Tayloe v. SandifordAnnotate this Case
20 U.S. 13 (1822)
U.S. Supreme Court
Tayloe v. Sandiford, 20 U.S. 7 Wheat. 13 13 (1822)
Tayloe v. Sandiford
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 13
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COUNTY
OF THE COUNTY OF ALEXANDRIA
In general, a sum of money in gross to be paid for the nonperformance of an agreement is considered as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages.
A fortiori when if is expressly reserved as a penalty.
Thus where, in a building contract, the following covenant was contained, "the said houses to be completely finished on or before 24 December next, under a penalty of one thousand dollars in case of failure," it was held that this was not intended as liquidated damages for the breach of that single covenant only, but applied to all the covenants made by the same party in that agreement; that it was in the nature of a penalty, and could not be set off in an action brought by the party to recover the price of the work.
An agreement to perform certain work within a limited time under a certain penalty is not to be construed as liquidating the damages which the party is to pay for the breach of his covenant.
A person owing money under distinct contracts has a right to apply his payments to whichever debt he may choose, and this power may be exercised without any express directions given at the time.
A direction may be evidenced by circumstances as well as by words, and a positive refusal to pay one debt and an acknowledgement of another with a delivery of the sum due upon it would be such a circumstance.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the County of Alexandria, rendered in an action of assumpsit, brought by T. & S. Sandiford against John Tayloe. It appeared on the trial of the cause that on 13 May, 1816, the parties entered into a written contract by
which the defendants in error undertook to build for the plaintiff three houses on the Pennsylvania avenue in the City of Washington. On the 18th day of the same month, the parties entered into a contract under seal for the building of three additional houses at a stipulated price. This contract contains the following covenant: "The said houses to be completely finished on or before 24 December next under a penalty of $1,000 in case of failure."
The parties entered into a third verbal contract for some additional work, to be measured and paid for according to measurement.
These three houses were not completed by the day, and the plaintiff in error claimed the sum of $1,000 as stipulated damages, and retained it out of the money due to the defendants in error. This suit was thereupon brought, and on the trial of the cause the defendant in the circuit court claimed to set off in this action $1,000 as in the nature of stipulated damages, but the court overruled this claim and decided that the said sum of $1,000 had been received in the nature of a penalty, and could not be set off in this action.
The defendant then moved the court to instruct the jury that
"upon the evidence offered, if believed, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover in this action the said sum of $1,000 inasmuch as the same, if due at all, was due under a contract under seal, and that the declarations of the defendant, and the understanding between the parties as to the reservation of the said $1,000 given in evidence
as aforesaid, was competent and sufficient evidence of the defendants' intention to apply his payment to the extinguishment in the first instance of such parts of the said moneys as were due by simple contract, and to reserve the $1,000 out of the money due under the said original contract."
This instruction the court refused to give, and did instruct the jury
"That it was competent to the plaintiffs to recover the said $1,000 in this action unless they should be satisfied by the evidence that the defendant, at the time of paying the money, had expressly directed the same or a sufficient part thereof to the payment of the $1,500 due on the simple contract."
To both these opinions the defendant excepted, and the jury having given a verdict for the plaintiff in the circuit court, this writ of error was brought to the judgment rendered thereon.
It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the circuit court erred.
1st. In overruling the claim to offset the $1,000 mentioned in the agreement.
2d. In declaring that the plaintiff in that court might so apply the payments made as to discharge the contract under seal and leave the sum retained by the defendant in that court to be demanded under the simple contract.
1. Is the sum of $1,000 mentioned in the agreement of 13 May to be considered as a penalty, or as stipulated damages?
The words of the reservation are, "The said house to be completely finished on or before 24
December next, under the penalty of $1,000, in case of failure."
In general, a sum of money in gross to be paid for the nonperformance of an agreement is considered as a penalty, the legal operation of which is to cover the damages which the party in whose favor the stipulation is made may have sustained from the breach of contract by the opposite party. It will not, of course, be considered as liquidated damages, and it will be incumbent on the party who claims them as such to show that they were so considered by the contracting parties. Much stronger is the inference in favor of its being a penalty when it is expressly reserved as one. The parties themselves denominate it a penalty, and it would require very strong evidence to authorize the court to say that their own words do not express their own intention. These writings appear to have been drawn on great deliberation, and no slight conjecture would justify the court in saying that the parties were mistaken in the import of the terms they have employed.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error supposes that the contract furnishes clear evidence that the parties intended this sum as liquidated damages. The circumstance that it is annexed to the single covenant stipulating the time when the work shall be completed is considered as showing that it was intended to fix the damages for the breach of that covenant.
Without deciding on the weight to which this argument would be entitled if supported by the fact, the Court cannot admit that it is so supported. The engagement that the said houses shall be completely
finished on or before 24 December next is as much an engagement for the manner as for the time of finishing the work, and covers, we think, all the covenants made by the defendants in error in that agreement. The case therefore presents the single question whether an agreement to perform certain work by a limited time under a certain penalty is to be construed as liquidating the damages which the party is to pay for a breach of his covenant. This question seems to have been decided in the case of Smith v. Dickenson, reported in 3 Bos. & Pull. 630.
The plaintiff in error relies on the case of Fletcher v. Dycke, reported in 2 T.R. 32., in which an agreement was entered into to do certain work within a certain time, and if the work should not be done within the time specified, "to forfeit and pay the sum of
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