The construction of a state statute by the highest court of the
state must be accepted by this Court even though similar statutes
of other states have been differently construed by the highest
courts of those states.
A treaty between the United States and a foreign government
within the constitutional limits of the treaty making power is, by
the express words of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land,
binding alike on national and state courts, and must be enforced by
them in the litigation of private rights.
While undoubtedly the giving of actions for injury and death
results in care and security against accidents to travelers, the
protection and security thus afforded are too remote to be
considered as elements in contemplation of the contracting powers
to the Treaty of 1871 between Italy and the United States.
By a fair construction, Articles 2, 3 and 23 of the Treaty with
Italy of 1871, 17 Stat. 845, do not confer upon the nonresident
alien relatives of a citizen of Italy a right of action for damages
for his death in one of the states of this Union although such an
action is afforded by a statute of that state to native resident
relatives, and although the existence of such an action might
indirectly promote his safety, and so
held as to the
statute of Pennsylvania, it having been so construed by the highest
court of that state.
216 Pa.St. 402 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 213 U. S. 271
MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The husband of the plaintiff in error was killed while a
passenger on a train by the negligence of the defendant. The death
occurred within the State of Pennsylvania, and this action was
brought in a court of that state to recover damages for it.
Page 213 U. S. 272
The plaintiff was a resident of Italy and a subject of the King
of Italy. By the statutory law of the State of Pennsylvania (Act of
April 15, 1851, P.L. 669, pars. 18 and 19, as amended by the Act of
April 26, 1855, P.L. 309, par. 1), the right to recover damages for
death occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence is, in certain
cases, conferred upon the husband, wife, children, or parents of
the person killed. By its literal terms, the benefits of the
statute are extended to all such surviving relatives, irrespective
of their condition. It has, however, been held by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in the case of
Deni v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 181 Pa. 525, as well as in the case at bar, that this
statute does not give to relatives of the deceased, who are
nonresident aliens, the right of action therein provided for. There
is nothing in this case to take it out of the general rule that the
construction of a state statute by the highest court of the state
must be accepted by this Court. It is therefore not material that
similar statutes have been differently construed, as, for instance,
in
Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, and
Kellyville
Coal Co. v. Petraytis, 195 Ill. 217.
The plaintiff rests her right to recover not upon this statute
alone, but upon certain provisions of a treaty between the United
States and the King of Italy, ratifications of which were exchanged
on November 18, 1871. 17 Stat. 845. She asserts that the effect of
the treaty was to confer upon the plaintiff the same right to
recover damages for the death of her husband that she would have
enjoyed by the statute of the State of Pennsylvania if she had been
a resident and citizen of that state. The contention of the
plaintiff in this respect was denied by the trial court, which
granted a judgment of nonsuit, which was affirmed by the supreme
court of the state, and is now here on writ of error. The only
question for our decision is whether a proper interpretation and
effect were allowed to the treaty.
We do not deem it necessary to consider the constitutional
limits of the treatymaking power. A treaty, within those
Page 213 U. S. 273
limits, by the express words of the Constitution, is the supreme
law of the land, binding alike national and state courts, and is
capable of enforcement, and must be enforced by them in the
litigation of private rights.
Ware v. Hylton,
3 Dall. 199;
United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103,
5
U. S. 110;
Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253,
27 U. S. 314;
Haguenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483; per
Mr. Justice Miller, in
Head Money Cases, 112 U.
S. 580,
112 U. S. 598,
quoted with approval by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER in
In re
Cooper, 143 U. S. 472,
143 U. S. 501;
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.
S. 407,
119 U. S. 418;
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258.
We put our decision upon the words of the treaty. By a fair
interpretation of them, did they directly confer upon the plaintiff
the right which she seeks to maintain? We are of the opinion that
they did not.
Three Articles only are relied on as material. They are:
"
Article 2"
"The citizens of each of the high contracting parties shall have
liberty to travel in the states and territories of the other, to
carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to hire and occupy houses and
warehouses, to employ agents of their choice, and generally to do
anything incident to or necessary for trade, upon the same terms as
the natives of the country, submitting themselves to the laws there
established."
"
Article 3"
"The citizens of each of the high contracting parties shall
receive, in the states and territories of the other, the most
constant protection and security for their persons and property,
and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as
are, or shall be, granted to the natives, on their submitting
themselves to the conditions imposed upon the natives."
"
Article 23"
"The citizens of either party shall have free access to the
courts of justice, in order to maintain and defend their own
rights, without any other conditions, restrictions, or taxes
than
Page 213 U. S. 274
such as are imposed upon the natives. They shall therefore be
free to employ, in defense of their rights, such advocates,
solicitors, notaries, agents, and factors as they may judge proper,
in all their trials at law, and such citizens or agents shall have
free opportunity to be present at the decisions and sentences of
the tribunals in all cases which may concern them, and, likewise at
the taking of all examinations and evidences which may be exhibited
in the said trials."
Article 23 bestows upon citizens of either power, whether
resident or nonresident, free access to the courts, "in order to
maintain and defend their own rights," with the ancillary
privileges of suitors. This Article does not define substantive
rights, but leaves them to be ascertained by the law governing the
courts, and administered and enforced in them.
Articles 2 and 3 deal with the rights of the citizens of one
party sojourning in the territory of the other. There seems to be
nothing pertinent to the case in Article 2. But special stress is
laid upon Article 3, which stipulates for the citizen of each, in
the territory of the other, equality with the natives of rights and
privileges in respect of protection and security of person and
property. It cannot be contended that protection and security for
the person or property of the plaintiff herself have been withheld
from her in the territory of the United States, because neither she
nor her property has ever been within that territory. She herself,
therefore, is entirely outside the scope of the article. The
argument, however, is that, if the right of action for her
husband's death is denied to her, that he, the husband, has not
enjoyed the equality of protection and security for his person
which this article of the treaty assures to him. It is said that,
if compensation for his death is withheld from his surviving
relatives, a motive for caring for his safety is removed, the
chance of his death by unlawful violence or negligence is
increased, and thereby the protection and security of his person
are materially diminished. The conclusion is drawn that a full
compliance with the treaty demands that, for his protection and
security, this action by his surviving
Page 213 U. S. 275
relatives should lie. The argument is not without force.
Doubtless one reason which has induced legislators to give to
surviving relatives an action for death has been the hope that care
for life would be stimulated. This thought was dwelt upon in
Mulhall v. Fallon, supra, in considering a statute which
made the amount recoverable dependent upon the degree of
culpability of the negligent person. Another reason for such
legislation, quite as potent, was the desire to secure compensation
to those who might be supposed to suffer directly and materially by
the death. This thought seems to have been uppermost in
Pennsylvania, according to the courts of that state.
See
Chambers v. B. & O. R. Co., 207 U.
S. 142, and cases cited. Without dwelling further upon
the purpose and effect of legislation of this kind, and assuming
that both might be calculated in some degree to increase the
protection and security of persons who may be exposed to dangers,
we are of opinion that the protection and security thus afforded
are so indirect and remote that the contracting powers cannot
fairly be thought to have had them in contemplation.
If an Italian subject, sojourning in this country, is himself
given all the direct protection and security afforded by the laws
to our own people, including all rights of actions for himself or
his personal representatives to safeguard the protection and
security, the treaty is fully complied with, without going further
and giving to his nonresident alien relatives a right of action for
damages for his death, although such action is afforded to native
resident relatives and although the existence of such an action may
indirectly promote his safety.
Judgment affirmed.