In actions by public school students under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against school officials, wherein the students were found to have
been suspended from school without procedural due process, the
students, absent proof of actual injury, are entitled to recover
only nominal damages. Pp.
435 U. S.
253-267.
(a) The basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate
persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
rights. Pp.
435 U. S.
254-257.
(b) To further the purpose of § 1983, the rules governing
compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected
by the particular right in question, just as the common law rules
of damages were defined by the interests protected in the various
branches of tort law. Pp.
435 U. S.
257-259.
(c) Mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of
procedural due process cannot be presumed to occur, as in the case
of presumed damages in the common law of defamation
per
se, but, although such distress is compensable, neither the
likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so
great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof
that such injury actually was caused. Pp.
435 U. S.
259-264.
(d) The issues of what elements and prerequisites for recovery
of damages are appropriate to compensate for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights must be considered with
reference to the nature of the interests protected by the
particular right in question. Therefore, cases dealing with awards
of damages for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
rights other than the right to procedural due process, are not
controlling in this case. Pp.
435 U. S.
264-265.
(e) Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in
the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's
substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized
society that procedural due process be observed, the denial of
procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury, and therefore, if it is determined
that the suspensions of the students in
Page 435 U. S. 248
this case were justified, they nevertheless will be entitled to
recover nominal damages. Pp.
435 U. S.
266-267.
545 F.2d 30, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined. MARSHALL, J., concurred in the result. BLACKMUN, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we consider the
elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages by students who
were suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without
procedural due process. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the students are entitled to recover substantial
nonpunitive damages even if their suspensions were justified, and
even if they do not prove that any other actual injury was caused
by the denial of procedural due process. We disagree, and hold
that, in the absence of proof of actual injury, the students are
entitled to recover only nominal damages.
I
Respondent Jarius Piphus was a freshman at Chicago Vocational
High School during the 1973-1974 school year. On January 23, 1974,
during school hours, the school principal saw Piphus and another
student standing outdoors on school property passing back and forth
what the principal described as an irregularly shaped cigarette.
The principal approached the students unnoticed and smelled what he
believed was the
Page 435 U. S. 249
strong odor of burning marihuana. He also saw Piphus try to pass
a packet of cigarette papers to the other student. When the
students became aware of the principal's presence, they threw the
cigarette into a nearby hedge.
The principal took the students to the school's disciplinary
office and directed the assistant principal to impose the "usual"
20-day suspension for violation of the school rule against the use
of drugs. [
Footnote 1] The
students protested that they had not been smoking marihuana, but to
no avail. Piphus was allowed to remain at school, although not in
class, for the remainder of the school day while the assistant
principal tried, without success, to reach his mother.
A suspension notice was sent to Piphus' mother, and, a few days
later, two meetings were arranged among Piphus, his mother, his
sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid
clinic. The purpose of the meetings was not to determine whether
Piphus had been smoking marihuana, but rather to explain the
reasons for the suspension. Following an unfruitful exchange of
views, Piphus and his mother, as guardian
ad litem, filed
suit against petitioners in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and its jurisdictional
Page 435 U. S. 250
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, charging that Piphus had been
suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
together with actual and punitive damages in the amount Of $3,000.
[
Footnote 2] Piphus was
readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order after
eight days of his suspension.
Respondent Silas Brisco was in the sixth grade at Clara Barton
Elementary School in Chicago during the 1973-1974 school year. On
September 11, 1973, Brisco came to school wearing one small
earring. The previous school year, the school principal had issued
a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students because he
believed that this practice denoted membership in certain street
gangs and increased the likelihood that gang members would
terrorize other students. Brisco was reminded of this rule, but he
refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a symbol of
black pride, not of gang membership.
The assistant principal talked to Brisco's mother, advising her
that her son would be suspended for 20 days if he did not remove
the earring. Brisco's mother supported her son's position, and a
20-day suspension was imposed. Brisco and his mother, as guardian
ad litem, filed suit in Federal District Court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, charging that Brisco had been
suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [
Footnote 3] The
complaint
Page 435 U. S. 251
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, together with actual
and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. [
Footnote 4] Brisco was readmitted to school during
the pendency of proceedings,for a preliminary injunction after 17
days of his suspension.
Piphus' and Brisco's cases were consolidated for trial and
submitted on stipulated records. The District Court held that both
students had been suspended without procedural due process.
[
Footnote 5] It also held that
petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages
under the second branch of
Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308
(1975), because they "should have known that a lengthy suspension
without any adjudicative hearing of any type" would violate
procedural due process. App. to Pet. for Cert. A14. [
Footnote 6] Despite these holdings, the
District Court declined to award damages because:
"Plaintiffs put no evidence in the record to quantify their
Page 435 U. S. 252
damages, and the record is completely devoid of any evidence
which could even form the basis of a speculative inference
measuring the extent of their injuries. Plaintiffs' claims for
damages therefore fail for complete lack of proof."
Ibid.
The court also stated that the students were entitled to
declaratory relief and to deletion of the suspensions from their
school records, but, for reasons that are not apparent, the court
failed to enter an order to that effect. Instead, it simply
dismissed the complaints. No finding was made as to whether
respondents would have been suspended if they had received
procedural due process.
On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded. 545 F.2d 30 (1976). It first held that the District Court
erred in not granting declaratory and injunctive relief. It also
held that the District Court should have considered evidence
submitted by respondents after judgment that tended to prove the
pecuniary value of each day of school that they missed while
suspended. The court said, however, that respondents would not be
entitled to recover damages representing the value of missed school
time if petitioners showed on remand
"that there was just cause for the suspension[s] and that
therefore [respondents] would have been suspended even if a proper
hearing had been held."
Id. at 32.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that even if the District
Court found on remand that respondents' suspensions were justified,
they would be entitled to recover substantial "nonpunitive" damages
simply because they had been denied procedural due process.
Id. at 31. Relying on its earlier
Page 435 U. S. 253
decision in
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No.
515, 523 F.2d 569 (CA7 1975),
cert. denied,
425 U. S. 963
(1976), the court stated that such damages should he awarded "even
if, as in the case at bar, there is no proof of individualized
injury to the plaintiff, such as mental distress. . . ." 545 F.2d
at 31. We granted certiorari to consider whether, in an action
under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a
plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by the
deprivation before he may recover substantial "nonpunitive"
damages. 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
II
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rev.Stat. § 1979, derived from § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
The legislative history of § 1983, elsewhere detailed,
e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S.
172-183 (1961);
id. at
365 U. S.
225-234 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225,
407 U. S.
238-242 (1972), demonstrates that it was intended to
"[create] a species of tort liability" in favor of persons who are
deprived of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured" to them by
the Constitution.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.
S. 409,
424 U. S. 417
(1976).
Petitioners contend that the elements and prerequisites for
recovery of damages under this "species of tort liability" should
parallel those for recovery of damages under the common law of
torts. In particular, they urge that the purpose of an award of
damages under § 1983 should be to compensate
Page 435 U. S. 254
persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights; and, further, that plaintiffs should be
required to prove not only that their rights were violated, but
also that injury was caused by the violation, in order to recover
substantial damages. Unless respondents prove that they actually
were injured by the deprivation of procedural due process,
petitioners argue, they are entitled at most to nominal
damages.
Respondents seem to make two different arguments in support of
the holding below. First, they contend that substantial damages
should be awarded under § 1983 for the deprivation of a
constitutional right whether or not any injury was caused by the
deprivation. This, they say, is appropriate both because
constitutional rights are valuable, in and of themselves, and
because of the need to deter violations of constitutional rights.
Respondents believe that this view reflects accurately that of the
Congress that enacted § 1983. Second, respondents argue that, even
if the purpose of a § 1983 damages award is, as petitioners
contend, primarily to compensate persons for injuries that are
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, every
deprivation of procedural due process may be
presumed to
cause some injury. This presumption, they say, should relieve them
from the necessity of proving that injury actually was caused.
A
Insofar as petitioners contend that the basic purpose of a §
1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, they have the
better of the argument. Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do
not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from
injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by
the interests they protect.
Our legal system's concept of damages reflects this view of
legal rights. "The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo
Page 435 U. S. 255
American law is that of
compensation for the injury
caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty." 2 F. Harper
& F. James, Law of Torts § 25.1, p. 1299 (1956) (emphasis in
original). [
Footnote 7] The
Court implicitly has recognized the applicability of this principle
to actions under § 1983 by stating that damages are available under
that section for actions "found . . . to have been violative of . .
. constitutional rights
and to he caused compensable injury. .
. ."
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 319
(emphasis supplied);
see Codd v. Velger, 429 U.
S. 624,
429 U. S.
630-631 (177) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144,
398 U. S. 232
(1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting);
see also
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.
S. 388,
403 U. S. 397
(1971) (action for damages directly under Fourth Amendment);
id. at
403 U. S.
408-409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). The lower
federal courts appear generally to agree that damages awards under
§ 1983 should be determined by the compensation principle.
[
Footnote 8]
The Members of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did not address
directly the question of damages, but the principle that damages
are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the
deprivation of rights hardly could have been foreign to the many
lawyers in Congress in 1871. [
Footnote 9] Two other
Page 435 U. S. 256
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 appear to incorporate
this principle, and no reason suggests itself for reading § 1983
differently. [
Footnote 10]
To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983
should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no
evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable
than that inherent in the award of
Page 435 U. S. 257
compensatory damages.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
at
424 U. S. 442
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). [
Footnote 11]
B
It is less difficult to conclude that damages awards under §
1983 should be governed by the principle of compensation than it is
to apply this principle to concrete cases. [
Footnote 12] But over the centuries, the common
law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the
principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries
caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining
the elements of damages
Page 435 U. S. 258
and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the
appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well.
[
Footnote 13]
It is not clear, however, that common law tort rules of damages
will provide a complete solution to the damages issue in every §
1983 case. In some cases, the interests protected by a particular
branch of the common law of torts may parallel closely the
interests protected by a particular constitutional right. In such
cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules of damages
directly to the § 1983 action.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
231-232 (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting). In
other cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional
right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of the
common law of torts.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 196,
and n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring);
id. at
365 U. S.
250-251 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part);
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., supra at
398 U. S. 232
(BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting);
Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 394;
id. at
403 U. S.
408-409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). In those
cases, the task will be the more difficult one of adapting common
law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries
caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.
Although this task of adaptation will be one of some delicacy --
as this case demonstrates -- it must be undertaken. The purpose of
§ 1983 would be defeated if injuries caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights went uncompensated simply because the common
law does not recognize an analogous cause of action.
Cf. Jones
v. Hildebrant, 432 U. S. 183,
432 U. S.
190-191 (1977) (WHITE, J., dissenting);
Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229,
396 U. S. 240
(1969). In order to further
Page 435 U. S. 259
the purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should
be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in
question -- just as the common law rules of damages themselves were
defined by the interests protected in the various branches of tort
law. We agree with Mr. Justice Harlan that
"the experience of judges in dealing with private [tort] claims
supports the conclusion that courts of law are capable of making
the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury
necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of
[constitutional] rights."
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra at
403 U. S. 409
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). With these principles in
mind, we now turn to the problem of compensation in the case at
hand.
C
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."
This Clause "raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a
person's possessions," or liberty, or life.
Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
407 U. S. 81
(1972). Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Thus, in deciding what
process constitutionally is due in various contexts, the Court
repeatedly has emphasized that "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process. .
. ."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319,
424 U. S. 344
(1976). [
Footnote 14] Such
rules "minimize
Page 435 U. S. 260
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of" life, liberty,
or property by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a
State proposes to deprive them of protected interests.
Fuentes
v. Shevin, supra at
407 U. S.
81.
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that, if petitioners can
prove on remand that "[respondents] would have been suspended even
if a proper hearing had been held," 545 F.2d at 32, then
respondents will not be entitled to recover damages to compensate
them for injuries caused by the suspensions. The court thought
that, in such a case, the failure to accord procedural due process
could not properly be viewed as the cause of the suspensions.
Ibid.; cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274,
429 U. S.
285-287 (1977);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
429 U. S.
270-271, n. 21 (1977). The court suggested that, in such
circumstances, an award of damages for injuries caused by the
suspensions would constitute a windfall, rather than compensation,
to respondents. 545 F.2d at 32, citing
Hostrop v. Board of
Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d at 579;
cf. Mt.
Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, supra, at
429 U. S.
285-286. We do not understand the parties to disagree
with this conclusion. Nor do we. [
Footnote 15]
The parties do disagree as to the further holding of the Court
of Appeals that respondents are entitled to recover substantial --
although unspecified -- damages to compensate them for "the injury
which is
inherent in the nature of the
Page 435 U. S.
261
wrong,'" 545 F.2d at 31, even if their suspensions were
justified and even if they fail to prove that the denial of
procedural due process actually caused them some real, if
intangible, injury. Respondents, elaborating on this theme, submit
that the holding is correct because injury fairly may be "presumed"
to flow from every denial of procedural due process. Their argument
is that, in addition to protecting against unjustified
deprivations, the Due Process Clause also guarantees the "feeling
of just treatment" by the government. Anti-Fascist Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123,
341 U. S. 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). They contend that the
deprivation of protected interests without procedural due process,
even where the premise for the deprivation is not erroneous,
inevitably arouses strong feelings of mental and emotional distress
in the individual who is denied this "feeling of just treatment."
They analogize their case to that of defamation per se, in
which "the plaintiff is relieved from the necessity of producing
any proof whatsoever that he has been injured" in order to recover
substantial compensatory damages. C. McCormick, Law of Damages §
116, p. 423 (1935). [Footnote
16]
Page 435 U. S. 262
Petitioners do not deny that a purpose of procedural due process
is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government has
dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken
deprivations of protected interests. They go so far as to concede
that, in a proper case, persons in respondents' position might well
recover damages for mental and emotional distress caused by the
denial of procedural due process. Petitioners' argument is the more
limited one that such injury cannot be presumed to occur, and that
plaintiffs at least should be put to their proof on the issue, as
plaintiffs are in most tort actions.
We agree with petitioners in this respect. As we have observed
in another context, the doctrine of presumed damages in the common
law of defamation
per se "is an oddity of tort law, for it
allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without
evidence of actual loss."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323,
418 U. S. 349
(1974). The doctrine has been defended on the grounds that those
forms of defamation that are actionable
per se are
virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that
this kind of injury is extremely difficult to prove.
See
id. at
418 U. S. 373,
418 U. S. 376
(WHITE, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 17] Moreover, statements that are defamatory
per se, by their very nature, are likely to cause mental
and emotional distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there
arguably is little reason to require proof of this kind of injury
either. [
Footnote 18]
Page 435 U. S. 263
But these considerations do not support respondents' contention
that damages should be presumed to flow from every deprivation of
procedural due process.
First, it is not reasonable to assume that every departure from
procedural due process, no matter what the circumstances or how
minor, inherently is as likely to cause distress as the publication
of defamation
per se is to cause injury to reputation and
distress. Where the deprivation of a protected interest is
substantively justified but procedures are deficient in some
respect, there may well be those who suffer no distress over the
procedural irregularities. Indeed, in contrast to the immediately
distressing effect of defamation
per se, a person may not
even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists the aid
of counsel to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation.
Moreover, where a deprivation is justified but procedures are
deficient, whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to
the justified deprivation, rather than to deficiencies in
procedure. But as the Court of Appeals held, the injury caused by a
justified deprivation, including distress, is not properly
compensable under § 1983. [
Footnote 19] This ambiguity in causation, which is absent
in the case of defamation
per se, provides additional need
for requiring the plaintiff to convince the trier of fact that he
actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due
process itself.
Finally, we foresee no particular difficulty in producing
evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by
the denial of procedural due process itself. Distress is a personal
injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by
Page 435 U. S. 264
showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect
on the plaintiff. [
Footnote
20] In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused
by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under
§ 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the
difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding
compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was
caused.
D
The Court of Appeals believed, and respondents urge, that cases
dealing with awards of damages for racial discrimination, the
denial of voting rights, and the denial of Fourth Amendment rights
support a presumption of damages where procedural due process is
denied. [
Footnote 21] Many
of the cases relied upon do not help respondents, because they held
or implied that some actual, if intangible, injury must be proved
before compensatory damages may be recovered. Others simply did not
address the issue. [
Footnote
22] More importantly, the elements and
Page 435 U. S. 265
prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate
injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are
not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
deprivation of another. As we have said,
supra at
435 U. S.
258-259, these issues must be considered with reference
to the nature of the interests protected by the particular
constitutional right in question. For this reason, and without
intimating an opinion as to their merits, we do not deem the cases
relied upon to be controlling.
Page 435 U. S. 266
III
Even if respondents' suspensions were justified, and even if
they did not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that
they were deprived of their right to procedural due process.
"It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the
Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at
stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing. . . ."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at
407 U. S. 87;
see Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 632
(STEVENS, J., dissenting);
Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U. S. 413,
237 U. S. 424
(1915).
Common law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of
certain "absolute" rights that are not shown to have caused actual
injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. [
Footnote 23] By making the deprivation of
such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual
injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that
those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it
remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be
awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of
exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious
deprivations of rights.
Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in the
sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's
substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized
society that procedural due process be observed,
see Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
401 U. S. 37
(1971);
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at
171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), we believe that the denial
of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury. [
Footnote 24] We therefore hold that
Page 435 U. S. 267
if, upon remand, the District Court determines that respondents'
suspensions were justified, respondents nevertheless will be
entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar from
petitioners. [
Footnote
25]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It s so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
At the time of the suspensions, the Board of Education's general
rule governing suspensions provided:
"For gross disobedience or misconduct a pupil may be suspended
temporarily by the principal for a period not exceeding one school
month for each offense. Each such suspension shall be reported
immediately to the District Superintendent and also to the parent
or guardian of the pupil, with a full statement of the reasons for
such suspension. The District Superintendent shall have authority
to review the action of the principal and to return the suspended
pupil."
Rule 6-9 of the Rules of the Board of Education of the city of
Chicago (1973), quoted in District Court opinion, App. to Pet. for
Cert. A9. The District Court held that the terms "gross
disobedience" and "misconduct" in this general rule are not
unconstitutionally vague because they were narrowed by the school
principals' issuance of the particular rules allegedly violated
here.
Id. at A9-A10. Rule 6-9 was amended following this
Court's decision in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 (1975).
See App. to Pet. for Cert
A10-A11, n. 3.
[
Footnote 2]
The complaint named as defendants, individually and in their
official capacities, the principal of the school; the General
Superintendent of Schools of the City of Chicago; and the members
of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago.
[
Footnote 3]
Also named as plaintiff in Brisco's suit was People United to
Save Humanity (PUSH), a religious corporation organized under the
laws of Illinois, the membership of which includes parents of
children in the Chicago public schools. The District Court held
that PUSH had standing to maintain this suit, a ruling not
challenged on appeal.
In addition to the procedural due process claim, Brisco's
complaint alleged that enforcement of the "no-earring" rule
violated his right to freedom of expression under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Neither court below passed on this claim,
nor do we.
[
Footnote 4]
The complaint named as defendants, individually and in their
official capacities, the principal of the school; the General
Superintendent of Schools of the city of Chicago; the members of
the Board of Education of the city of Chicago; and the Illinois
Superintendent of Public Instruction. The District Court granted
the latter party's motion to dismiss.
[
Footnote 5]
The District Court read
Goss v. Lopez, supra, as
requiring "more formal procedures" for suspensions of more than 10
days than for suspensions of less than 10 days, and it set forth a
detailed list of procedural requirements.
See App. to Pet.
for Cert. A11-A12. Petitioners have not challenged either the
holding that respondents were denied procedural due process, or the
listing of rights that must be granted.
[
Footnote 6]
Although respondents' suspensions occurred before
Goss v.
Lopez was decided, the District Court thought that petitioners
should have been placed on notice that the suspensions violated
procedural due process by
Linwood v. Board of Ed. of City of
Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (CA7),
cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1027 (1972). Petitioners have not challenged this holding.
The District Court expressly held that petitioners did not lose
their immunity under the first branch of
Wood v. Strickland,
i.e., that they did not act "with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student," 420 U.S. at
420 U. S.
322:
"Here the record is barren of evidence suggesting that any of
the defendants acted maliciously in enforcing disciplinary policies
against the plaintiffs. Undoubtedly defendants believed that they
were protecting the integrity of the educational process."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A13.
[
Footnote 7]
See also D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.1, pp. 135-138
(1973); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 1 (1935); W. Prosser, Law of
Torts § 2, p. 7 (4th ed.1971).
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker,
535 F.2d 823, 829-830, and n. 13 (CA3 1976);
United States ex
rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 590 (CA2 1975);
Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (CA1 1973);
Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for. State Colleges of
Conn., 474 F.2d 485, 488-489 (CA2 1973);
Donovan v.
Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (CA9 1970).
[
Footnote 9]
See 1 F. Hilliard, Law of Torts, ch. 3, § 5 (3d ed.
1866); T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 25-35 (5th ed. 1869). Thus,
one proponent of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 asked during
debate:
"[W]hat legislation could be more appropriate than to give a
person injured by another under color of . . . State laws a remedy
by civil action?"
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Wilson). And one opponent of § 1 complained:
"The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character,
the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five
dollars or even five cents; they may be what lawyers call merely
nominal damages; and yet, by this section, jurisdiction of that
civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its being
prosecuted, as now, in the courts of the States."
Id. at App. 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
See
also Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, 50 Ind. L.J. 5, 10 (1974).
[
Footnote 10]
Section 2 of the Act, 17 Stat. 13-14, now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), made it unlawful to conspire,
inter alia,
"for the purpose of depriving any person or any class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or
immunities under the laws. . . ."
It further provided (emphasis supplied):
"[I]f any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy
shall do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object
of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so
injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and
maintain an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by
such injury or
deprivation of rights and privileges
against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy.
. . ."
Section 6 of the Act, 17 Stat. 15, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1986, provided (emphasis supplied):
"[A]ny person or persons, having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the second section of
this act are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or
aid in preventing the same, shall neglect or refuse to do so, and
such wrongful act shall be committed, such person or persons
shall be liable to the person injured, or his legal
representatives,
for all damages caused by any such wrongful
act. . . ."
[
Footnote 11]
This is not to say that exemplary or punitive damages might not
be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the specific purpose
of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163-164 (CA10
1976);
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 n. 4 (CA6
1975),
cert. dismissed, 429 U. S. 118
(1976);
Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 558 (CA7 1974);
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (CA1),
cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968);
Mansell v. Saunders, 372
F.2d 573, 576 (CA5 1967);
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74,
84-88 (CA3 1965). Although we imply no approval or disapproval of
any of these cases, we note that there is no basis for such an
award in this case. The District Court specifically found that
petitioners did not act with a malicious intention to deprive
respondents of their rights or to do them other injury,
see n 6,
supra, and the Court of Appeals approved only the award of
"non-punitive" damages, 545 F.2d 30, 31 (1976).
We also note that the potential liability of § 1983 defendants
for attorney's fees,
see Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, amending 42
U.S.C. § 1988, provides additional -- and by no means
inconsequential -- assurance that agents of the State will not
deliberately ignore due process rights.
See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, the criminal counterpart of § 1983.
[
Footnote 12]
For discussions of the problems of fashioning damages awards
under § 1983,
see generally McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, Part 1, 60 Va.L.Rev. 1, 55-66 (1974); Nahmod,
supra, n. 9, at 25-27, n. 89; Yudof, Liability for
Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49
S.Cal.L.Rev. 1322, 1366-1383 (1976); Comment, Civil Actions for
Damages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 Texas L.Rev.
1015, 1023-1035 (1967).
[
Footnote 13]
The Court has looked to the common law of torts in similar
fashion in constructing immunities under § 1983.
See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
424 U. S.
417-419 (1976), and cases there discussed. Title 42
U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes courts to look to the common law of the
States where this is "necessary to furnish suitable remedies" under
§ 1983.
[
Footnote 14]
See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.
S. 105,
431 U. S.
112-114 (1977);
Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S. 675,
430 U. S.
677-678, 682 (1977);
Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 134,
416 U. S. 170
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and in result in part);
id. at
416 U. S. 201
(WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at
416 U. S.
214-215 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600,
416 U. S.
609-610,
416 U. S. 618
(1974);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254,
397 U. S. 266
(1970).
[
Footnote 15]
A few courts appear to have taken a contrary view in cases where
public employees holding property interests in their jobs were
discharged with cause but without procedural due process.
E.g.,
Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 920 (CA4 1975);
Zimmerer v.
Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 178-179 (CA5 1973);
Horton v.
Orange County Bd. of Ed., 464 F.2d 536, 537-538 (CA4 1972).
See also Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield County School
Dist., 521 F.2d 1201, 1207-1208 (CA4 1975) (opinion of Winter,
J.)
[
Footnote 16]
Respondents also contend that injury should be presumed because,
even if they were guilty of the conduct charged, they were deprived
of the chance to present facts or arguments in mitigation to the
initial decisionmaker.
Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U. S. 778,
411 U. S.
784-785 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S.
479-480, 488 (1972). They claim that
"[i]t can never be known . . . what, if anything, the exercise
of such an opportunity to plead one's cause on judgmental or
discretionary grounds would have availed."
Brief for Respondents 28. But, as previously indicated, the
Court of Appeals held that respondents cannot recover damages for
injuries caused by their suspensions if the District Court
determines that "[respondents] would have been suspended even if a
proper hearing had been held." 545 F.2d at 32. This holding, which
respondents do not challenge, necessarily assumes that the District
Court can determine what the outcome would have been if respondents
had received their hearing. We presume that this determination will
include consideration of the likelihood that any mitigating
circumstances to which respondents can point would have swayed the
initial decisionmakers.
[
Footnote 17]
"By the very nature of harm resulting from defamatory
publications, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof.
Libel and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and
subtle."
1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 5.30, p. 468 (1956);
see also Restatement of Torts § 621, comment
a,
p. 314 (1938).
[
Footnote 18]
The essence of libel
per se is the publication in
writing of false statements that tend to injure a person's
reputation. The essence of slander
per se is the
publication by spoken words of false statements imputing to a
person a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, matter affecting
adversely a person's fitness for trade, business, or profession, or
serious sexual misconduct. 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts
§§ 5.9-5.13 (1956); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558, 559,
569-574 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 112 (4th ed.1971).
[
Footnote 19]
In this case, for example, respondents denied the allegations
against them. They may well have been distressed that their denials
were not believed. They might have been equally distressed if they
had been disbelieved only after a full-dress hearing, but in that
instance, they would have no cause of action against
petitioners.
[
Footnote 20]
We use the term "distress" to include mental suffering or
emotional anguish. Although essentially subjective, genuine injury
in this respect may be evidenced by one's conduct and observed by
others. Juries must be guided by appropriate instructions, and an
award of damages must be supported by competent evidence concerning
the injury.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.
S. 323,
418 U. S. 350
(1974).
[
Footnote 21]
See cases cited in
Hostrop v. Board of Junior
College Dist. No. 51, 523 F.2d 569, 579 (CA7 1975),
cert.
denied, 425 U. S. 963
(1976).
[
Footnote 22]
In
Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119
(CA7 1974), and
Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634
(CA7 1974), cited in
Hostrop, supra at 579, the court held
that damages may be awarded for humiliation and distress caused by
discriminatory refusals to lease housing to plaintiffs. The court's
comment in
Seaton that "[h]umiliation can be inferred from
the circumstances, as well as established by the testimony," 491
F.2d at 636, suggests that the court considered the question of
actual injury to be one of fact.
See generally Annot.,
Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial,
Ethnic, or Religious Abuse or Discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290
(1971).
In
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (CA3 1965);
Sexton
v. Gibbs, 327 F.
Supp. 134 (ND Tex.1970),
aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (CA5
1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); and
Rhoads
v. Horvat, 270 F.
Supp. 307 (Colo.1967), cited in
Hostrop, supra, at
579, the courts indicated that damages may be awarded for
humiliation and distress caused by unlawful arrests, searches, and
seizures. In
Basista v. Weir, the court held that nominal
damages could be awarded for an illegal arrest even if compensatory
damages were waived, and that such nominal damages would, in an
appropriate case, support an award of punitive damages. 340 F.2d at
87-88. Because it was unclear whether the plaintiff had waived his
claim for compensatory damages, that issue was left open upon
remand.
Id. at 88. In
Sexton v. Gibbs, where the
court found "that Plaintiff suffered humiliation, embarrassment and
discomfort," substantial compensatory damages were awarded.
327 F.
Supp. at 143. In
Rhoads v. Horvat, the court allowed a
jury award of $5,000 in compensatory damages for an illegal arrest
to stand, stating that it did "not doubt that the plaintiff was
outraged by the arrest."
270 F.
Supp. at 311.
Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (CA8 1919), cited in
Hostrop, supra at 579, and
Ashby v. White, 1 Bro.
P. C. 62, 1 Eng.Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703),
rev'g 2 Ld.Raym.
938, 92 Eng.Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), do appear to support the award of
substantial damages simply upon a showing that a plaintiff was
wrongfully deprived of the right to vote. Citing
Ashby v.
White, this Court has held that actions for damages may be
maintained for wrongful deprivations of the right to vote, but it
has not considered the prerequisites for recovery.
Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U. S. 536,
273 U. S. 540
(1927);
see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649 (1944);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.
S. 433,
307 U. S. 469
(1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.);
Nixon v. Condon,
286 U. S. 73
(1932);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.
S. 368 (1915);
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.
S. 475 (1903);
Swafford v. Templeton,
185 U. S. 487
(1902);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S.
58 (1900). The common law rule of damages for wrongful
deprivations of voting rights embodied in
Ashby v. White
would, of course, be quite relevant to the analogous question under
§ 1983.
[
Footnote 23]
See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.8, pp. 191-193
(1973); C. McCormick, Law of Damages §§ 20-22 (1935); Restatement
of Torts § 907 (1939)
[
Footnote 24]
A number of lower federal courts have approved the award of
nominal damages under § 1983 where deprivations of constitutional
rights are not shown to have caused actual injury.
E.g.,
Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 240 (CA3 1977);
United
States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d at 829-830;
Manett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (CA1 1973);
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d at 87;
Bell v.
Gayle, 384 F.
Supp. 1022, 1026-1027 (ND Tex.1974);
United States ex rel.
Myers v. Sielaff, 381 F.
Supp. 840, 844 (ED Pa.1974);
Berry v. Macon County Bd. of
Ed., 380 F.
Supp. 1244,
1248
(MD Ala.1971).
[
Footnote 25]
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals' holding could be
affirmed on the ground that the District Court held them to too
high a standard of proof of the amount of damages appropriate to
compensate intangible injuries that are proved to have been
suffered. Brief for Respondents 49-52. It is true that plaintiffs
ordinarily are not required to prove with exactitude the amount of
damages that should be awarded to compensate intangible injury.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at
418 U. S. 350.
But, as the Court of Appeals said, "in the case at bar, there is no
proof of individualized injury to [respondents], such as mental
distress. . . ." 545 F.2d at 31. With the case in this posture,
there is no occasion to consider the quantum of proof required to
support a particular damages award where actual injury is
proved.