A citizen of one state can sue a corporation which has been
created by and transacts its business in another state (the suit
being brought in the latter state) although some of the members of
the corporation are not citizens of the state in which the suit is
brought and although the state itself may be a member of the
corporation.
The cases of
Curtis v.
Strawbridge, 3 Cranch 267;
Bank
United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 84;
Commercial and Railroad Bank of
Vicksburg v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60, reviewed and
controlled.
The Act of Congress passed on 28 February, 1839, making it
"lawful for a court to entertain jurisdiction and proceed to the
trial and adjudication of a suit between parties who may be
properly before it, although there may be other defendants, any one
or more of whom are not inhabitants of, or found within, the
district where the suit is brought, or do not voluntarily appear
thereto"
is an enlargement of jurisdiction as to the character of the
parties. The clause exempting absent defendants from the operation
of the judgment or decree is an exception to this enlargement of
jurisdiction, and must be strictly applied.
A corporation created by and transacting business in a state is
to be deemed an inhabitant of the state, capable of being treated
as a citizen for all purposes of suing and being sued, and an
averment of the facts of its creation and the place of transacting
business is sufficient to give the circuit courts jurisdiction.
Letson, a citizen of New York, brought an action of covenant
against the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad
Company, alleging that they had not fulfilled a contract with him
relating to the construction of the road
The suit was brought in November, 1841.
In April, 1842, the defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
which was afterwards amended to read as follows:
"And the said the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
Railroad Company come and say that this court ought not to have or
take further cognizance of the action aforesaid, because they say
that the said the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad
Company is not a corporation whose members are citizens of South
Carolina, but that some of the members of the said corporation are
citizens of South Carolina, and some of them, namely John
Rutherford and Charles Baring, are and were at the time of
commencing the said
Page 43 U. S. 498
action citizens of North Carolina, and the State of South
Carolina is and was at the time of commencing the said action a
member of the said corporation, and the Bank of Charleston, South
Carolina, is also and was at the time of commencing the said action
a member of the said corporation, which said the Bank of
Charleston, South Carolina, is a corporation, some of whose
members, namely, Thomas Parish and Edmund Lafau, are and were at
the time of commencing the said action citizens of New York. And
the Charleston Insurance & Trust Company is now and was at the
time of commencing the said action a member of the said Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Company, which said Charleston
Insurance & Trust Company is a corporation some of whose
members, namely Samuel D. Dickson, Henry R. Dickson, Henry Parish,
and Daniel Parish, are now and were at the time of commencing the
said action, citizens of the State of New York."
"And this the said Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
Railroad Company are ready to verify. Wherefore they pray judgment
whether this Court can or will take further cognizance of the
action aforesaid."
To this plea there was a general demurrer, which, upon argument,
was sustained by the court.
The railroad company then pleaded the general issue, and the
cause went on to trial. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff
and assessed his damages at $18,140.23.
The writ of error was brought to review the opinion of the court
upon the demurrer.
Page 43 U. S. 550
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jurisdiction of the court is denied in this case upon the
grounds that two members of the corporation sued are citizens of
North Carolina, that the State of South Carolina is also a member,
and that two other corporations in South Carolina are members,
having in them members who are citizens of the same state with the
defendant in error.
The objection that the State of South Carolina is a member
cannot be sustained. Cases have been already decided by this Court
which overrule it. The doctrine is if the state be not necessarily
a defendant, though its interest may be affected by the decision,
the courts of the United States are bound to exercise jurisdiction.
United States v.
Peters, 5 Cranch 115. In the case of
Bank of
the
Page 43 U. S. 551
United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, this Court
ruled
"that when a government becomes a partner in a trading concern,
it divests itself, so far as it concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character and takes that of a private
citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and
its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it
associates itself and takes the character which belongs to its
associates and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus many
states of this Union which have an interest in banks are not suable
even in their own courts, yet they never exempt the corporation
from being sued. The State of Georgia, by giving to the bank the
capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its
sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the
bank, and waives all the privileges of that character."
22 U. S. 9
Wheat. 907. South Carolina stands in the same attitude in the case
before us, that Georgia did in the case in 9 Wheaton. It is no
objection, then, to the jurisdiction of the court on account of the
averment in the plea that the State of South Carolina is a member
of the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Company.
The true principle is that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts
of the United States cannot be decreed or taken away on account of
a state's having an interest in a suit unless the state is a party
on the record.
Osborne v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 852. This must be the rule
under our system, whether the jurisdiction of the court is denied
on account of any interest which a state may have in the subject
matter of the suit or when it is alleged that jurisdiction does not
exist on account of the character of the parties.
We will here consider that averment in the plea which alleges
that the court has not jurisdiction
"because the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad
Company is not a corporation whose members are citizens of South
Carolina, but that some of the members of the said corporation are
citizens of South Carolina and some of them, namely, John
Rutherford and Charles Baring, are and were at the time of
commencing the said action citizens of North Carolina."
The objection is equivalent to this proposition -- that a
corporation in a state cannot be sued in the circuit courts of the
United States by a citizen of another state unless all the members
of the corporation are citizens of the state in which the suit is
brought.
The suit in this instance is brought by a citizen of New York in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South
Carolina, which is the locality of the corporation sued.
Page 43 U. S. 552
Jurisdiction is denied because it is said it is only given when
"the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is
brought and a citizen of another state." And it is further said
that the present is not such a suit, because two of the corporators
are citizens of a third state.
The point in this form has never before been under the
consideration of this Court. We are not aware that it ever occurred
in either of the circuits until it was made in this case. It has
not then been directly ruled in any case. Our inquiry now is what
is the law upon the proposition raised by the plea.
Our first remark is that the jurisdiction is not necessarily
excluded by the terms when "the suit is between a citizen of the
state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state"
unless the word "citizen" is used in the Constitution and the laws
of the United States in a sense which necessarily excludes a
corporation.
A corporation aggregate is an artificial body of men, composed
of divers constituent members
ad instar corporis humani,
the ligaments of which body politic, or artificial body, are the
franchises and liberties thereof, which bind and unite all its
members together, and in which the whole frame and essence of the
corporation consist. Bac.Abr.Corp. (A). It must of necessity have a
name, for the name is, as it were, the very being of the
Constitution, the heart of their combination, with out which they
could not perform their corporate acts, for it is nobody to plead
and be impleaded, to take and give, until it hath gotten a name.
Bac.Abr.Corp. (C).
Composed of persons, it may be that the members are citizens --
and if they are, though the corporation can only plead and be
impleaded by its name, or the name by which it may sue or be sued,
if a controversy arises between it and a plaintiff who is a citizen
of another state, and the residence of the corporation is in the
state in which the suit is brought, is not the suit substantially
between citizens of different states, or, in the words of the act
giving to the courts jurisdiction, "a suit between a citizen of the
state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another
state?"
Jurisdiction, in one sense, in cases of corporations, exists in
virtue of the character of members, and must be maintained in the
courts of the United States unless citizens can exempt themselves
from their constitutional liability to be sued in those courts by a
citizen of another state by the fact that the subject of
controversy between them has arisen upon a contract to which the
former are parties, in their corporate and not in their personal
character.
Page 43 U. S. 553
Constitutional rights and liabilities cannot be so taken away or
be so avoided. If they could be, the provision which we are here
considering could not comprehend citizens universally, in all the
relations of trade, but only those citizens in such relations of
business as may arise from their individual or partnership
transactions.
Let it then be admitted for the purposes of this branch of the
argument that jurisdiction attaches in cases of corporations in
consequence of the citizenship of their members, and that foreign
corporations may sue when the members are aliens; does it
necessarily follow, because the citizenship and residence of the
members give jurisdiction in a suit at the instance of a plaintiff
of another state, that all of the corporators must be citizens of
the state in which the suit is brought?
The argument in support of the affirmative of this inquiry is
that in the case of a corporation in which jurisdiction depends
upon the character of the parties, the court looks beyond the
corporation to the individuals of which it is composed for the
purpose of ascertaining whether they have the requisite character,
and for no other purpose.
The object would certainly be to ascertain the character of the
parties, but not to the extent of excluding all inquiry as to what
the effect will be when it has been ascertained that the
corporators are citizens of different states from that of the
locality of the corporation, where by its charter it can only be
sued.
Then the question occurs, if the corporation be only suable
where its locality is, and those to whom its operations are
confided are citizens of that state, and a suit is brought against
it by a citizen of another state, whether by a proper
interpretation of the terms giving to the circuit court
jurisdiction it is not a suit between citizens of the state where
the suit is brought and a citizen of another state. The fact that
the corporators do live in different states does not aid the
solution of the question.
The first, obvious, and necessary interpretation of the terms by
which jurisdiction is given is that the suit need not be between
citizen and citizen, but may be between citizens. Then do the words
"of the state where the suit is brought" limit the jurisdiction to
a case in which all the defendants are citizens of the same
state?
The constitutional grant of judicial power extends to
controversies "between citizens of different states." The words in
the legislative grant of jurisdiction "of the state where the suit
is brought and
Page 43 U. S. 554
a citizen of another state" are obviously no more than
equivalent terms to confine suits in the circuit courts to those
which are "between citizens of different states." The words in the
Constitution, then, are just as operative to ascertain and limit
jurisdiction as the words in the statute. It is true that under
these words "between citizens of different states," Congress may
give the courts jurisdiction between citizens in many other forms
than that in which it has been conferred. But in the way it is
given, the object of the legislature seems exclusively to have been
to confer jurisdiction upon the court, strictly in conformity to
the limitation as it is expressed in the Constitution, "between
citizens of different states."
A suit then brought by a citizen of one state against a
corporation by its corporate name in the state of its locality, by
which it was created and where its business is done by any of the
corporators who are chosen to manage its affairs, is a suit, so far
as jurisdiction is concerned, between citizens of the state where
the suit is brought and a citizen of another state. The corporators
as individuals are not defendants in the suit, but they are parties
having an interest in the result, and some of them being citizens
of the state where the suit is brought, jurisdiction attaches over
the corporation -- nor can we see how it can be defeated by some of
the members, who cannot be sued, residing in a different state. It
may be said that the suit is against the corporation, and that
nothing must be looked at but the legal entity and then that we
cannot view the members except as an artificial aggregate. This is
so in respect to the subject matter of the suit and the judgment
which may be rendered, but if it be right to look to the members to
ascertain whether there be jurisdiction or not, the want of
appropriate citizenship in some of them to sustain jurisdiction,
cannot take it away when there are other members who are citizens
with the necessary residence to maintain it.
But we are now met and told that the cases of
Srawbridge
v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, and that of
Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 5 Cranch 84, hold a different
doctrine.
We do not deny that the language of those decisions does not
justify in some degree the inferences which have been made from
them, or that the effect of them has been to limit the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts in practice to the cases contended for by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error. The practice has been, since
those cases were decided, that if there be two or more plaintiffs
and two or more joint defendants, each of the plaintiffs must be
capable of suing each
Page 43 U. S. 555
of the defendants in the courts of the United States in order to
support the jurisdiction, and in cases of corporation to limit
jurisdiction to cases in which all the corporators were citizens of
the state in which the suit was brought. The case of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss was decided without argument. That
of
Bank v. Deveaux after argument of great ability. But
never since that case has the question been presented to this Court
with the really distinguished ability of the arguments of the
counsel in this -- in no way surpassed by those in the former. And
now we are called upon in the most imposing way to give our best
judgments to the subject, yielding to decided cases everything that
can be claimed for them on the score of authority except the
surrender of conscience.
After mature deliberation, we feel free to say that the cases of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss and that of
Bank v.
Deveaux were carried too far, and that consequences and
inferences have been argumentatively drawn from the reasoning
employed in the latter which ought not to be followed. Indeed it is
difficult not to feel that the case of
Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia is founded upon principles
irreconcilable with some of those on which the cases already
adverted to were founded. The case of
Commercial Bank of
Vicksburg v. Slocomb was most reluctantly decided upon the
mere authority of those cases. We do not think either of them
maintainable upon the true principles of interpretation of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. A corporation
created by a state to perform its functions under the authority of
that state and only suable there, though it may have members out of
the state, seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one,
inhabiting and belonging to that state, and therefore entitled, for
the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that
state. We remark too that the cases of
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss and
Bank v. Deveaux have never been
satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not, especially the
last, entirely satisfactory to the Court that made them. They have
been followed always most reluctantly and with dissatisfaction. By
no one was the correctness of them more questioned than by the late
Chief Justice who gave them. It is within the knowledge of several
of us that he repeatedly expressed regret that those decisions had
been made, adding whenever the subject was mentioned that if the
point of jurisdiction was an original one, the conclusion would be
different. We think we may safely assert that a majority of the
members of this Court
Page 43 U. S. 556
have at all times partaken of the same regret, and that whenever
a case has occurred on the circuit involving the application of the
case of
Bank v. Deveaux, it was yielded to because the
decision had been made, and not because it was thought to be right.
We have already said that the case of
Bank of Vicksburg v.
Slocomb, 14 Peters, was most reluctantly given upon mere
authority. We are now called upon, upon the authority of those
cases alone, to go further in this case than has yet been done. It
has led to a review of the principles of all the cases. We cannot
follow further, and upon our maturest deliberation we do not think
that the cases relied upon for a doctrine contrary to that which
this Court will here announce, are sustained by a sound and
comprehensive course of professional reasoning. Fortunately a
departure from them involves no change in a rule of property. Our
conclusion, too, if it shall not have universal acquiescence, will
be admitted by all to be coincident with the policy of the
Constitution and the condition of our country. It is coincident
also with the recent legislation of Congress as that is shown by
the Act of 28 February, 1839, in amendment of the acts respecting
the judicial system of the United States. We do not hesitate to say
that it was passed exclusively with an intent to rid the courts of
the decision in the case of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss.
But if in all we have said upon jurisdiction we are mistaken, we
say that the Act of 28 February, 1839, enlarges the jurisdiction of
the courts, comprehends the case before us, and embraces the entire
result of the opinion which we shall now give.
The first section of that act provides
"That where in any suit at law or in equity commenced in any
court of the United States there shall be several defendants, any
one or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of, or found within
the district where the suit is brought, or shall not voluntarily
appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain
jurisdiction and proceed to the trial and adjudication of such suit
between the parties who may be properly before it; but the judgment
or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice other
parties not regularly served with process or not voluntarily
appearing to answer."
We think, as was said in the case of
Commercial Bank of
Vicksburg v. Slocomb that this act was intended to remove the
difficulties which occurred in practice, in cases both in law and
equity, under that clause in the 11th section of the Judiciary Act,
which declares
"That no civil suit shall be brought before either
Page 43 U. S. 557
of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any
original process in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the
writ,"
but a reexamination of the entire section will not permit us to
reaffirm what was said in that case, that the act did not
contemplate a change in the jurisdiction of the courts as it
regards the character of the parties. If the act in fact did no
more than to make a change by empowering the courts to take
cognizance of cases other than such as were permitted in that
clause of the 11th section, which we have just cited, it would be
an enlargement of jurisdiction as to the character of parties. The
clause that the judgment or decree rendered shall not conclude or
prejudice other parties who have not been regularly served with
process or who have not voluntarily appeared to answer is an
exception, exempting parties so situated from the enactment and
must be so strictly applied. It is definite as to the persons of
whom it speaks, and contains no particular words as a subsequent
clause by which the general words of the statute can be restrained.
The general words embrace every suit at law or in equity in which
there shall be several defendants
"any one or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of, or found
within the district where the suit is brought, or who shall not
voluntarily appear thereto."
The words, "shall not be inhabitants of" applies as well to
corporators as to persons who are not so, and if, as corporators,
they are not suable individually and cannot be served with process
or voluntarily appear in an action against the corporation of which
they are members, the conclusion should be that they are not
included in the exception, but are within the general terms of the
statute. Or, if they are viewed as defendants in the suit, then, as
corporators, they are regularly served with process in the only way
the law permits them to be when the corporation is sued by its
name.
The case before us might be safely put upon the foregoing
reasoning and upon the statute, but hitherto we have reasoned upon
this case upon the supposition that in order to found the
jurisdiction in cases of corporations, it is necessary there should
be an averment which, if contested, was to be supported by proof
that some of the corporators are citizens of the state by which the
corporation was created, where it does its business, or where it
may be sued. But this has been done in deference to the doctrines
of former cases in this Court upon which we have been commenting.
But there is a broader ground upon which we desire to be
understood, upon which we
Page 43 U. S. 558
altogether rest our present judgment, although it might be
maintained upon the narrower ground already suggested. It is that a
corporation created by and doing business in a particular state is
to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an
artificial person, an inhabitant of the same state, for the
purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a
citizen of that state as much as a natural person. Like a citizen,
it makes contracts, and though in regard to what it may do in some
particulars it differs from a natural person, and in this
especially, the manner in which it can sue and be sued, it is
substantially, within the meaning of the law, a citizen of the
state which created it and where its business is done, for all the
purposes of suing and being sued. And in coming to this conclusion
as to the character of a corporation, we only make a natural
inference from the language of this Court upon another occasion,
and assert no new principle.
In the case of
Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636, this Court says
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its
very existence. These are such as were supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. Among the most
important are immortality, and if the expression may be allowed,
individuality -- properties by which a perpetual succession of many
persons are considered as the same and may act as a single
individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs and
to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous
and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of
transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of
clothing bodies of men in succession with these qualities and
capacities that corporations were invented and are in use. By these
means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting
for the promotion of the particular object like one immortal
being."
Again, in
Providence Bank and
Billings, 4 Pet. 514, it is said,
"The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character
and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body
of men. This capacity is always given to such a body. Any
privileges which may exempt it from the burdens common to
individuals do not flow necessarily from the charter, but must be
expressed in it, or they do not exist."
In that case, the bank was adjudged to be liable to a tax on its
property as an individual. Lord Coke says
"Every corporation
Page 43 U. S. 559
and body politic residing in any county, riding, city or town
corporate, or having lands or tenements in any shire,
qua
propriis manibus et sumptibus possident et habent, are said to
be inhabitants there within the purview of the statute."
In the case of
King v. Gardiner, in Cowper, a
corporation was decided by the Court of King's Bench to come within
the description of occupiers or inhabitants. In
Bank v.
Deveaux, the case relied upon most for the doctrines contended
for by the plaintiff in error, it is said of a corporation, "This
ideal existence is considered as an inhabitant, when the general
spirit and purposes of the law requires it." If it be so for the
purposes of taxation, why is it not so for the purposes of a suit
in the circuit court of the United States, when the plaintiff has
the proper residence? Certainly the spirit and purposes of the law
require it. We confess our inability to reconcile these qualities
of a corporation -- residence, habitancy, and individuality -- with
the doctrine that a corporation aggregate cannot be a citizen for
the purposes of a suit in the courts of the United States unless in
consequence of a residence of all the corporators being of the
state in which the suit is brought. When the corporation exercises
its powers in the state which chartered it, that is its residence,
and such an averment is sufficient to give the circuit courts
jurisdiction.
Our conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider that
averment in the plea which denies jurisdiction on the ground that
citizens of the same state with the plaintiff are members of
corporations in South Carolina, which are members of the
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Company.
The judgment of the circuit court below is
affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
South Carolina and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof
it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
affirmed with costs and damages at the rate of six percentum per
annum.