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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 10–930 and 11–218
_________________
CHARLES L. RYAN, PETITIONER
10–930
v.
ERNEST VALENCIA GONZALES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
TERRY TIBBALS, PETITIONER
11–218
v.
SEAN CARTER
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[January 8, 2013]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These two cases present the question whether the
incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the
prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings. We hold that neither
18 U. S. C. §3599 nor 18 U. S. C. §4241
provides such a right and that the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district courts must
stay federal habeas proceedings when petitioners are adjudged
incompetent.
I
A
Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted by an
Arizona jury of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault,
first-degree burglary, and theft. The convictions arose from
Gonzales’ repeated stabbing of Darrel and Deborah Wagner in front
of their 7-year-old son during a burglary of the Wagners’ home.
Darrel Wagner died from the stabbing, while Deborah Wagner survived
but spent five days in intensive care. The trial court sentenced
Gonzales to death on the murder charge and to various prison terms
for the other crimes.
After exhausting state remedies, Gonzales filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court on
November 15, 1999. While the petition was pending, Gonzales’
appointed counsel moved to stay the proceedings, contending that
Gonzales was no longer capable of rationally communicating with or
assisting counsel. He argued that mental incompetence entitled
Gonzales to a stay under Ninth Circuit precedent. See
Rohan
v.
Woodford,
334 F.3d 803 (2003). In
Rohan, the Ninth Circuit held
that the federal statute guaranteeing state capital prisoners a
right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, 21
U. S. C. §848(q)(4)(B) (2000 ed.) (now codified as 18
U. S. C. §3599(a)(2)), could not “be faithfully enforced
unless courts ensure that a petitioner is competent,” 334
F. 3d, at 813.
Rohan thus concluded that “where an
incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises claims that could
potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally,
refusing to stay proceedings pending restoration of competence
denies him his statutory right to assistance of counsel, whether or
not counsel can identify with precision the information sought.”
Id., at 819.
Applying
Rohan, the District Court denied
a stay after concluding that the claims properly before it were
record based or resolvable as a matter of law and thus would not
benefit from Gonzales’ input. The court found it unnec-essary to
determine whether Gonzales was incompetent, though it did find that
he possessed “at least a limited capacity for rational
communication.”
Gonzales v.
Schriro, 617 F. Supp. 2d
849, 863 (Ariz. 2008).
Gonzales thereafter filed an emergency petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit. While Gonzales’
petition was pending, the Ninth Circuit decided
Nash v.
Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (2009), which held that habeas
petitioners have a right to competence on appeal, even though
appeals are entirely record based.
Id., at 1050 (“While an
appeal is record-based, that does not mean that a habeas petitioner
in a capital case is relegated to a nonexistent role. Meaningful
assistance of appellate counsel may require rational communication
between counsel and a habeas petitioner”). Applying
Nash and
Rohan, the court granted the writ of mandamus, concluding
that even though Gonzales’ “exhausted claims are record-based or
legal in nature, he is entitled to a stay pending a competency
determination” under 18 U. S. C. §3599.
In re
Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1244 (2010).
We granted certiorari to determine whether §3599
provides a statutory right to competence in federal habeas
proceedings. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
B
Sean Carter was convicted by an Ohio jury of
aggra-vated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and sentenced to
death for anally raping his adoptive grandmother, Veader Prince,
and stabbing her to death. After exhausting his state-court
appeals, Carter initiated federal habeas proceedings on March 19,
2002, in the Northern District of Ohio. Carter eventually filed a
third amended petition, along with a motion requesting a competency
determi-nation and a stay of the proceedings. The District Court
granted the motion.
Following several psychiatric evaluations and a
com-petency determination, the District Court found Carter
incompetent to assist counsel. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s test in
Rohan, it determined that Carter’s assistance was required
to develop four of his exhausted claims. As a result, the court
dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice and prospectively
tolled the statute of limitations.
Carter v.
Bradshaw, 583 F. Supp. 2d 872, 884 (2008). The State
appealed.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “[f]ederal
habeas petitioners facing the death penalty for state criminal
convictions do not enjoy a constitutional right to competence.”
Carter v.
Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329, 332 (2011). It
nevertheless located a statutory right to competence in §4241,
relying, in part, on this Court’s decision in
Rees v.
Peyton,
384 U.S.
312 (1966) (
per curiam) (
Rees
I ).[
1] 644
F. 3d, at 332
. The Sixth Circuit explained:
“By applying section 4241 to habeas
actions,
Rees addresses the situation where a habeas
petitioner awaiting the death penalty may seek to forego any
collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence, and defines a
statutory right for the petitioner to be competent enough to (1)
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him, and (2) assist properly in his defense.”
Id., at
333.
The court concluded that “[a]nytime a capital
habeas petitioner affirmatively seeks to forego his habeas
petition, whether by action or inaction, . . . a district
court may employ section 4241.”
Id., at 334.
The court therefore amended the District Court’s
judgment and ordered that Carter’s petition be stayed in-definitely
with respect to any claims that required his assistance.
Id., at 336–337. Judge Rogers dissented, arguing that there
was no constitutional or statutory basis for the court’s decision.
Id., at 337–342.
We granted certiorari to determine whether §4241
provides a statutory right to competence in federal habeas
proceedings. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
Both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have
concluded that death row inmates pursuing federal habeas are
entitled to a suspension of proceedings when found incompetent. The
Ninth Circuit located this right in §3599, while the Sixth Circuit
located it in §4241. Neither section provides such a right.
A
Section 3599(a)(2) guarantees federal habeas
petitioners on death row the right to federally funded
counsel.[
2] The statute
provides that petitioners who are “financially unable to obtain
adequate representation . . . shall be entitled to the
appointment of one or more attorneys.” Appointed attorneys are
required to have experience in death penalty litigation,
§§3599(b)–(d), and, once appointed, are directed to “represent the
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial
proceedings,” §3599(e). The statute also gives district courts the
power to authorize funding for “investigative, expert, or other
services” as are “reasonably necessary for the representation of
the defendant.” §3599(f). But §3599 does not direct district courts
to stay proceedings when habeas petitioners are found
incompetent.[
3]
In addition to lacking any basis in the
statutory text, the assertion that the right to counsel implies a
right to competence is difficult to square with our constitutional
precedents. The right to counsel is located in the Sixth Amendment.
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”) If the right to counsel carried with it an implied right
to competence, the right to competence at trial would flow from the
Sixth Amendment. But “[w]e have repeatedly and consistently
recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant
violates
due process,’ ” not the Sixth Amendment.
Cooper v.
Oklahoma,
517 U.S.
348, 354 (1996) (quoting
Medina v.
California,
505 U.S.
437, 453 (1992); emphasis added); see also
Drope v.
Missouri,
420 U.S.
162, 172 (1975) (“[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate
to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while
incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to
a fair trial” (citing
Pate v.
Robinson,
383 U.S.
375, 385 (1966))).
It stands to reason that the benefits flowing
from the right to counsel
at trial could be affected if an
incompe-tent defendant is unable to communicate with his attorney.
For example, an incompetent defendant would be unable to assist
counsel in identifying witnesses and deciding on a trial strategy.
For this reason, “[a] defendant may not be put to trial unless he
‘ “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . .
[and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” ’ ”
Cooper,
supra, at 354 (quoting
Dusky v.
United States,
362 U.S.
402 (1960) (
per curiam)). Notwithstanding the connection
between the right to competence at trial and the right to counsel
at trial, we have never said that the right to competence
derives from the right to counsel. We will not assume or
infer that Congress intended to depart from our precedents and
locate a right to competence in federal habeas proceedings within
the right to counsel. “We normally assume that, when Congress
enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent.”
Merck & Co. v.
Reynolds, 559 U. S. ___, ___
(2010) (slip op., at 12).
The Ninth Circuit located a statutory right to
competence in §3599. 623 F. 3d, at 1245 (citing
Rohan,
334 F.3d 803, and
Nash, 581 F. 3d 1048). Because
Rohan is the Ninth Circuit’s controlling precedent, we
briefly address that decision.
In
Rohan, a habeas petitioner asserted a
right to com-petency based both on the Due Process Clause and on 21
U. S. C. §848(q)(4)(B) (2000 ed.). After discussing the
history of the common law, which prohibited the indictment, trial
and execution of mentally incompetent defendants,[
4] the Court of Appeals stated that the
petitioner’s due process claim raised “substantial” “constitutional
ques-tions.”
Rohan, 334 F. 3d, at 814. This conclusion
is puzzling in light of the Ninth Circuit’s acknowledgment that
there is “no constitutional right to counsel on habeas,”
id., at 810 (citing
Murray v.
Giarratano,
492 U.S.
1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion)), and that “there is no due
process right to collateral review at all,” 334 F. 3d, at 810
(citing
United States v.
MacCollom,
426 U.S.
317, 323 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Ninth Circuit was
simply incorrect in suggesting that, in this case, there might be a
constitutional concern—much less a “substantial” one—raised by the
petitioner’s due process claim.
Invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance,
the Ninth Circuit gave the petitioner the practical benefit of a
due process right to competence in federal habeas proceedings
through its interpretation of §848(q)(4)(B).[
5] 334 F. 3d, at 814. In analyzing that
statute, the
Rohan court relied on a Ninth Circuit en banc
opinion in
Calderon v.
United States Dist. Court for
Central Dist. of Cal.,
163 F.3d 530 (1998) (
Kelly V), overruled in unrelated
part,
Woodford v.
Garceau,
538
U.S. 202 (2003), which held that a prisoner’s incompetence is
grounds for equitably tolling the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) 1-year statute of limitations for
filing habeas petitions. The
Rohan court purported to be
bound by the “rationale” of
Kelly V—that a prisoner’s
incompetence could “eviscerate the statutory right to
counsel,”[
6]
Kelly V,
supra, at 541—and concluded that “[i]f a petitioner’s
statutory rights depend on his ability to communicate rationally,
compelling him to pursue relief while incompetent is no less an
infringement than dismissing his late petition.” 334 F. 3d, at
814.
We are not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s
assertion that a habeas petitioner’s mental incompetency could
“evis-cerate the statutory right to counsel” in federal habeas
proceedings. Given the backward-looking, record-based nature of
most federal habeas proceedings, counsel can generally provide
effective representation to a habeas petitioner regardless of the
petitioner’s competence. Indeed, where a claim is “adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d) (2006 ed.), counsel should, in most circumstances, be able
to identify whether the “adjudication . . . resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States,” §2254(d)(1), without any
evi-dence outside the record. See
Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9)
(“[R]eview under [28 U. S. C.] §2254(d)(1) is limited to
the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits. . . . This backward-looking language requires
an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.
It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in
existence at that same time—
i.e., the record before the
state court”). Attorneys are quite capable of reviewing the
state-court record, identifying legal errors, and marshaling
relevant arguments, even without their clients’ assistance.
Rohan also cited
Rees I,
384 U.S.
312, in support of its conclusion. 334 F. 3d, at 815. In
Rees I, a state inmate on death row filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in District Court, alleging that the
state-court conviction violated his constitutional rights. 384
U. S., at 313. The District Court denied his petition, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Ibid. Shortly after Rees’ counsel
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, Rees directed his
counsel to withdraw the petition and to forgo any further
proceedings. Counsel advised the Court that he could not accede to
these instructions without a psychiatric evaluation of Rees,
because there was some doubt as to Rees’ mental competency.
Ibid. In response, the Court directed the District Court to
determine Rees’ mental competence.
Id., at 313–314. After
the District Court conducted a hearing and found Rees incompetent,
the Court issued a one-sentence order directing that the petition
for certiorari be “held without action.”
Rees v.
Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967) (
Rees II ).[
7] When Rees died several decades
later, the Court dismissed the petition.
Rees v.
Superintendent of Va. State Penitentiary, 516 U.S. 802
(1995) (
Rees III ).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he record
in
Rees II shows that incompetence is grounds for staying
habeas proceedings.”
Rohan,
supra, at 815. This
conclusion is unwarranted.
Rees I concerned whether an
incompetent habeas petitioner may withdraw his certiorari petition,
and it provides no clear answer even to that question. Likewise,
the unique, one-sentence order in
Rees II offered no
rationale for the decision to hold Rees’ petition. As a result,
Rees offers no support for federal habeas petitioners
seeking to stay district court proceedings or for the Ninth
Circuit’s opinions in
Rohan,
Nash, or this
case.[
8]
Gonzales barely defends the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of §3599.[
9] He
offers a single, halfhearted argument in support of the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion based on our statement in
McFarland v.
Scott,
512 U.S.
849, 858 (1994), that “the right to counsel necessarily
includes a right for that counsel meaningfully to research and
present a defendant’s habeas claims.” But
McFarland was
addressing whether a district court could issue a
stay of
execution after a capital prisoner had filed a request for
counsel but before he had filed his habeas petition.
Id., at
854–858. We held that a district court may stay a capital
prisoner’s execution once the prisoner has invoked his statutory
right to counsel.
Id., at 859.
McFarland has no
relevance here where Gonzales is not seeking a stay of execution,
but rather a stay of the District Court’s proceedings. Moreover,
Gonzales moved for a stay more than six years after initiating his
habeas petition. This was certainly ample time for his attorney to
research and present the claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that §3599
does not provide federal habeas petitioners with a “statutory
right” to competence.[
10]
B
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion
as the Ninth Circuit but located the statutory right to competence
during habeas proceedings in 18 U. S. C. §4241. Relying
largely on
Rees I, the Sixth Circuit concluded that §4241
provides a statutory right to competence. 644 F. 3d, at 333.
But as discussed, Part II–A,
supra,
Rees I did not
recognize a statutory right to competence in federal ha-beas
proceedings.[
11] Moreover,
§4241 does not even apply to such proceedings. Section 4241(a)
provides:
“At any time after the commencement of a
prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the
defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or
supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the
defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for
a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The
court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its
own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suf-fering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
By its own terms, §4241 applies only to trial
proceedings prior to sentencing and “at any time after the
commencement of probation or supervised release.” Federal habeas
proceedings, however, commence after sentencing, and federal habeas
petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated, not on probation.
Furthermore, §4241, like the rest of Title 18
generally, applies exclusively to
federal defendants and
probationers subject to prosecution by the United States. Carter is
not, and does not claim to be, a federal defendant. Rather, he is a
state prisoner challenging the basis of his conviction in a
federal civil action. See
Blair v.
Martel, 645 F.3d
1151, 1155 (CA9 2011) (“By its own terms, §4241 does not apply
unless a federal criminal defendant is on trial or is released on
probation”).
Finally, §4241(a) authorizes the district court
to grant a motion for a competency determination if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant’s mental
incompetence renders him “unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his
defense.” (Emphasis added.) See also
§4241(d).[
12] A habeas
proceeding under §2254, however, is not a “proceedin[g] against”
the habeas petitioner; this, on the other hand, is a civil action
against the warden of the state prison. And, a federal
habeas petitioner does not mount a “defense” to the government’s
prosecution. Rather, the petitioner collaterally attacks his
conviction at an earlier state trial. Accordingly, the statutory
right to competence provided in §4241 is simply inapplicable to
federal habeas proceedings.
We would address Carter’s arguments in defense
of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, but, there are none. Carter’s
brief informed us that “[t]his Court need not consider the
statutory argument with which the [petitioner’s] brief begins—i.e.,
that there is no ‘statutory right’ under 18 U. S. C. §4241 to be
competent in habeas proceedings.” Brief for Respondent in No.
11–218, p. 15. Apparently, Carter found the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning indefensible. We agree.
III
Both Gonzales and Carter argued at length in
their briefs and at oral argument that district courts have the
equitable power to stay proceedings when they determine that habeas
petitioners are mentally incompetent.[
13] Neither petitioner disputes that “[d]istrict courts .
. . ordinarily have authority to issue stays, where such a stay
would be a proper exercise of discretion.”
Rhines v.
Weber,
544 U.S.
269, 276 (2005) (citation omitted); see also
Enelow v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,
293 U.S.
379, 382 (1935) (explaining that a district court may stay a
case “pending before it by virtue of its inherent power to control
the progress of the cause so as to maintain the orderly processes
of justice”). Similarly, both petitioners agree that “AEDPA does
not deprive district courts of [this] authority.”
Rhines,
supra, at 276. Petitioners and respondents disagree,
however, about the types of situations in which a stay would be
appropriate and about the permissible duration of a
competency-based stay. We do not presume that district courts need
unsolicited advice from us on how to manage their dockets. Rather,
the decision to grant a stay, like the decision to grant an
evidentiary hearing, is “generally left to the sound discretion of
district courts.”
Schriro v.
Landrigan,
550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007). For pur-poses of resolving these cases, it is
unnecessary to determine the precise contours of the district
court’s discretion to issue stays. We address only its outer
limits.
A
In Gonzales’ case, the District Court
correctly found that all of Gonzales’ properly exhausted claims
were record based or resolvable as a matter of law, irrespective of
Gonzales’ competence.[
14]
617 F. Supp. 2d, at 863; see also
State v.
Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 509–515,
892 P.2d 838, 845–851 (1995) (adjudicating Gonzales’ claims on
the merits). The court therefore denied Gonzales’ motion for a
stay. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in so
holding, because a stay is not generally warranted when a
petitioner raises only record-based claims subject to 28
U. S. C. §2254(d). As previously noted, review of such
claims “is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”
Pin-holster, 563
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Accordingly, any evidence that
a petitioner might have would be inadmis-sible.
Ibid.
(“[T]he record under review is limited to the record in existence
at that same time—
i.e., the record before the state court”).
Because federal habeas is “a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal,” the types of errors redressable
under §2254(d) should be apparent from the record.
Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011)
(slip op., at 13) (quoting
Jackson v.
Virginia,
443 U.S.
307, 332, n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
Counsel can read the record.
B
In Carter’s case, the District Court concluded
that four of Carter’s claims could potentially benefit from
Carter’s assistance.[
15]
However, three of these claims were adjudicated on the merits in
state postconviction proceedings and, thus, were subject to review
under §2254(d). See
State v.
Carter, No. 99–T–0133,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5935, *5–*13 (Dec. 15, 2000). Any extrarecord
evidence that Carter might have concerning these claims would
therefore be inadmissible.
Pinholster,
supra, at ___.
Consequently, these claims do not warrant a stay.
It is unclear from the record whether Carter
exhausted the fourth claim.[
16] If that claim was exhausted, it too would be record
based. But even if Carter could show that the claim was both
unexhausted and not procedurally defaulted,[
17] an indefinite stay would be inappropriate.
“AEDPA’s acknowledged purpose” is to “ ‘reduc[e] delays in the
execution of state and federal criminal sentences.’ ”
Schriro,
supra, at 475 (quoting
Woodford, 538
U. S., at 206). “Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates
AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner
to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings.”
Rhines,
544 U. S., at 277. In the context of discussing stay and
abeyance procedures, we observed:
“[N]ot all petitioners have an incentive
to obtain federal relief as quickly as possible. In particular,
capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics
to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence
of death. Without time limits [on stays], petitioners could
frustrate AEDPA’s goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely
their federal ha-beas review.”
Id., at 277–278.
The same principle obtains in the context of
competency-based stays. At some point, the State must be allowed to
defend its judgment of conviction.[
18]
If a district court concludes that the
petitioner’s claim could substantially benefit from the
petitioner’s assistance, the district court should take into
account the likelihood that the petitioner will regain competence
in the foreseeable future. Where there is no reasonable hope of
competence, a stay is inappropriate and merely frustrates the
State’s attempts to defend its presumptively valid judgment.
IV
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
We vacate the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.