Notwithstanding its knowledge that appellant was in the Cook
County jail awaiting trial, the State of Illinois mailed notice of
automobile forfeiture proceedings to appellant at his home, which
he did not receive until his release, when he learned that the car
had been forfeited. The circuit court rejected appellant's motion
for rehearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The procedure followed here did not comport with
due process requirements, as the State made no effort to provide
appellant with notice "reasonably calculated" to apprise him of the
pendency of the forfeiture proceedings.
52 Ill. 2d
37,
284 N.E.2d
646, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
On June 16, 1970, appellant was arrested on a charge of armed
robbery and, immediately thereafter, the State of Illinois
instituted forfeiture proceedings against appellant's automobile
pursuant to the Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute, Ill.Rev.Stat.,
c. 38, § 36-1
et seq. (1969). Appellant was held in
custody in the Cook County jail from June 16, 1970, to October 7,
1970, awaiting trial. Nevertheless, the State mailed notice of the
pending forfeiture proceedings, not to the jail facility, but to
appellant's home address as listed in the records of the Secretary
of State. [
Footnote 1] It is
undisputed that appellant,
Page 409 U. S. 39
who remained in custody throughout the forfeiture proceedings,
did not receive such notice until his release. [
Footnote 2] After an
ex parte hearing on
August 19, 1970, the circuit court of Cook County ordered the
forfeiture and sale of appellant's vehicle.
Upon learning of the forfeiture after his release, appellant
filed a motion for rehearing, requesting that the order of
forfeiture be set aside because the manner of notice did not
comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court of Cook County denied the
motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois, three justices
dissenting, held that, in light of the
in rem nature of
the proceedings, substituted service as utilized by the State did
not deny appellant due process of law.
People ex rel. Hanrahan
v. One 196 Oldsmobile, 52 Ill. 2d
37,
284 N.E.2d
646 (1972). We cannot agree.
In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U. S. 306
(1950), after commenting on the vagueness of the classifications
"
in rem, or more indefinitely
quasi in rem, or
more vaguely still,
in the nature of a proceeding in
rem,'" this Court held that
"the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being
primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to
state."
Id. at
339 U. S.
312.
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
Page 409 U. S. 40
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."
Id. at 314. More specifically,
Mullane held
that notice by publication is not sufficient with respect to an
individual whose name and address are known or easily
ascertainable. Similarly, in
Covey v. Town of Somers,
351 U. S. 141
(1956), we held that, in the context of a foreclosure action by the
town, notice by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate
where the individual involved was known by the town to be an
incompetent without the protection of a guardian.
See also
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208 (
1962);
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.
S. 112 (1956);
New York v. New York, N. H. & H.
R. Co., 344 U. S. 293
(1953).
In the instant case, the State knew that appellant was not at
the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also
that appellant could not get to that address, since he was at that
very time confined in the Cook County jail. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the State made any effort to
provide notice which was "reasonably calculated" to apprise
appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. [
Footnote 3] Accordingly, we grant the
motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, reverse the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
Under Illinois law, the address of a vehicle owner must be
registered in the office of the Secretary of State. Ill.Rev.Stat.,
c. 95 1/2, § 3-405 (1971). The Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute
authorizes service of notice by certified mail to the address as
listed in the records of the Secretary of State. Ill.Rev.Stat., c.
38, § 36-1 (1969).
[
Footnote 2]
Appellant was tried on October 7, 1970, for the offense of armed
robbery. The court, sitting without a jury, found appellant guilty
only of plain robbery, and sentenced him to probation for three
years, the first four months of which to be served in the Cook
County jail. In light of appellant's pretrial detention, the
four-month requirement was "considered served," and appellant was
released immediately on his own recognizance.
[
Footnote 3]
Since we dispose of this case on the notice question, we do not
reach the additional issues raised by appellant.