General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert - 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
U.S. Supreme Court
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
Argued January 19-20, 1976
Reargued October 13, 1976
Decided December 7, 1976
429 U.S. 125
This class action was brought by respondents challenging as violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the disability plan of petitioner. Under the plan, petitioner provides nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all its employees, but disabilities arising from pregnancy are excluded. The District Court following trial held that the exclusion constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the intervening decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, wherein this Court held that disparity in treatment between pregnancy-related and other disabilities was not sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, was not applicable in a Title VII context. Under § 703(a)(1) of that Title it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation because of that individual's sex.
Held: Petitioner's disability benefits plan does not violate Title VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Pp. 429 U. S. 133-146.
(a) The plan, which is strikingly similar to the one in Geduldig,
"does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender, but merely removes one physical condition -- pregnancy -- from the list of compensable disabilities. . . . Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition."
417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 496-497, n. 20. Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that, in a case like this, must trigger the finding of an unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(1), Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan like petitioner's providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all. Pp. 429 U. S. 133-136.
(b) There was no more showing here than there was in Geduldig that
the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits from petitioner's plan was a pretext for discriminating against women, since pregnancy, though confined to women, is in other ways significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability. P. 429 U. S. 136.
(c) Gender-based discrimination does not result simply because an employer's disability benefits plan is less than all-inclusive. Petitioner's plan is no more than an insurance package covering some risks but excluding others, and there has been no showing that the selection of included risks creates a gender-based discriminatory effect. Pp. 429 U. S. 136-140.
(d) A 1972 guideline of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) relied upon by respondents, not only conflicts with earlier EEOC pronouncements, but is at odds with the consistent interpretation of the Wage and Hour Administrator with respect to § 703(h) of Title VII, as amended by the Equal Pay Act, and the legislative history of Title VII, both of which support the "plain meaning" of the language used by Congress when it enacted § 703(a)(1). Pp. 429 U. S. 140-145.
519 F.2d 661, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in which BLACKMUN, J., joined in part. STEWART, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 429 U. S. 146. BLACKMUN, J., filed a statement concurring in part, post, p. 429 U. S. 146. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 429 U. S. 146. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 429 U. S. 160.