Petitioner brought a class action on behalf of herself and all
persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids
manufactured by respondents, alleging that, because of antitrust
violations committed by respondents, she and the class she seeks to
represent have been forced to pay illegally fixed higher prices for
the hearing aids and related services they purchased from
respondents' retail dealers. Treble damages were sought under § 4
of the Clayton Act, which provides that "[a]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws" may bring suit and recover treble damages.
Respondents moved to dismiss the damages claim on the ground that
petitioner had not been injured in her "business or property"
within the meaning of § 4. The District Court held that, under § 4,
a retail purchaser is injured in "property" if it can be shown that
antitrust violations caused an increase in the price paid for the
article purchased; however, it certified the question to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retail
purchasers of consumer goods and services who allege no injury of a
commercial or business nature are not injured in their "business or
property" within the meaning of § 4, and that the phrase "business
or property" was intended to limit standing to those engaged in
commercial ventures.
Held: Consumers who pay a higher price for goods
purchased for personal use as a result of antitrust violations
sustain an injury in their "property" within the meaning of § 4.
Pp.
442 U. S.
337-345.
(a) Statutory construction must begin with the language employed
by Congress. The word "property" has a naturally broad and
inclusive meaning comprehending, in common usage, anything of
material value owned or possessed. Congress' use of the disjunctive
"or" in the phrase "business or property" indicates "business" was
not intended to modify "property," nor was "property" intended to
modify "business." Giving the word "property" the independent
significance to which it is entitled in this context does not
destroy the restrictive significance of the phrase "business or
property" as a whole. Pp.
442 U. S.
337-339.
(b) Monetary injury, standing alone, may be injury in one's
"property" within the meaning of § 4.
Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works
Page 442 U. S. 331
v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390.
Thus, the fact that petitioner was deprived of only money is no
reason to conclude that she did not sustain a "property" injury.
Pp.
442 U. S.
339-340.
(c) Nor does petitioner's status as a "consumer" who purchased
goods at retail for personal use change the nature of the injury
she suffered or the intrinsic meaning of "property" in § 4. Pp.
442 U. S.
340-342.
(d) The legislative history reflects that the treble damages
remedy was designed to protect consumers, and that no one
questioned the right of consumers to sue under § 4. Thus, to the
extent that § 4's legislative history is relevant, it also supports
the conclusion that a consumer deprived of money by reason of
anticompetitive conduct is injured in "property" within the meaning
of § 4. Pp.
442 U. S.
342-344.
(e) The fact that allowing class actions such as this may add a
significant burden to the federal courts' already overcrowded
dockets is an important, but not a controlling, consideration,
since Congress created the § 4 treble damages remedy precisely for
the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust
violations. P.
442 U. S.
344.
(f) Respondents' arguments that the cost of defending consumer
class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small
businesses in particular, and will ultimately be paid by consumers,
are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress than
to this Court; in any event, they cannot govern the reading of the
plain language of § 4. Pp.
442 U. S. 344-345.
579 F.2d 1077, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except BRENNAN, J., who took no part in the
decision of the case. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
442 U. S.
345.
Page 442 U. S. 334
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether consumers who pay a
higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of
antitrust violations sustain an injury in their "business or
property" within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
731, 15 U.S. C § 15.
Page 442 U. S. 335
I
Petitioner brought a class action on behalf of herself and all
persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids
manufactured by five corporations, respondents here. Her complaint
alleges that respondents have committed a variety of antitrust
violations, including vertical and horizontal price fixing.
[
Footnote 1] Because of these
violations, the complaint alleges, petitioner and the class of
persons she seeks to represent have been forced to pay illegally
fixed higher prices for the hearing aids and related services they
purchased from respondents' retail dealers. Treble damages and
injunctive relief are sought under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 731, 737, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint or summary
judgment in the District Court. Among other things, respondents
argued that Reiter, as a retail purchaser of hearing aids for
personal use, lacked standing to sue for treble damages under § 4
of the Clayton Act because she had not been injured in her
"business or property" within the meaning of the Act.
The District Court held that, under § 4, a retail purchaser is
injured in "property" if the purchaser can show that antitrust
violations caused an increase in the price paid for the article
purchased. The District Court relied on
Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390,
203 U. S. 396
(1906), and the legislative history of the Clayton Act set forth in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.
S. 477,
Page 442 U. S. 336
429 U. S. 486
n. 10 (1977), indicating that Congress intended to give a § 4
remedy to consumers.
435 F.
Supp. 933, 935-938 (Minn. 1977).
The District Court determined, however, that the respondents had
raised a "controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion,"
id. at 938,
and accordingly certified the question for interlocutory review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). It then stayed further proceedings in
the case and declined to express any opinion on the merits of the
other issues raised by respondents' motions or on the
certifiability of the class.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retail purchasers of
consumer goods and services who allege no injury of a commercial or
business nature are not injured in their "business or property"
within the meaning of § 4. 579 F.2d 1077 (CA8 1978). Noting the
absence of any holdings on this precise issue by this Court or
other courts of appeals, the court reasoned that the phrase
"business or property" was intended to limit standing to those
engaged in commercial ventures. It relied on the legislative
history and this Court's statement in
Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U. S. 251,
405 U. S. 264
(1972), that "business or property" referred to "commercial
interests or enterprises." A contrary holding, the Court of Appeals
observed, would add a substantial volume of litigation to the
already strained dockets of the federal courts, and could be used
to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses. Small and
medium-sized retailers would be especially hard hit by "gigantic
consumer class actions," and granting standing to retail consumers
might actually have an anticompetitive impact as a consequence.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals thought
"it sensible as a matter of policy and compelled as a matter of
law that consumers alleging no injury of a commercial or
competitive nature are not injured in their property under section
4 of the Clayton Act."
579 F.2d at 1087.
Page 442 U. S. 337
We granted certiorari, 439 U.S. 1065 (1979). [
Footnote 2] We reverse. [
Footnote 3]
II
As is true in every case involving the construction of a
statute, our starting point must be the language employed by
Congress. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, provides:
"
Any person who shall be injured in his business
or
property by reason of
anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
15 U.S.C. § 15 (emphasis added).
On its face, § 4 contains little in the way of restrictive
language. In
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U. S. 308
(1978), we remarked:
"'The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting
all who are made victims of the forbidden practices
Page 442 U. S. 338
by whomever they may be perpetrated.'
Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S.
219,
334 U. S. 236;
cf. Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S.
134,
392 U. S. 138-139. And the
legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress
used the phrase 'any person' intending it to have its naturally
broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the floor
debates of any more restrictive definition."
Id. at
434 U. S.
312.
Similarly here, the word "property" has a naturally broad and
inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common
usage "property" comprehends anything of material value owned or
possessed.
See, e.g., Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1818 (1961). Money, of course, is a form of
property.
Respondents protest that, if the reference to "property" in § 4
means "money," the term "business" then becomes superfluous, for
every injury in one's business necessarily involves a pecuniary
injury. They argue that, if Congress wished to permit one who lost
only money to bring suit under § 4, it would not have used the
restrictive phrase "business or property"; rather, it would have
employed more generic language akin to that of § 16, for example,
which provides for injunctive relief against any "threatened loss
or damage." 15 U.S.C. § 26. Congress plainly intended to exclude
some category of injury in choosing the phrase "business or
property" for § 4. Only a "commercial interest" gloss, they argue,
both gives the phrase the restrictive significance intended for it
and, at the same time, gives independent significance to the word
"business" and the word "property." The argument of respondents is
straightforward: the phrase "business or property" means "business
activity or property related to one's business." Brief for
Respondents 11 n. 7.
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive
"or" and rob the term "property" of its independent
Page 442 U. S. 339
and ordinary significance; moreover, it would convert the noun
"business" into an adjective. In construing a statute, we are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.
S. 528,
348 U. S.
538-539 (1955). Canons of construction ordinarily
suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not.
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.
S. 726,
438 U. S.
739-740 (1978). Congress' use of the word "or" makes
plain that "business" was not intended to modify "property," nor
was "property" intended to modify "business."
When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money, it suffers
an injury in both its "business" and its "property." But neither
term is rendered redundant by recognizing that a consumer not
engaged in a "business" enterprise, but rather acquiring goods or
services for personal use, is injured in "property" when the price
of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of
the anticompetitive conduct complained of. The phrase "business or
property" also retains restrictive significance. It would, for
example, exclude personal injuries suffered.
E.g., Hamman v.
United States, 267 F.
Supp. 420, 432 (Mont.1967). Congress must have intended to
exclude some class of injuries by the phrase "business or
property." But it taxes the ordinary meaning of common terms to
argue, as respondents do, that a consumer's monetary injury arising
directly out of a retail purchase is not comprehended by the
natural and usual meaning of the phrase "business or property." We
simply give the word "property" the independent significance to
which it is entitled in this context. A consumer whose money has
been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been
injured "in his . . . property" within the meaning of § 4.
Indeed, this Court indicated as much in
Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390
(1960). There the city alleged that the anticompetitive conduct of
the defendants
Page 442 U. S. 340
had caused the city to pay more for water pipes purchased for
use in the city's water system. The defendants answered that the
pecuniary injury resulting from the alleged overcharges did not
injure the city in its "business or property" within the meaning of
§ 4. This Court, without relying on the fact that the city was
engaged in a business enterprise, stated:
"The city was . . . injured in its property, at least, if not in
its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the
worth of the pipe. A person whose property is diminished by a
payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in its
property."
203 U.S. at
203 U. S. 396.
The holding of
Chattanooga Foundry could well have been
grounded on the undisputed fact that the city was engaged in the
commercial enterprise of supplying water for a charge and,
therefore, engaged in a business. It was not uncommon for both
municipalities and private companies to own and operate competing
waterworks at the turn of the century. In operating a municipal
public utility, the city was in a real sense engaged in the
"business of furnishing water" when it purchased the pipe to carry
water for the city's reservoirs to its customers.
Ibid.
Yet the Court's holding in
Chattanooga Foundry was
deliberately grounded on the premise that the city had been injured
in its "property" -- independent of any injury it had sustained in
its "business of furnishing water" -- because the defendants'
antitrust violation caused it to pay a higher price for the pipe
than it otherwise would have paid.
Ibid. Chattanooga
Foundry therefore establishes that monetary injury, standing
alone, may be injury in one's "property" within the meaning of § 4.
Thus, the fact that petitioner Reiter was deprived of only money,
albeit a modest amount, is no reason to conclude that she did not
sustain a "property" injury.
Nor does her status as a "consumer" change the nature of
Page 442 U. S. 341
the injury she suffered or the intrinsic meaning of "property"
in § 4. That consumers of retail goods and services have standing
to sue under § 4 is implicit in our decision in
Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773,
421 U. S. 780,
782 (1975). There we held that a bar association was subject to a
treble damages suit brought under § 4 by persons who sought legal
services in connection with the purchase of a residence.
Furthermore, we have often referred to "consumers" as parties
entitled to seek damages under § 4 without intimating that
consumers of goods and services purchased for personal, rather than
commercial, use were in any way foreclosed by the statutory
language from asserting an injury in their "property."
E.g.,
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. at
434 U. S.
313-315;
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 486
n. 10;
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
392 U. S. 481,
392 U. S. 494
(1968);
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U. S. 219,
334 U. S. 236
(1948).
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.
S. 251 (1972), is not to the contrary. There we held
that injury to a state's total economy, for which the state sought
redress in its
parens patriae capacity, was not cognizable
under § 4. It is true we noted that the words "business or
property" refer to "commercial interests or enterprises," and
reasoned that Hawaii could not recover on its claim for damage done
to its "general economy" because such injury did not harm Hawaii's
"commercial interests." 405 U.S. at
405 U. S.
264.
However, the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed
as though we were dealing with language of a statute. Use of the
phrase "commercial interests or enterprises," read in context, in
no sense suggests that only injuries to a business entity are
within the ambit of § 4. Respondents ignore the Court's careful use
of the disjunctive and the naturally broad meaning of the term
"interests" in
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., supra. The
phrase "commercial interests" was used there as a generic reference
to the interests of the
Page 442 U. S. 342
State of Hawaii as a party to a commercial transaction. This is
apparent from Hawaii's explicit reaffirmance of the rule of
Chattanooga Foundry and statement that, here, injury to a
state "occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace"
through a "payment of money wrongfully induced," treble damages are
recoverable by a state under the Clayton Act.
Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., supra, at
405 U. S. 263
n. 14. A central premise of our holding in
Hawaii was
concern over duplicative recoveries. We noted that a "large and
ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the
general
economy'" for which the State sued was "no more than a reflection
of injuries to the `business or property' of consumers" for which,
on a proper showing, they could recover in their own right. 405
U.S. at 405 U. S.
263-264.
Consumers in the United States purchase at retail more than $1.2
trillion in goods and services annually. 1978 Economic Report of
the President 257 (Table B-1). It is in the sound commercial
interests of the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain
the lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive
private enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to
ensure fair price competition in an open market. Here, where
petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the
price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially inflated by
reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an
injury in her "property" under § 4.
Nothing in the legislative history of § 4 conflicts with our
holding today. Many courts and commentators have observed that the
respective legislative histories of § 4 of the Clayton Act and § 7
of the Sherman Act, its predecessor, shed no light on Congress'
original understanding of the terms "business or property."
[
Footnote 4] Nowhere in the
legislative record
Page 442 U. S. 343
is specific reference made to the intended scope of those terms.
Respondents engage in speculation in arguing that the substitution
of the terms "business or property" for the broader language
originally proposed by Senator Sherman [
Footnote 5] was clearly intended to exclude pecuniary
injuries suffered by those who purchase goods and services at
retail for personal use. None of the subsequent floor debates
reflect any such intent. On the contrary, they suggest that
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare
prescription." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 (1978). Certainly
the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the treble
damages remedy of what is now § 4 as a means of protecting
consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing.
E.g., 21 Cong.Rec. 2457, 2460, 2558 (1890). Because
Congress, in 1890, rejected a proposal to allow a group of
consumers to bring a collective action as a class, some legislators
questioned whether individual consumers would be willing to bring
actions for relatively small amounts.
See, e.g., id. at
1767-1768, 569, 2612, 3147-3148, 3150. At no time, however, was the
right of a consumer to bring an action for damages questioned.
[
Footnote 6]
In
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., supra,
after examining the legislative history of § 4, we described the
Sherman Act as "conceived of primarily as a remedy for [t]he people
of the United States as individuals,' especially consumers," and
the treble damages provision of the Clayton Act as
"conceived primarily as 'open[ing] the door of justice
Page 442 U. S. 344
to every man . . . and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages
for the wrong suffered.'"
429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 486
n. 10. Thus, to the extent that the legislative history is
relevant, it supports our holding that a consumer deprived of money
by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in
"property" within the meaning of § 4. [
Footnote 7]
Respondents also argue that allowing class actions to be brought
by retail consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant
burden to the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. That
may well be true, but cannot be a controlling consideration here.
We must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble
damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging
private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits
provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available
to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and
deterring violations. Indeed, nearly 20 times as many private
antitrust actions are currently pending in the federal courts as
actions filed by the Department of Justice. Administrative Office
of the United States Courts Ann.Rep. 101, Table 28 (1978). To be
sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the
federal courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to
provide the judicial resources necessary to execute its
mandates.
Finally, respondents argue that the cost of defending consumer
class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small
businesses in particular, and will ultimately be paid by
Page 442 U. S. 345
consumers in any event. These are not unimportant
considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly
addressed to Congress than to this Court. However accurate
respondents' arguments may prove to be -- and they are not without
substance -- they cannot govern our reading of the plain language
in § 4.
District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous
claims brought to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad
power and discretion vested in them by Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 with
respect to matters involving the certification and management of
potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions.
See
generally Durham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical
Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978
B.Y.U.L.Rev. 299. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory
language "business or property" need not result in administrative
chaos, class action harassment, or "windfall" settlements if the
district courts exercise sound discretion and use the tools
available.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the decision of this
case.
[
Footnote 1]
Specifically, Reiter alleges that respondents violated §§ 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and
2, and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 14. She
claims respondents restricted the territories, customers, and
brands of hearing aids offered by their retail dealers, used the
customer lists of their retail dealers for their own purposes,
prohibited unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing
their hearing aids, and conspired among themselves and with their
retail dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids.
[
Footnote 2]
Differing views on this issue have been expressed by various
courts.
See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077
(CA8 1978) (case below);
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture
Industries, 552 F.2d 90, 98-99, and n. 23 (CA3),
cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977);
Cleary v. Chalk, 159
U.S.App.D.C. 415, 419 n. 17, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 n. 17 (1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974);
Theophil v.
Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F.
Supp. 131 (EDNY 1978);
Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1221 (ND Cal.1977),
appeal docketed, No. 77-1725
(CA9).
[
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals expressly noted that Reiter's claim for
injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act was not before it
on interlocutory appeal. 579 F.2d at 1087, n.19. The court
therefore expressed no view as to Reiter's standing to raise this
claim. It also expressly refused to decide whether Reiter's claim
for treble damages under § 4 was barred by the direct purchaser
rule of
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.
S. 720 (1977). 579 F.2d at 1079 n. 3. Accordingly, these
issues are not before us.
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.
S. 251,
405 U. S. 261
(1972);
Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 426
F Supp. 880, 882-883 (N.D.Cal.1977),
appeal docketed, No.
77-1547 (CA9); M. Forkosch, Antitrust and the Consumer 2-3 (1956);
Comment, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 237, 242-243, 249-252 (1979).
See also 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law � 106, pp. 14-16 (1978).
[
Footnote 5]
As originally introduced, the bill that ultimately became the
Sherman Act authorized "any person or corporation injured or
damnified by [an unlawful] arrangement, contract, agreement, trust,
or combination" to sue for damages thereby sustained. S. 1, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1889).
[
Footnote 6]
Of course, the treble damages remedy of § 4 took on new
practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 23.
[
Footnote 7]
Although in no sense a controlling consideration, we note that
our holding is consistent with the assumption on which Congress
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
90 Stat. 1394, 15 U.S.C. § 15c
et seq. The text and
legislative history of this statute make clear that, in 1976,
Congress believed that consumers have a cause of action under § 4,
which the statute authorizes the states to assert in a
parens
patriae capacity.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(a)(1),
15c(a)(1)(b)(ii), 15c(b)(2); H.R.Rep. No. 94-499, pp. 6, 9 (1975).
See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at
411 U. S. 734
n. 14.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, and write separately only to point
out that the concern expressed by the Court of Appeals that an
interpretation of "business or property" in the manner in which the
Court interprets it today would
"add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained
dockets of the federal courts, and could be used to exact unfair
settlements from retail businesses,"
ante at
442 U. S. 336,
is by no means an unfounded one. And pronouncements from this Court
exhorting district courts to be "especially alert to identify
frivolous
Page 442 U. S. 346
claims brought to extort nuisance settlements" will not be a
complete solution for those courts which are actually on the firing
line in this type of litigation.
Ante at
442 U. S. 345.
But I fully agree that we must take the statute as Congress wrote
it, and I also fully agree with the Court's construction of the
phrase "business or property." I think that the Court's
observation,
ante at
442 U. S. 343
n. 6, that "the treble damages remedy of § 4 took on new practical
significance for consumers with the advent of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
23" is a miracle of understatement; and in the absence of any
jurisdictional limit, there is considerable doubt in my mind
whether this type of action is indeed ultimately of primary benefit
to consumers themselves, who may recover virtually no monetary
damages, as opposed to the attorneys for the class, who stand to
obtain handsome rewards for their services. Be that as it may, the
problem, if there is one, is for Congress, and not for the
courts.