American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. DonovanAnnotate this Case
452 U.S. 490 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan
Argued January 21, 1981
Decided June 17, 1981
452 U.S. 490
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) requires the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), in promulgating occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, to set the standard "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence" that no employee will suffer material impairment of health. Section 3(8) of the Act defines the term "occupational safety and health standard" as meaning a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment. Section 6(f) of the Act provides that the Secretary's determinations "shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." The Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), promulgated the so-called Cotton Dust Standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust (an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products), exposure to which induces byssinosis, a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease known in its more severe manifestations as "brown lung" disease. Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12, suffer from the most disabling form of byssinosis, and 100,000 employed and retired workers suffer from some form of the disease. The Standard sets permissible exposure levels to cotton dust for the different operations in the cotton industry. Implementation of the Standard depends primarily on a mix of engineering controls, such as installation of ventilation systems, and work practice controls, such as special floor-sweeping procedures. During the 4-year interim period permitted for full compliance with the Standard, employers are required to provide respirators to employees and to transfer employees
unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, having a dust level that meets the Standard's permissible exposure limit, with no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits. OSHA estimated the total industrywide cost of compliance as $656.5 million. Petitioners, representing the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the Standard in the Court of Appeals, contending, inter alia, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that the Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard, that OSHA's determination of the Standard's "economic feasibility" was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the wage guarantee requirement was beyond OSHA's authority. The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major respects. It held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits; that Congress itself balanced the costs and benefits in its mandate to OSHA under § 6(b)(5) to adopt the most protective feasible standard; and that OSHA's determination of economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The court also held that OSHA had authority to require employers to guarantee employees' wage and employment benefits following transfer because of inability to wear a respirator.
1. Cost-benefit analysis by OSHA in promulgating a standard under 6(b)(5) is not required by the Act because feasibility analysis is. Pp. 452 U. S. 506-522.
(a) The plain meaning of the word "feasible" is "capable of being done," and, thus, § 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that most adequately assures that no employee will suffer material impairment of health, limited only by the extent to which this is "capable of being done." In effect then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits by placing the "benefit" of the worker's health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5). Pp. 452 U. S. 508-512.
(b) Section 3(8), either alone or in tandem with § 6(b)(5), does not incorporate a cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Even if the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" in § 3(8) might be construed to contemplate some balancing of costs and benefits, Congress specifically chose in § 6(b)(5) to impose separate and additional requirements for issuance of standards dealing with such materials and agents: it required that those standards be issued to prevent material health impairment
to the extent feasible. To interpret § 3(8) as imposing an additional and overriding cost-benefit analysis requirement on the issuance of § 6(b)(5) standards would eviscerate § 6(b)(5)'s "to the extent feasible" requirement. Pp. 452 U. S. 512-513.
(c) The Act's legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress itself, in § 6(b)(5), balanced the costs and benefits. There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a "toxic material" or "harmful physical agent" standard. Rather, not only does the history confirm that Congress meant "feasible," rather than "cost-benefit," when it used the former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and healthful working environment. Pp. 452 U. S. 514-522.
2. Whether or not, in the first instance, this Court would find OSHA's findings supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the whole record, "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test when it upheld such findings. Pp. 452 U. S. 522-536.
3. Whether or not OSHA has the underlying authority to promulgate a wage guarantee requirement with respect to employees who are transferred to another position when they are unable to wear a respirator, OSHA failed to make the necessary determination or statement of reasons that this requirement was related to achievement of health and safety goals. Pp. 452 U. S. 536-540.
199 U.S. App.D.C. 54, 617 F.2d 636, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
BRENNAN, .J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post p 452 U. S. 541. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 452 U. S. 543. POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the cases.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. . . ." § 2(b), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(a), (b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA,) [Footnote 1] promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "constellation of respiratory effects" known as "byssinosis." 43 Fed.Reg. 27352, col. 3 (1978). This disease was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the Act. S.Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, p. 143 (Comm. Print 1971) (Leg.Hist.).
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry, [Footnote 2] challenged the validity of the "Cotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 65(f). They contend in this Court, as they did below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations, [Footnote 3] counter that Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require
OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 617 F.2d 636 (1979). We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 817 (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but not decided in last Term's Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute,448 U. S. 607 (1980), [Footnote 4] and to decide other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard. [Footnote 5]
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as "brown lung" disease, is a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust. [Footnote 6] See 43 Fed.Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit
6-16, App. 15-22. [Footnote 7] Byssinosis is a "continuum . . . disease," 43 Fed.Reg. 27354, col. 2 (1978), that has been categorized into four grades. [Footnote 8] In its least serious form, byssinosis produces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness, shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective indications of loss of pulmonary functions. Id. at 27352, col. 2. In its most serious form, byssinosis is a chronic and irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely disabling. Ibid. At worst, as is true of other respiratory diseases, including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssinosis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions and can contribute to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 6-73, App. 72 ("there is an association between mortality and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has described the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows:
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust], symptoms occur on Monday, or other days after absence
from the work environment; later, symptoms occur on other days of the week; and eventually, symptoms are continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure."
A. Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-16, App. 15. [Footnote 9]
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling grades, it is likely that prolonged exposure contributes to the progression. 43 Fed.Reg. 27354, cols. 1 and 2 (1978); Exhibit
6-27, App. 25; Exhibit 11, App. 152. It also appears that a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, App.192. [Footnote 10]
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such workers, suffer from the most disabling form of byssinosis. [Footnote 11] 43 Fed.Reg. 27353, col. 3 (1978); Exhibit 124, App. 347. The Senate Report accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 active and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease. S.Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Leg.Hist. 143. One study found that over 25% of a sample of active cotton preparation and yarn manufacturing workers suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43 Fed.Reg. 27355, col. 3 (1978); Exhibit 6-51, App. 44. [Footnote 12] Other studies confirm these general findings on the prevalence of byssinosis. See, e.g., Ct. of App. J.A. 3683; Ex. 6-56, id. at 376-385.
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the United States as a distinct occupational hazard associated with cotton mills. S.Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Leg.Hist.
142 [Footnote 13] In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust [Footnote 14] be limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter of air (1,000
Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.