication of a contrary approach here. Section 229 implements the
Convention, but Bond’s crime could hardly be more unlike the
uses of mustard gas on the Western Front or nerve agents in the
Iran-Iraq war that form the core concerns of that treaty. See
Kenyon & Feakes 6. There are no life-sized paintings of
Bond’s rival washing her thumb. And there are no apparent
interests of the United States Congress or the community of nations
in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt with
(like virtually all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by the State.
The Solicitor General acknowledged as much at oral argument. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 47 (“I don’t think anybody would say
[that] whether or not Ms. Bond is prosecuted would give rise to an
international incident”).
This case is unusual,
and our analysis is appropriately limited. Our disagreement with
our colleagues reduces to whether section 229 is “utterly
clear.” Post, at 5 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). We
think it is not, given that the definition of “chemical
weapon” in a particular case can reach beyond any normal
notion of such a weapon, that the context from which the statute
arose demonstrates a much more limited prohibition was intended,
and that the most sweeping reading of the statute would
fundamentally upset the Constitution’s balance between
national and local power. This exceptional convergence of factors
gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s expansive
reading of section 229, and calls for us to interpret the statute
more narrowly.
In sum, the global need
to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government
to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault
with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.
There is no reason to suppose that Congress—in implementing
the Convention on Chemical Weapons—thought otherwise.
* * *
The Convention
provides for implementation by each ratifying nation “in
accordance with its constitutional processes.”
Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331. As James Madison explained,
the constitutional process in our “compound republic”
keeps power “divided between two distinct governments.”
The Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). If section
229 reached Bond’s conduct, it would mark a dramatic
departure from that constitutional structure and a serious
reallocation of criminal law enforcement authority between the
Federal Government and the States. Absent a clear statement of that
purpose, we will not presume Congress to have authorized such a
stark intrusion into traditional state authority.
The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.