Lake Nixon Club is an amusement place owned by respondent and
his wife, located 12 miles from Little Rock, Ark. It has recreation
facilities, including swimming, boating, and dancing, and a snack
bar serving four food items, at least three of which contain
ingredients coming from outside the State. The Club leases 15
paddle boats on a royalty basis from an Oklahoma company (from
which it purchased one boat) and operates a juke box which, along
with records it plays, is manufactured outside Arkansas. The Club
is advertised in a monthly magazine distributed at Little Rock
hotels, motels, and restaurants, in a monthly newspaper published
at a nearby Air Force base, and over two area radio stations.
Approximately 100,000 whites patronize the establishment each
season and are routinely furnished "membership" cards in the
"club," on payment of a 25� fee. Negroes are denied admission.
Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, brought this class
action to enjoin respondent from denying them admission to the Lake
Nixon Club, alleging that it is a "public accommodation" subject to
the provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
that respondent violated the Act by refusing petitioners admission
solely on racial grounds. Title II prohibits racial discrimination
at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce.
The District Court, though finding that petitioners had been
refused admission solely because they were Negroes and that the
Lake Nixon Club is not a private club (to which Title II does not
apply), dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
establishment is not a "public accommodation" within the meaning of
the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Section 201(b) of the Act
includes among the categories of covered public accommodations:
"(2) any restaurant, . . . lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises . . . ," "(3) any . . . place of . . .
entertainment," and "(4) any establishment . . . within the
premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and . . . which holds itself out as serving patrons
of such covered establishment." Under § 201(c), a place of public
accommodation
Page 395 U. S. 299
affects commerce if "(2). . . [it is an establishment described
in § 201(b)(2) and] serves or offers to serve interstate travelers
or a substantial portion of the food it serves . . . has moved in
commerce; (3) [it is an establishment described in § 201(b)(3) and]
customarily presents films, performances, . . . or other sources of
entertainment which move in commerce;" or "(4) [it is an
establishment described in § 201(b)(4) and] there is physically
located within its premises, an establishment the operations of
which affect commerce. . . ."
Held:
1. Lake Nixon Club, as the courts below correctly held, is not a
private club, since it routinely affords "membership" to all
whites, and has none of the attributes of self-government and
member ownership traditionally associated with private clubs. Pp.
395 U. S.
301-302.
2. The Lake Nixon Club's snack bar is a "place of public
accommodation" under § 201(b)(2) of the Act, since it is
"principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises." Pp.
395 U. S.
302-304.
3. The operations of the snack bar "affect commerce" under §
201(c)(2) of the Act. P.
395 U. S.
304.
(a) The owners' choice of advertising media leaves no doubt that
they seek a broad-based patronage from an audience they know
includes interstate travelers, and it would be unrealistic to
assume that none of the 100,000 patrons served each season is an
interstate traveler. P.
395 U. S.
304.
(b) A "substantial portion of the food" served at the snack bar
has moved in interstate commerce. P.
395 U. S.
305.
4. The snack bar's status as a covered establishment
automatically brings the entire Lake Nixon Club facility within the
coverage of Title II of the Act by virtue of §§ 201(b)(4) and
201(c)(4). P.
395 U. S.
305.
5. The Lake Nixon Club is a covered accommodation under §§
201(b)(3) and 201(c)(3) of the Act, as it is a "place of
entertainment," which, in the light of the overriding purpose of
Title II to remove discriminatory denials of access to public
facilities, includes recreational areas, and is not, as respondent
argues, limited to spectator entertainment. Pp.
395 U. S.
305-308.
6. The Club's operations clearly "affect commerce" within the
meaning of § 201(c)(3), since the paddle boats and the juke box and
its records are "sources of entertainment [that] move in commerce."
P.
395 U. S.
308.
395 F.2d 118, reversed.
Page 395 U. S. 300
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, brought
this class action in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas to enjoin respondent from denying them admission to a
recreational facility called Lake Nixon Club, owned and operated by
respondent, Euell Paul, and his wife. The complaint alleged that
Lake Nixon Club was a "public accommodation" subject to the
provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
et seq., and that respondent
violated the Act in refusing petitioners admission solely on racial
grounds. [
Footnote 1] After
trial, the District Court, although finding that respondent had
refused petitioners admission solely because they were Negroes,
[
Footnote 2]
Page 395 U. S. 301
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lake Nixon Club was
not within any of the categories of "public accommodations" covered
by the 1964 Act.
263 F.
Supp. 412 (1967). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, one judge dissenting. 395 F.2d 118 (1968). We granted
certiorari. 393 U.S. 975 (1968). We reverse.
Lake Nixon Club, located 12 miles west of Little Rock, is a
232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, sun bathing,
picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar.
The Pauls purchased the Lake Nixon site in 1962, and subsequently
operated this amusement business there in a racially segregated
manner.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted a sweeping
prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin at places of public
accommodation whose operations affect commerce. [
Footnote 3] This prohibition does not extend
to discrimination or segregation at private clubs. [
Footnote 4] But, as both courts below
properly found, Lake Nixon is not a private club. It is simply a
business operated for a profit, with none of the attributes of
self-government and member ownership traditionally associated with
private clubs. It is true that, following enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Pauls began to refer to the establishment
as a private club. They even began to require
Page 395 U. S. 302
patrons to pay a 25-cent "membership" fee, which gains a
purchaser a "membership" card entitling him to enter the Club's
premises for an entire season, and, on payment of specified
additional fees, to use the swimming, boating, and miniature golf
facilities. But this "membership" device seems no more than a
subterfuge designed to avoid coverage of the 1964 Act. White
persons are routinely provided "membership" cards, and some 100,000
whites visit the establishment each season. As the District Court
found, Lake Nixon is "open in general to all of the public who are
members of the white race." 263 F. Supp. at 418. Negroes, on the
other hand, are uniformly denied "membership" cards, and thus
admission, because of the Pauls' fear that integration would "ruin"
the "business." The conclusion of the courts below that Lake Nixon
is not a private club is plainly correct -- indeed, respondent does
not challenge that conclusion here.
We therefore turn to the question whether Lake Nixon Club is "a
place of public accommodation" as defined by § 201(b) of the 1964
Act, and, if so, whether its operations "affect commerce" within
the meaning of § 201(c) of that Act.
Section 201(b) defines four categories of establishments as
covered public accommodations. Three of these categories are
relevant here:
"Each of the following establishments which serves the public is
a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if
its operations affect commerce. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any
such
Page 395 U. S. 303
facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or
any gasoline station;"
"(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
and"
"(4) any establishment (A) . . . (ii) within the premises of
which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (b)
which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered
establishment."
Section 201(c) sets forth standards for determining whether the
operations of an establishment in any of these categories affect
commerce within the meaning of Title II:
"The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the
meaning of this title if . . . (2) in the case of an establishment
described in paragraph (2) [set out
supra] . . . , it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial
portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products
which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (3) [set out
supra] .
. . , it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce, and (4) in the case of an establishment described in
paragraph (4) [set out
supra] . . . , there is physically
located within its premises an establishment the operations of
which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For
purposes of this section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States. . . ."
Petitioners argue first that Lake Nixon's snack bar is a covered
public accommodation under §§ 201(b)(2) and 201(c)(2), and that, as
such, it brings the entire establishment
Page 395 U. S. 304
within the coverage of Title II under §§ 201(b)(4) and
201(c)(4). Clearly, the snack bar is "principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises." Thus, it is a
covered public accommodation if "it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it
serves . . . has moved in commerce." We find that the snack bar is
a covered public accommodation under either of these standards.
The Pauls advertise the Lake Nixon Club in a monthly magazine
called "Little Rock Today," which is distributed to guests at
Little Rock hotels, motels, and restaurants, to acquaint them with
available tourist attractions in the area. Regular advertisements
for Lake Nixon were also broadcast over two area radio stations. In
addition, Lake Nixon has advertised in the "Little Rock Air Force
Base," a monthly newspaper published at the Little Rock Air Force
Base, in Jacksonville, Arkansas. This choice of advertising media
leaves no doubt that the Pauls were seeking broad-based patronage
from an audience which they knew to include interstate travelers.
Thus, the Lake Nixon Club unquestionably offered to serve
out-of-state visitors to the Little Rock area. And it would be
unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000 patrons actually
served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler.
[
Footnote 5] Since the Lake
Nixon Club offered to serve and served out-of-state persons, and
since the Club's snack bar was established to serve all patrons of
the entire facility, we must conclude that the snack bar offered to
serve and served out-of-state persons.
See Hamm v. Rock
Hill, 379 U. S. 306,
379 U. S. 309
(1964);
see also Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239 (C.A.4th
Cir.1968).
Page 395 U. S. 305
The record, although not as complete on this point as might be
desired, also demonstrates that a "substantial portion of the food"
served by the Lake Nixon Club snack bar has moved in interstate
commerce. The snack bar serves a limited fare -- hot dogs and
hamburgers on buns, soft drinks, and milk. The District Court took
judicial notice of the fact that the "principal ingredients going
into the bread were produced and processed in other States," and
that "certain ingredients [of the soft drinks] were probably
obtained . . . from out-of-State sources." 263 F. Supp. at 418.
Thus, at the very least, three of the four food items sold at the
snack bar contain ingredients originating outside of the State.
There can be no serious doubt that a "substantial portion of the
food" served at the snack bar has moved in interstate commerce.
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.
S. 294,
379 U. S.
296-297 (1964);
Gregory v. Meyer, 376 F.2d 509,
511, n. 1 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967).
The snack bar's status as a covered establishment automatically
brings the entire Lake Nixon facility within the ambit of Title II.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201(b)(4) and 201(c)(4), set out
supra; see H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 20;
Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (C.A. 5th
Cir.1968). [
Footnote 6]
Petitioners also argue that the Lake Nixon Club is a covered
public accommodation under §§ 201(b)(3) and 201(c)(3) of the 1964
Act. These sections proscribe discrimination by "any motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place
of exhibition or entertainment" which
"customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
Page 395 U. S. 306
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce."
Under any accepted definition of "entertainment," the Lake Nixon
Club would surely qualify as a "place of entertainment." [
Footnote 7] And indeed it advertises
itself as such. [
Footnote 8]
Respondent argues, however, that, in the context of § 201(b)(3),
"place of entertainment" refers only to establishments where
patrons are entertained as spectators or listeners, rather than
those where entertainment takes the form of direct participation in
some sport or activity. We find no support in the legislative
history for respondent's reading of the statute. The few
indications of legislative intent are to the contrary.
President Kennedy, in submitting to Congress the public
accommodations provisions of the proposed Civil Rights Act,
emphasized that
"no action is more contrary to the spirit of our democracy and
Constitution -- or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen who
seeks only equal treatment -- than the barring of that citizen from
restaurants, hotels, theatres,
recreational areas and
other public accommodations and facilities [
Footnote 9]"
(Emphasis added.) While Title II was being considered by the
Senate, a civil rights demonstration occurred at a Maryland
amusement park. The then Assistant Majority Leader of the Senate,
Hubert Humphrey, took note of the demonstration and opined that
such an amusement
Page 395 U. S. 307
park would be covered by the provisions which were eventually
enacted as Title II:
"In this particular instance, I am confident that merchandise
and facilities used in the park were transported across State
lines."
"
* * * *"
"The spectacle of national church leaders being hauled off to
jail in a paddy wagon demonstrates the absurdity of the present
situation regarding equal access to public facilities in Maryland
and the absurdity of the arguments of those who oppose title II of
the President's omnibus civil rights bill."
109 Cong.Rec. 12276 (1963). Senator Magnuson, floor manager of
Title II, spoke in a similar vein. [
Footnote 10]
Admittedly, most of the discussion in Congress regarding the
coverage of Title II focused on places of spectator entertainment,
rather than recreational areas. But it does not follow that the
scope of § 201(b)(3) should be restricted to the primary objects of
Congress' concern when a natural reading of its language would call
for broader coverage. In light of the overriding purpose of Title
II
"to remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in
discriminatory denials of access to facilities
Page 395 U. S. 308
ostensibly open to the general public,"
H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, we agree with the
en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342
(1968), that the statutory language "place of entertainment" should
be given full effect according to its generally accepted meaning
and applied to recreational areas.
The remaining question is whether the operations of the Lake
Nixon Club "affect commerce" within the meaning of 201(c)(3). We
conclude that they do. Lake Nixon's customary "sources of
entertainment . . . move in commerce." The Club leases 15 paddle
boats on a royalty basis from an Oklahoma company. Another boat was
purchased from the same company. The Club's juke box was
manufactured outside Arkansas, and plays records manufactured
outside the State. The legislative history indicates that
mechanical sources of entertainment such as these were considered
by Congress to be "sources of entertainment" within the meaning of
§ 201(c)(3). [
Footnote
11]
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioners alleged that the denial of admission also
constitutes a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as
amended, 14 Stat. 27, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Neither the District
Court nor the Court of Appeals passed on this contention. Our
conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the question.
[
Footnote 2]
Respondent at trial answered affirmatively a question of the
trial judge whether Negroes were denied admission "simply . . .
because they were Negroes." Respondent's answer to an interrogatory
why Negroes were refused admission was:
"[w]e refused admission to them because white people in our
community would not patronize us if we admitted Negroes to the
swimming pool. Our business would be ruined, and we have our entire
life savings in it."
[
Footnote 3]
Section 201(a) of the Act provides:
"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin."
[
Footnote 4]
Section 201(e) of the Act provides:
"The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club
or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to
the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made
available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within
the scope of subsection (b)."
[
Footnote 5]
The District Court, which did not find it necessary to decide
whether the snack bar served or offered to serve interstate
travelers, conceded that "It is probably true that some
out-of-State people spending time in or around Little Rock have
utilized [Lake Nixon's] facilities." 263 F. Supp. at 418.
[
Footnote 6]
Accord: Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F.
Supp. 474 (D.C.E.D. Va.1966);
United States v. Fraley,
282 F. Supp. 948 (D.C.M.D. N.C.1968);
United States v. All Star
Triangle Bowl, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 300 (D.C. S.C.1968).
[
Footnote 7]
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 757, defines
"entertainment" as "the act of diverting, amusing, or causing
someone's time to pass agreeably: [synonymous with] amusement."
[
Footnote 8]
Respondent advertised over a local radio station that "Lake
Nixon continues their policy of offering you year-round
entertainment."
[
Footnote 9]
Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job
Opportunities, June 19, 1963, in Public Papers of the Presidents,
John F. Kennedy, 1963, at 485. This statement was originally made
in a Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, Feb. 28,
1963, in Public Papers,
supra, at 228.
[
Footnote 10]
"Motion picture theaters which refuse to admit Negroes will
obviously draw patrons from a narrower segment of the market than
if they were open to patrons of all races. . . . Thus, the demand
for films from out of State, and the royalties from such films,
will be less."
"
* * * *"
"These principles are applicable not merely to motion picture
theaters, but to
other establishments which receive supplies,
equipment, or goods through the channels of interstate
commerce. If these establishments narrow their potential
markets by artificially restricting their patrons to non-Negroes,
the volume of sales and, therefore, the volume of interstate
purchases, will be less."
(Emphasis added.) 110 Cong.Rec. 7402 (1964).
[
Footnote 11]
The Senate rejected an amendment which would have ruled out most
mechanical sources by requiring that the source of entertainment be
one which has "not come to rest within a State." 110 Cong.Rec.
1391-13921 (1964).
See also the remarks of Senator
Magnuson,
supra, n
10.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I also rest on the
Fourteenth Amendment. My views were set forth in
Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U. S. 226,
378 U. S. 242,
where I said:
"Segregation of Negroes in the restaurants and lunch counters of
parts of America is a relic of slavery. It is a badge of
second-class citizenship.
Page 395 U. S. 309
It is a denial of a privilege and immunity of national
citizenship and of the equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States."
Id. 378 U. S. 260.
And see my concurring opinion in
Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U. S. 241,
379 U. S. 279
et seq.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
I could and would agree with the Court's holding in this case
had Congress, in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, based its power to bar
racial discrimination at places of public accommodations upon § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote
2/1] But Congress, in enacting this legislation, did not choose
to invoke this broad Fourteenth Amendment power to protect against
racial discrimination; instead, it tied the Act, and limited its
protection, to congressional power to regulate commerce among the
States. Both courts below found that respondent's swimming and
recreational place is covered by the Act if its operations "affect
commerce" within the meaning of § 201(c) of the Act. The Act
itself, in § 201(c), provides the test for determining whether this
respondent's recreational operations adversely affect interstate
commerce. That test is to determine from evidence whether the
operation of an establishment like respondent's (a) "serves or
offers to serve interstate travelers" or (b) "a substantial portion
of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it
sells, has moved in commerce. . . ." In order, therefore, for the
Act to be held to apply, the test must be shown to be met by
evidence and judicial
Page 395 U. S. 310
findings, not by guesswork, or assumptions, or "judicial
knowledge" of crucially relevant facts, or by unproved
probabilities or possibilities. My trouble with the Court's holding
is that it runs roughshod over District Court findings supported by
the record and emphatically affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Let
us briefly review the facts and findings on the foregoing two
separate conditions of the Act's applicability.
(A) Did Lake Nixon serve or offer to serve interstate travelers?
There is not a word of evidence showing that such an interstate
traveler was ever there, or ever invited there, or ever dreamed of
going there. Nixon Lake can be reached only by country roads. The
record fails to show whether these country roads are passable in
all kinds of weather. They seem to be at least six to eight miles
off the state or interstate roads over which interstate travelers
are accustomed to travel. Petitioners did not offer evidence to
show whether Lake Nixon is a natural lake, or whether it is simply
a small body of water obtained by building a dam across a little
creek in a narrow hollow between the hills. The District Court made
findings about Lake Nixon and Spring Lake [
Footnote 2/2] as follows:
"Both are accessible by country roads; neither is located on or
near a State or federal highway. There is no evidence that either
facility has ever tried to attract interstate travelers as such,
and the location of the facilities is such that it would be in the
highest degree unlikely that an interstate traveler would break his
trip for the purpose of utilizing either establishment."
263 F.
Supp. 412, 418.
Page 395 U. S. 311
The foregoing finding is not impaired by this additional
statement of the District Judge:
"Of course, it is probably true that some out-of-State people
spending time in or around Little Rock have utilized one or both
facilities."
Ibid. In the first place, the court's statement that
"it is probably true" takes this out of the category of a finding
of fact, and, secondly, "out-of-State people spending time in or
around Little Rock" who happened to visit Lake Nixon would
certainly not be the kind of "interstate travelers" doing the kind
of interstate traveling that would "affect" interstate
commerce.
The Court of Appeals, affirming the findings of the District
Court, said:
"There is no evidence that any interstate traveler ever
patronized this facility, or that it offered to serve interstate
travelers. . . ."
395 F.2d 118, 127. This Court rejects these joint findings of
the two courts below in this way. Referring to advertisements of
Lake Nixon in a monthly magazine distributed at Little Rock hotels,
motels, and restaurants, to radio announcements, and to
advertisements in the "Little Rock Air Force Base," this Court
says:
"Thus, the Lake Nixon Club unquestionably offered to serve
out-of-state visitors to the Little Rock area. And it would be
unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000 patrons actually
served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler."
In the above statement, this Court jumps from the fact that
there were an estimated number of admissions onto the club premises
during a season to the conclusion that some one or more of these
was an "interstate traveler," and that the owners of the premises,
Mr. and Mrs. Paul, were bound to know that there were interstate
travelers
Page 395 U. S. 312
present. [
Footnote 2/3] That
conclusion is far too speculative to be used as a means of
rejecting the solemn findings of the two courts below. If the facts
here are to be left to such "iffy" conjectures, one familiar with
country life and traveling would, it seems to me, far more likely
conclude that travelers on interstate journeys would stick to their
interstate highways, and not go miles off them by way of what, for
all this record shows, may well be dusty, unpaved, "country" roads
to go to a purely local swimming hole where the only food they
could buy was hamburgers, hot dogs, milk, and soft drinks (but not
beer). This is certainly not the pattern of interstate movements I
would expect interstate travelers in search of tourist attractions
to follow.
(B) The second prong of the test to determine applicability of
the Act to Lake Nixon is whether a "substantial portion" of the
hamburgers, milk, and soda pop sold there had previously moved in
interstate commerce. The Court's opinion generously concedes that
the record is "not as complete on this point as might be desired. .
. ." This is certainly no exaggeration. In fact, I would go further
and agree with the two courts below that the record is totally
devoid of evidence to show that a "substantial portion" of the
small amount of food sold had previously moved in interstate
commerce. The District Court found as follows on this point:
"Food and soft drinks are purchased locally by both
establishments. The record before the Court does not disclose where
or how the local suppliers obtained the products which they sold to
the establishments. The meat products sold by defendants may or may
not have come from animals raised, slaughtered, and processed in
Arkansas. The bread
Page 395 U. S. 313
used by defendants was baked and packaged locally, but judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that the principal ingredients
going into the bread were produced and processed in other States.
The soft drinks were bottled locally, but certain ingredients were
probably obtained by the bottlers from out-of-State sources."
263 F. Supp. at 418. Fact-findings on serious problems like this
one, which involves marking the jurisdictional authority of State
and Nation, should not be made on the basis of "judicial notice"
and on probabilities not based on evidence. The Court of Appeals
approved this finding of the District Court that a substantial part
of the food served at Lake Nixon had not previously moved in
interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals said:
"With regard to whether a substantial portion of the food which
Lake Nixon serves has moved in commerce, the trial court found that
food and soft drinks were purchased locally by the Club, but noted
that the record before the court did not disclose where or how the
local suppliers obtained the products. The court further observed
that the meat products sold by the defendants may or may not have
come from animals raised, slaughtered, and processed in Arkansas.
It also made an observation that the bread used in the sandwiches
was baked and packaged locally, but took judicial notice that the
principal ingredients going into the bread were produced and
processed in other states. This observation on the part of the
court, however, was entirely voluntary, and the ingredients in the
bread would not constitute a substantial part of the food served.
We might add that it is a matter of common knowledge that Borden's
of Arkansas, which the record shows supplied the milk, obtains the
unprocessed
Page 395 U. S. 314
milk for its local plant from Arkansas dairy farmers."
395 F.2d at 124.
Finally, the Court mentions, almost as an afterthought, Lake
Nixon's 15 paddle boats leased from an Oklahoma company on a
royalty basis. As to these paddle boats, the Court of Appeals
said:
"It is common knowledge that, annually, thousands of this type
boat are manufactured locally in Arkansas, and there is no evidence
whatsoever that any of the equipment moved in interstate
commerce."
395 F.2d at 125.
The Court's opinion also mentions a juke box leased by Lake
Nixon from the juke box's local owner. The Court apparently refers
to this juke box on the premise that playing music and dancing
makes an establishment the kind of place sf "entertainment" that is
covered by § 201(b)(3) of the Act. [
Footnote 2/4] The Court of Appeals pointed out that
Senator Magnuson, floor manager of this part of the Act, said that
dance studios would be exempt under the Act. 110 Cong.Rec. 7406.
Also, Senator Humphrey, a leading proponent of the measure,
said:
"The deletion of the coverage of retail establishments generally
is illustrative of the moderate nature of this bill, and of its
intent to deal only with the problems which urgently require
solution."
110 Cong.Rec. 6533.
Page 395 U. S. 315
See also Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394
F.2d 342.
It seems clear to me that neither the paddle boats nor the
locally leased juke box is sufficient to justify a holding that the
operation of Lake Nixon affects interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Act. While it is the duty of courts to enforce this
important Act, we are not called on to hold, nor should we hold,
subject to that Act this country people's recreation center, lying
in what may be, so far as we know, a little "sleepy hollow" between
Arkansas hills miles away from any interstate highway. This would
be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal
Government complete control over every little remote country place
of recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and county
in every one of the 50 States. This goes too far for me. [
Footnote 2/5] I would affirm the judgments
of the two courts below.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
U.S.Const., Amdt. XIV, § 5.
See concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Clark, which I joined, in
United States v.
Guest, 383 U. S. 745,
383 U. S.
761.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The District Court held hearings and made findings concerning
Lake Nixon and another establishment, Spring Lake, in a single
trial. No appeal was taken from the District Court's decision
holding that Spring Lake was not covered by the Act.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In fact, Mr. Paul testified under oath that no interstate
travelers were members of the "club," that they had not invited any
to join, and that, as far as he knew, none had ever used the
premises.
[
Footnote 2/4]
"(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of
this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment;"
An establishment affects commerce within the meaning of this
subsection if, according to § 201(c) of the Act,
"it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/5]
In my opinion in
Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U. S. 241,
379 U. S. 268,
which also applies to
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.
S. 294, concurring in the Court's decision upholding the
application of this Act to an Atlanta, Georgia, motel and a
Birmingham, Alabama, restaurant, I said:
"I recognize that every remote, possible, speculative effect on
commerce should not be accepted as an adequate constitutional
ground to uproot and throw into the discard all our traditional
distinctions between what is purely local, and therefore controlled
by state laws, and what affects the national interest and is
therefore subject to control by federal laws. I recognize too that
some isolated and remote lunchroom which sells only to local people
and buys almost all its supplies in the locality may possibly be
beyond the reach of the power of Congress to regulate commerce,
just as such an establishment is not covered by the present
Act."
379 U.S. at
379 U. S.
275.