Upon trial in a Kentucky state court, respondent was convicted
of several offenses. The trial court refused to give respondent's
requested jury instruction on the presumption of innocence, but did
give an instruction to the effect that the jury could return a
guilty verdict only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that
respondent had committed the acts charged with the requisite
criminal intent. Relying on its understanding of
Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478 --
where this Court reversed a conviction resulting from a trial in
which the judge had refused to give a requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence -- the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
such an instruction is constitutionally required in all criminal
trials, and that the failure of a trial judge to give it cannot be
harmless error.
Held: The Kentucky Supreme Court erred in interpreting
Taylor, supra, as holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely requires that an instruction on
the presumption of innocence must be given in every criminal case.
The failure to give such an instruction when requested does not, in
and of itself, violate the Constitution. Under
Taylor,
such a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the
circumstances -- including all the instructions, the arguments of
counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and
other relevant factors -- to determine whether the defendant
received a constitutionally fair trial.
570
S.W.2d 627, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.
S. 478 (1978), this Court reversed a criminal conviction
resulting from a trial in which the judge had refused to give a
requested jury instruction on
Page 441 U. S. 787
the presumption of innocence. Relying on its understanding of
that decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court in the present case held
that such an instruction is constitutionally required in all
criminal trials, and that the failure of a trial judge to give it
cannot be harmless error.
570
S.W.2d 627. We granted certiorari to consider whether the
Kentucky Supreme Court correctly interpreted our holding in
Taylor. 439 U.S. 1067.
I
The respondent was charged in three separate indictments with
the commission of several armed robberies. At trial, numerous
eyewitnesses identified the respondent as the perpetrator. Weapons,
stolen money, and other incriminating evidence found in the
respondent's automobile were introduced in evidence. The respondent
did not take the stand in his own defense. The only evidence on his
behalf was given by his wife and sister, who offered alibi
testimony concerning his whereabouts during the time of the
commission of one of the robberies.
The respondent's counsel requested that the jury be instructed
on the presumption of innocence. [
Footnote 1] This instruction was refused by the trial
judge. An instruction was given, however, to the effect that the
jury could return a verdict of guilty only if they found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the respondent had committed the acts charged
in the indictment with the requisite criminal intent.
Page 441 U. S. 788
The jury found the respondent guilty of 10 counts of
first-degree robbery, 2 counts of first-degree wanton endangerment,
and 2 counts of first-degree attempted robbery. The respondent was
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 230
years.
On appeal, the respondent argued that he had been denied due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason
of the trial judge's refusal to give an instruction on the
presumption of innocence. A divided Kentucky Supreme Court agreed,
interpreting this Court's decision in
Taylor "to mean
that, when an instruction on the presumption of innocence is asked
for and denied, there is a reversible error." 570 S.W.2d at 633.
[
Footnote 2]
Two justices filed separate dissenting opinions. In their view,
the
Taylor case should be understood as dealing with the
factual situation there presented, and not as establishing a
constitutional rule that failure to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence requires automatic reversal of a
conviction. Since these justices concluded that the respondent
received a fair trial, they would have affirmed the
convictions.
II
While this Court in
Taylor reversed a conviction
resulting from a trial in which the judge had refused to give a
requested instruction on the presumption of innocence, the Court
did not there fashion a new rule of constitutional law requiring
that such an instruction be given in every criminal case. Rather,
the Court's opinion focused on the failure to give the instruction
as it related to the overall fairness of the trial considered in
its entirety.
The Court observed, for example, that the trial judge's
instructions were "Spartan," 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 486,
that the prosecutor improperly referred to the indictment and
otherwise
Page 441 U. S. 789
made remarks of dubious propriety,
id. at
436 U. S.
486-488, and that the evidence against the defendant was
weak.
Id. at
436 U. S.
488.
"[T]he combination of the skeletal instructions, the possible
harmful inferences from the references to the indictment, and the
repeated suggestions that petitioner's status as a defendant tended
to establish his guilt created a genuine danger that the jury would
convict petitioner on the basis of those extraneous considerations,
rather than on the evidence introduced at trial."
Id. at
436 U. S.
487-488.
It was under these circumstances that the Court held that the
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the presumption
of innocence denied the defendant due process of law. Indeed, the
Court's holding was expressly limited to the facts:
"We hold that,
on the facts of this case, the trial
court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a
fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at
436 U. S. 490
(emphasis added). This explicitly limited holding, and the Court's
detailed discussion of the circumstances of the defendant's trial,
belie any intention to create a rule that an instruction on the
presumption of innocence is constitutionally required in every
case.
In short, the failure to give a requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence does not, in and of itself, violate the
Constitution. Under
Taylor, such a failure must be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances --
including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of
counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and
other relevant factors -- to determine whether the defendant
received a constitutionally fair trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court thus erred in interpreting
Taylor to hold that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment absolutely requires that an instruction on the
presumption of innocence must be given in every criminal
Page 441 U. S. 790
case. The court's inquiry should have been directed to a
determination of whether the failure to give such an instruction in
the present case deprived the respondent of due process of law in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The respondent's lawyer made a timely request that the following
instruction be given:
"The law presumes an accused to be innocent of crime. He begins
the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence against him. And the
law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before the jury to
be considered in support of any charge against the accused. So the
presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit an accused
unless the jury members are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
the accused's guilt from all the evidence in the case."
[
Footnote 2]
The wanton endangerment convictions were reversed on state law
grounds not relevant here.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
No principle is more firmly established in our system of
criminal justice than the presumption of innocence that is accorded
to the defendant in every criminal trial. In
In re
Winship, 397 U. S. 358, the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt. I
believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
equally requires the presumption that a defendant is innocent until
he has been proved guilty.
Almost 85 years ago, the Court said:
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.
S. 432,
156 U. S. 453.
Only three years ago, the Court reaffirmed that the presumption of
innocence "is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice."
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.
S. 501,
425 U. S. 503.
See also Cool v. United States, 409 U.
S. 100,
409 U. S. 104.
And a fair trial, after all, is what the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment above all else guarantees.
While an instruction on the presumption of innocence, in one
sense, only serves to remind the jury that the prosecutor has the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it also has
Page 441 U. S. 791
a separate and distinct function. Quite apart from
considerations of the burden of proof, the presumption of
innocence
"cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the
suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the
arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal
evidence adduced."
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence ยง 2511, p. 407 (3d ed.1940). And because
every defendant, regardless of the totality of the circumstances,
is entitled to have his guilt determined only on the basis of the
evidence properly introduced against him at trial, I would hold
that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is
constitutionally required in every case where a timely request has
been made. [
Footnote 2/1]
There may be cases where the failure to give such an instruction
could not have affected the outcome of the trial. If that
conclusion can be drawn beyond a reasonable doubt, failure to give
the instruction would be harmless error.
Cf. Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18;
Harrington v. California, 395 U.
S. 250. Since the Kentucky Supreme Court did not
consider this possibility, I would vacate its judgment and remand
the case to that court, but only for consideration of whether the
failure to give the instruction in the circumstances presented here
was harmless error. [
Footnote
2/2]
[
Footnote 2/1]
At least one Member of the Court understood our opinion in
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, to
hold precisely that.
See id. at
436 U. S. 490
(BRENNAN, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 2/2]
On remand, the Kentucky court would, of course, be free to hold,
as a matter of state law, that it would not consider the question
of harmless error in this context.
See Watson v.
Commonwealth, 579 S.W.2d 103 (Ky.).