There is no merit in the contention that Article 401 of the
Penal Code of Cuba, which provides that the public employee who, by
reason of his office, has in his charge public funds or property,
and takes or consents that others should take any part therefrom,
shall be punished, applies only to persons in the public employ of
Spain. Spain having withdrawn from the island, its successor has
become "the public," to which the code, remaining unrepealed, now
refers.
Within the meaning of the Act of June 6, 1900, c. 793, 31 Stat.
656, providing for the surrender of persons committing defined
crimes within a foreign country occupied by or under the control of
the United States and fleeing to the United States, or any
territory thereof, or the District of Columbia, Cuba is foreign
territory which cannot be regarded in any constitutional, legal or
international sense as a part of the territory of the United
States, and this is not affected by the fact that it is under a
military governor appointed by and representing the President in
the work of assisting the inhabitants of the island in establishing
a. government of their own.
As between the United States and Cuba, that island is territory
held in trust for its inhabitants, to whom it rightfully belongs
and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered when a stable
government shall have been established by their voluntary
action.
The Act of June 6, 1900, is not unconstitutional in that it does
not secure to the accused when surrendered to a foreign country for
trial all the rights,
Page 180 U. S. 110
privileges and immunities that are guaranteed by the
Constitution to persons charged with the commission in this country
of crime against the United States.
The provisions in the Constitution relating to writs of habeas
corpus, bills of attainder,
ex post facto laws, trial by
jury for crimes, and generally to the fundamental guarantees of
life, liberty, and property embodied in that instrument have no
relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United
States against the laws of a foreign country.
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country,
he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and
to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for
its own people unless a different mode be provided for by treaty
stipulations between that country and the United States.
The contention that the United States recognized the existence
of an established government known as the Republic of Cuba, but is
now using its military or executive power to overthrow it, is
without merit.
The Act of June 6, 1900, is not in violation of the Constitution
of the United States, and this case comes within its provisions;
and, the court below having found that there was probable cause to
believe the appellant guilty of the offenses charged, the order for
his extradition was proper, and no ground existed for his discharge
on habeas corpus.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
By section 5270 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it
is provided:
"Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition
between the government of the United States and any foreign
government, any justice of the Supreme Court, circuit judge,
district judge, commissioner, authorized so to do by any of the
courts of the United States, or judge of a court of record of
general jurisdiction of any state, may, upon complaint made under
oath, charging any person found within the limits of any state,
district, or territory with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
Page 180 U. S. 111
provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought
before such justice, judge, or commissioner to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such
hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall
certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue
upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign
government for the surrender of such person according to the
stipulations of the treaty or convention, and he shall issue his
warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper
jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made."
This section was amended by Congress June 6, 1900, by adding
thereto the following proviso:
"
Provided, That whenever any
foreign country
or territory, or any part thereof,
is occupied by or
under the control of the United States, any person who shall
violate, or who has violated, the criminal laws
in force
therein, by the commission of any of the following offenses,
namely: murder, and assault with intent to commit murder;
counterfeiting or altering money; counterfeiting certificates or
coupons of public indebtedness, bank notes, or other instruments of
public credit, and the utterance or circulation of the same;
forgery or altering, and uttering what is forged or altered;
embezzlement or criminal malversation of the public funds,
committed by public officers, employees, or depositaries;
larceny or embezzlement of an amount not less than one hundred
dollars in value, burglary, defined to be the breaking and entering
by night-time into the house of another person with intent to
commit a felony therein, and the act of breaking and entering the
house or building of another, whether, in the day or night time,
with the intent to commit a felony therein; the act of entering or
of breaking and entering the offices of the government and public
authorities, or the offices of banks, banking houses, savings
banks, trust companies, insurance, or other companies, with the
Page 180 U. S. 112
intent to commit a felony therein; perjury or the subornation of
perjury; rape; arson; piracy by the law of nations; murder, assault
with intent to kill, and manslaughter, committed on the high seas,
on board a ship owned by or in control of citizens or residents of
such foreign country or territory and not under the flag of the
United States or of some other government; malicious destruction of
or attempt to destroy railways, trams, vessels, bridges, dwellings,
public edifices, or other buildings, when the act endangers human
life,
and who shall depart or flee, or who has departed or
fled, from justice therein to the United States, or to any
territory thereof, or to the District of Columbia, shall, when
found therein, be liable to arrest and detention by the authorities
of the United States, and
on the written request or requisition
of the military governor or other chief executive officer in
control of such foreign country or territory shall be returned and
surrendered, as hereinafter provided, to such authorities for
trial under the laws in force
in the place where such offense
was committed. All the provisions of sections fifty-two
hundred and seventy to fifty-two hundred and seventy-seven of this
title, so far as applicable, shall govern proceedings authorized by
this proviso:
Provided further, That such proceedings
shall be had
before a judge of the courts of the United States
only, who shall hold such person on evidence establishing probable
cause that he is guilty of the offense charged: And provided
further, That no return or surrender shall be made of any
person charged with the commission of an offense of a political
nature. If so held, such person shall be returned and surrendered
to the authorities in control of such foreign country or territory
on the order of the Secretary of State of the United States, and
such authorities shall secure to such person a fair and impartial
trial."
31 Stat. 656, c. 793.
On the 28th day of June, 1900, a warrant was issued by Judge
Lacombe of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York commanding the arrest of Charles F. W. Neely,
who,
"being then and there a public employee, to-wit, finance agent
of the department of posts in the City of Havana, Island of Cuba,
on the 6th day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine
hundred, or about that
Page 180 U. S. 113
time, having then and there charge of the collection and deposit
of moneys of the department of posts of the said City of Havana,
did unlawfully and feloniously take and embezzle from the public
funds of the said Island of Cuba the sum of $10,000 and more, being
then and there moneys and funds which had come into his charge and
under his control in his capacity as such public employee and
finance agent, as aforesaid, and by reason of his said office and
employment, thereby violating chapter 10, article 401, of the Penal
Code of the said Island of Cuba -- that is to say, a crime within
the meaning of the said act of Congress approved June 6, 1900, as
aforesaid, relating to the 'embezzlement or criminal malversation
of the public funds committed by public officers, employees, or
depositaries.' The warrant directed the accused to be brought
before the judge in order that the evidence of probable cause as to
his guilt could be heard and considered, and, if deemed sufficient,
that the same might be certified, with a copy of all the
proceedings, to the Secretary of State, that an order might issue
for his return and surrender pursuant to the authority of the above
act of Congress."
The warrant of arrest was based on a verified written complaint
of an assistant United States attorney for the Southern District of
New York.
On the same day and upon a like complaint, a warrant was issued
against Neely by the same judge commanding his arrest for the crime
of having unlawfully and fraudulently, while employed in and
connected with the business and operations of a branch of the
service of the Department of Posts in Havana, Cuba, between July 1,
1899, and May 1, 1900, embezzled and converted to his own use
postage stamps, moneys, funds, and property belonging to and in the
custody of that department, which had come into his custody and
under his authority as such employee, to the amount of $57,000, in
violation of sections 37 and 55 of the Postal Code of Cuba.
Neely having been arrested under these warrants, application was
made by the United States for his extradition to Cuba. The accused
moved to dismiss the complaints upon various grounds. That motion
having been denied, the case was heard
Page 180 U. S. 114
upon evidence. In disposing of the application for extradition,
Judge Lacombe said:
"In the opinion of this Court, the government has abundantly
shown that there is probable cause to believe that Neely is guilty
of the offense of 'embezzlement or criminal malversation of the
public funds,' he being at the time a 'public officer,' or
'employee,' or 'depositary.' Such an offense is obnoxious to the
Penal Code in force in Cuba, article 401 of which provides
that"
"the public employee who, by reason of his office, has in his
charge public funds or property, and who should take (or consent
that others should take) any part therefrom, shall be
punished,"
"etc. There is no merit in the contention that this article
applies only to persons in the public employ of Spain. Spain having
withdrawn from the island, its successor has become the 'public' to
which the Code, remaining unrepealed, now refers. The suggestion
that under this Penal Code, no public employee could be prosecuted
or punished until his superior had heard the case and turned the
offender over to the criminal law for trial is matter of defense,
and need not be considered here. The evidence shows probable cause
to believe that the prisoner is guilty of an offense defined in the
Act of June 6, 1900, and which is also a violation of the criminal
laws in Cuba, and upon such evidence he will be held for
extradition."
But it was further said:
"Two obstacles . . . now exist. He [the accused] has been held
to bail in this court upon a criminal charge of bringing into this
district government funds embezzled in another district. He has
also been arrested in a civil action brought in this court to
recover $45,000 which it is alleged he has converted. When both of
these proceedings have been discontinued, the order in extradition
will be signed. This may be done on August 13 at 11 A.M."
Subsequently, August 9, 1900, Neely presented in the court below
his written application for a writ of habeas corpus, and prayed
that he be discharged from restraint in the extradition
proceedings. He claimed on various grounds that the Act of June 6,
1900, under which he was arrested, detained, and imprisoned was in
violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The application for the writ of habeas corpus having been
Page 180 U. S. 115
denied and an appeal having been duly taken, the petitioner was
remanded to the custody of the marshall to await the determination
of such appeal in this Court.
I. That at the date of the Act of June 6, 1900, the Island of
Cuba was "occupied by" and was "under the control of the United
States" and that it is still so occupied and controlled cannot be
disputed. This Court will take judicial notice that such were at
the date named and are now, the relations between this country and
Cuba. So that the applicability of the above act to the present
case -- and this is the first question to be examined -- depends
upon the inquiry whether, within its meaning, Cuba is to be deemed
a
foreign country or territory.
We do not think this question at all difficult of solution if
regard be had to the avowed objects intended to be accomplished by
the war with Spain and by the military occupation of that island.
Let us see what were those objects as they are disclosed by
official documents and by the public acts of the representatives of
the United States.
On the 20th day of April, 1898, Congress passed a joint
resolution, the preamble of which recited that the abhorrent
conditions existing for more than three years in the Island of
Cuba, so near our own borders, had shocked the moral sense of the
people of the United States, had been a disgrace to civilization,
culminating in the destruction of a United States battleship, with
two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a
friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and could not longer be
endured. It was therefore resolved:
"1. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent."
"2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government
in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from
Cuba and Cuban waters."
"3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby
is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several states, to such extent as
may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect."
"4. That the
Page 180 U. S. 116
United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination,
when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of
the island to its people."
30 Stat. 738.
The adoption of this joint resolution was followed by the Act of
April 25, 1898, by which Congress declared:
"1. That war be, and the same is, hereby declared to exist, and
that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including
said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain."
"2. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby
is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several states to such extent as
may be necessary to carry this act into effect."
30 Stat. 364, c. 189.
The war lasted but a few months. The success of the American
Arms was so complete and overwhelming that a Protocol of Agreement
between the United States and Spain embodying the terms of a basis
for the establishment of peace between the two countries was signed
at Washington on the 12th of August, 1898. By that agreement it was
provided that "Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over
and title to Cuba," and that the respective countries would each
appoint commissioners to meet at Paris and there proceed to the
negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. 30 Stat. 1742.
Commissioners possessing full authority from their respective
governments for that purpose having met in Paris, a treaty of peace
was signed on December 10, 1898, and, ratifications having been
duly exchanged, it was proclaimed April 11, 1899. 30 Stat.
1754.
That treaty contained, among other provisions, the
following:
"Art. I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain,
to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so
long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the
obligations that may under international law result from the fact
of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. "
Page 180 U. S. 117
"Art. XVI. It is understood that any obligations assumed in this
treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the
time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of
such occupancy, advise any government established in the island to
assume the same obligations."
30 Stat. 1754-1761.
On the 13th of December, 1898, an order was issued by the
Secretary of War stating that, by direction of the President, a
division to be known as the Division of Cuba, consisting of the
geographical departments and provinces of the Island of Cuba, with
headquarters at Havana, was created and placed under the command of
Major General John R. Brooke, United States Army, who was required,
in addition to his command of the troops in the division, to
"exercise the authority of military governor of the island." And on
December 28, 1898, General Brooke, by a formal order, in accordance
with the order of the President, assumed command of that division,
and announced that he would exercise the authority of military
governor of the island.
On the 1st day of January, 1899 at the palace of the Spanish
governor general in Havana, the sovereignty of Spain was formally
relinquished and General Brooke immediately entered upon the full
exercise of his duties as military governor of Cuba.
Upon assuming the positions of military governor and major
general commanding the division of Cuba, General Brooke issued to
the people of Cuba the following proclamation:
"Coming among you as the representative of the President, in
furtherance and in continuation of the humane purpose with which my
country interfered to put an end to the distressing condition in
this island, I deem it proper to say that the object of the present
government is to give protection to the people, security to person
and property, to restore confidence, to encourage the people to
resume the pursuits of peace, to build up waste plantations, to
resume commercial traffic, and to afford full protection in the
exercise of all civil and religious rights. To this end, the
protection of the United States government will be directed, and
every possible provision made to carry
Page 180 U. S. 118
out these objects through the channels of
civil
administration, although under military control, in the
interest and for the benefit of all the people of Cuba and those
possessed of rights and property in the island. The civil and
criminal code which prevailed prior to the relinquishment of
Spanish sovereignty will remain in force, with such modifications
and changes as may from time to time be found necessary in the
interest of good government. The people of Cuba, without regard to
previous affiliations, are invited and urged to cooperate in these
objects by the exercise of moderation, conciliation, and good will
one toward another, and a hearty accord in our humanitarian
purposes will insure kind and beneficient government. The military
governor of the island will always be pleased to confer with those
who may desire to consult him on matters of public interest."
On the 11th day of January, 1899, the military governor,
"in pursuance of the authority vested in him by the President of
the United States, and in order to secure a better organization of
the civil service in the Island of Cuba,"
ordered that thereafter "the civil government shall be
administered by four departments, each under the charge of its
appropriate secretary," to be known, respectively, as the
departments of state and government, of finance, of justice and
public instruction, and of agriculture, commerce, industries and
public works, each under the charge of a secretary. To these
secretaries "were transferred, by the officers in charge of them,
the various bureaus of the Spanish civil government." Subsequently,
by order of the military governor, a supreme court for the island
was created, with jurisdiction throughout Cuban territory, composed
of a president or chief justice, six associate justices, one
fiscal, two assistant fiscals, one secretary or chief clerk, two
deputy clerks, and other subordinate employees, with administrative
functions, as well as those of a court of justice in civil and
criminal matters. By order of a later date, issued by the military
governor, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of criminal
jurisdiction was defined.
Under date of July 21, 1899, by direction of the military
governor, a code known as the Postal Code was promulgated
Page 180 U. S. 119
and declared to be the law relating to postal affairs in Cuba.
That Code abrogated all laws then existing in Cuba inconsistent
with its provisions. It provided that the director general of posts
of the island should have the control and management of the
department of posts, and prescribed numerous criminal offenses,
affixing the punishments for each. It is not disputed that one of
the offenses charged against Neely is included in those defined in
the Postal Code established by the military governor of Cuba, and
that the other is embraced by the Penal Code of that island which
was in force when the war ensued with Spain, and which by order of
the military governor remained in force, subject to such
modifications as might be found necessary in the interest of good
government.
On the 13th day of June, 1900, the present military governor of
Cuba, General Leonard Wood, made his requisition upon the President
for the extradition of Neely under the act of Congress.
The facts above detailed make it clear that, within the meaning
of the Act of June 6, 1900, Cuba is foreign territory. It cannot be
regarded, in any constitutional, legal, or international sense, a
part of the Territory of the United States.
While by the Act of April 25, 1898, declaring war between this
country and Spain, the President was directed and empowered to use
our entire land and naval forces, as well as the militia of the
several states, to such extent as was necessary to carry such act
into effect, that authorization was not for the purpose of making
Cuba an integral part of the United States, but only for the
purpose of compelling the relinquishment by Spain of its authority
and government in that island and the withdrawal of its forces from
Cuba and Cuban waters. The legislative and executive branches of
the government, by the joint resolution of April 20, 1898,
expressly disclaimed any purpose to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over Cuba "except for the pacification
thereof," and asserted the determination of the United States, that
object being accomplished, to leave the government and control of
Cuba to its own people. All that has been done in relation to Cuba
has had that end in view, and, so far as the Court is informed by
the public history of the relations
Page 180 U. S. 120
of this country with that island, nothing has been done
inconsistent with the declared object of the war with Spain.
Cuba is nonetheless foreign territory, within the meaning of the
act of Congress, because it is under a military governor appointed
by and representing the President in the work of assisting the
inhabitants of that island to establish a government of their own,
under which, as a free and independent people, they may control
their own affairs without interference by other nations. The
occupancy of the island by troops of the United States was the
necessary result of the war. That result could not have been
avoided by the United States consistently with the principles of
international law or with its obligations to the people of
Cuba.
It is true that, as between Spain and the United States --
indeed, as between the United States and all foreign nations --
Cuba, upon the cessation of hostilities with Spain and after the
treaty of Paris, was to be treated as if it were conquered
territory. But as between the United States and Cuba, that island
is territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba, to whom it
rightfully belongs and to whose exclusive control it will be
surrendered when a stable government shall have been established by
their voluntary action.
In his message to Congress of December 6, 1898, the President
said that
"as soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the
island, it will be necessary to give aid and direction to its
people to form a government for themselves,"
and that, "until there is complete tranquility in the island and
a stable government inaugurated, military occupation will be
continued." Nothing in the treaty of Paris stands in the way of
this declared object, and nothing existed at the date of the
passage of the Act of June 6, 1900, indicating any change in the
policy of our government as defined in the joint resolution of
April 20, 1898. In reference to the declaration in that resolution
of the purposes of the United States in relation to Cuba, the
President, in his annual message of December 5, 1899, said that the
pledge contained in it "is of the highest honorable obligation, and
must be sacredly kept." Indeed, the treaty of Paris contemplated
only a temporary occupancy and
Page 180 U. S. 121
control of Cuba by the United States. While it was taken for
granted by the treaty that, upon the evacuation by Spain, the
island would be occupied by the United States, the treaty provided
that, "so long as such occupation shall last," the United States
should
"assume and discharge the obligations that may, under
international law, result from the fact of its occupation for the
protection of life and property."
It further provided that any obligations assumed by the United
States, under the treaty, with respect to Cuba, were "limited to
the time of its occupancy thereof," but that the United States,
upon the termination of such occupancy, should "advise any
government established in the island to assume the same
obligations."
It cannot be doubted that, when the United States enforced the
relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty in Cuba and determined
to occupy and control that island until there was complete
tranquility in all its borders and until the people of Cuba had
created for themselves a stable government, it succeeded to the
authority of the displaced government so far, at least, that it
became its duty, under international law and pending the
pacification of the island, to protect in all appropriate legal
modes the lives, the liberty, and the property of all those who
submitted to the authority of the representatives of this country.
That duty was recognized in the treaty of Paris, and the Act of
June 6, 1900, so far as it applied to cases arising in Cuba, was in
aid or execution of that treaty, and in discharge of the
obligations imposed by its provisions upon the United States. The
power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution as well the powers enumerated in Section 8
of Article I of the Constitution as all others vested in the
government of the United States, or in any department or the
officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as
is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is
competent for the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power. What
legislation by Congress could be more appropriate for the
protection of life and property in Cuba, while occupied and
controlled by the United States, than legislation securing the
return to that island, to be tried by its
Page 180 U. S. 122
constituted authorities, of those who, having committed crimes
there, fled to this country to escape arrest, trial, and
punishment? No crime is mentioned in the extradition Act of June 6,
1900, that does not have some relation to the safety of life and
property. And the provisions of that act requiring the surrender of
any public officer, employee, or depositary fleeing to the United
States after having committed in a foreign country or territory
occupied by or under the control of the United States the crime of
"embezzlement or criminal malversation of the public funds" have
special application to Cuba in its present relations to this
country.
We must not be understood, however, as saying that, but for the
obligation imposed by the treaty of Paris upon the United States to
protect life and property in Cuba pending its occupancy and control
of that island, Congress would have been without power to enact
such a statute as that of June 6, 1900, so far as it embraced
citizens of the United States or persons found in the United States
who had committed crimes in the foreign territory so occupied and
controlled by the United States for temporary purposes. That
question is not open on this record for examination, and upon it we
express no opinion. It is quite sufficient in this case to adjudge,
as we now do, that it was competent for Congress, by legislation,
to enforce or give efficacy to the provisions of the treaty made by
the United States and Spain with respect to the Island of Cuba and
its people.
II. It is contended that the Act of June 6, 1900, is
unconstitutional and void in that it does not secure to the
accused, when surrendered to a foreign country for trial in its
tribunals, all of the rights, privileges, and immunities that are
guaranteed by the Constitution to persons charged with the
commission in this country of crime against the United States.
Allusion is here made to the provisions of the federal Constitution
relating to the writ of habeas corpus, bills of attainder,
ex
post facto laws, trial by jury for crimes, and generally to
the fundamental guaranties of life, liberty, and property embodied
in that instrument. The answer to this suggestion is that those
provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the
jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign
country.
Page 180 U. S. 123
In connection with the above proposition, we are reminded of the
fact that the appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such
citizenship does not give him an immunity to commit crime in other
countries, nor entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any
other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose
laws he has violated and from whose justice he has fled. When an
American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot
complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such
punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own
people unless a different mode be provided for by treaty
stipulations between that country and the United States. By the act
in question, the appellant cannot be extradited except upon the
order of a judge of a court of the United States, and then only
upon evidence establishing probable cause to believe him guilty of
the offense charged, and when tried in the country to which he is
sent, he is secured by the same act "a fair and impartial trial" --
not necessarily a trial according to the mode prescribed by this
country for crimes committed against its laws, but a trial
according to the modes established in the country where the crime
was committed, provided such trial be had without discrimination
against the accused because of his American citizenship. In the
judgment of Congress, these provisions were deemed adequate to the
ends of justice in cases of persons committing crimes in a foreign
country or territory "occupied by or under the control of the
United States," and subsequently fleeing to this country. We cannot
adjudge that Congress in this matter has abused its discretion, nor
decline to enforce obedience to its will as expressed in the Act of
June 6, 1900.
III. Another contention of the appellant is that, as Congress,
by the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, declared that "the
people of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent," and as peace has existed since at least the military
forces of Spain evacuated Cuba on or about January, 1899, the
occupancy and control of that island under the military authority
of the United States is without warrant in the Constitution, and an
unauthorized interference with the internal affairs of a friendly
power; consequently, it is argued, the appellant
Page 180 U. S. 124
should not be extradited for trial in the courts established
under the orders issued by the military governor of the island. In
support of this proposition, it is said that the United States
recognized the existence of the Republic of Cuba, and that the war
with Spain was carried on jointly by the allied forces of the
United States and of that Republic.
Apart from the view that it is not competent for the judiciary
to make any declaration upon the question of the length of time
during which Cuba may be rightfully occupied and controlled by the
United States in order to effect its pacification -- it being the
function of the political branch of the government to determine
when such occupation and control shall cease, and therefore when
the troops of the United States shall be withdrawn from Cuba -- the
contention that the United States recognized the existence of an
established government known as the Republic of Cuba, but is now
using its military or executive power to displace or overthrow it,
is without merit. The declaration by Congress that the people of
Cuba were, and of right ought to be, free and independent was not
intended as a recognition of the existence of an organized
government instituted by the people of that island in hostility to
the government maintained by Spain. Nothing more was intended than
to express the thought that the Cubans were entitled to enjoy -- to
use the language of the President in his message of December 5,
1897 -- that "measure of self control which is the inalienable
right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the
exhaustless treasure of their country." In the same message, the
President said:
"It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection
possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone
can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. The same
requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence is in question."
Again, in his message of April 11, 1898, referring to the
suggestion that the independence of the Republic of Cuba should be
recognized before this country entered upon war with Spain, he
said:
"Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United
States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this
country
Page 180 U. S. 125
now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international
obligation toward the organization to be recognized. In case of
intervention, our conduct would be subject to the approval or
disapproval of such government. We should be obliged to submit to
its direction, and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly
ally."
To this may be added the significant fact that the first part of
the joint resolution as originally reported from the Senate
committee read as follows:
"That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent,
and that the government of the
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true
and lawful government of the island."
But, upon full consideration, the views of the President
received the sanction of Congress, and the words in italics were
stricken out. It thus appears that both the legislative and
executive branches of the government concurred in not recognizing
the existence of any such government as the Republic of Cuba. It is
true that the cooperation of troops commanded by Cuban officers was
accepted by the military authorities of the United States in its
efforts to overthrow Spanish authority in Cuba. Yet from the
beginning to the end of the war, the supreme authority in all
military operations in Cuba and in Cuban waters against Spain was
with the United States, and those operations were not in any sense
under the control or direction of the troops commanded by Cuban
officers.
We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the Act of June
6, 1900, is not in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and that this case comes within the provisions of that act.
The court below having found that there was probable cause to
believe the appellant guilty of the offenses charged, the order for
his extradition was proper, and no ground existed for his discharge
on habeas corpus.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore
Affirmed.