Norton v. Cooly et al, No. 4:2022cv00100 - Document 16 (D. Utah 2024)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT. See order for details. Signed by Judge David Nuffer on 04/29/2024. (kpf)
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Norton v. Cooly et al Doc. 16 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH LONNIE NORTON, Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT v. Case No. 4:22-CV-100-DN OFFICER COOLY et al., District Judge David Nuffer Defendants. Plaintiff, self-represented inmate Lonnie Norton, brings this civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2024). 1 Having now screened the Complaint, (ECF No. 5), under its statutory review function, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2024), 2 the Court orders Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies before further pursuing claims. 1 The federal statute creating a "civil action for deprivation of rights" reads, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2024). 2 The screening statute reads: (a) Screening.—The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dockets.Justia.com COMPLAINT'S DEFICIENCIES The Complaint: (a) does not properly affirmatively link specific civil-rights violations to specific named defendants. (See below.) (b) possibly inappropriately alleges a constitutional right to a grievance process. See Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 F. App'x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ("[T]here is no independent constitutional right to state administrative grievance procedures. Nor does the state's voluntary provision of administrative grievance process create a liberty interest in that process."); Dixon v. Bishop, No. CV TDC-19-740, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41678, at *20 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2020) ("[P]risons do not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause when they adopt administrative mechanisms for hearing and deciding inmate complaints[;] any failure to abide by the administrative remedy procedure or to process [grievances] in a certain way does not create a constitutional claim."). (c) possibly inappropriately alleges civil-rights violations on the basis of denied grievances. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). (d) does not adequately link each element of a retaliation claim to specific named defendant(s). (See below.) (e) does not adequately link each element of a legal-access claim to specific named defendant(s). (See below.) (f) does not appear to recognize Defendants’ alleged failures to follow promises, jail policy, or ethics rules do not necessarily equal federal constitutional violations. See, e.g., Williams v. Miller, 696 F. App'x 862, 870 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Merely showing that [defendants] may have violated prison policy is not enough [to show a constitutional violation]." (citations omitted)); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating plaintiff never sought "to explain how or why the violation of the . . . [prison] policy . . . necessarily demonstrates" his constitutional rights were breached and "[i]t is his burden to establish that the Constitution, not just a policy, is implicated" (emphasis in original)); Hostetler v. Green, 323 F. App'x 653, 65758 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (noting defendant's mere violation of prison regulation does not equate to constitutional violation); Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[A] failure to adhere to administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional violation."). (g) possibly alleges “random and unauthorized deprivation of property under color of state law,” without considering that such a claim “does not give rise to a § 1983 claim if there is an adequate state post-deprivation remedy.” See Frazier v Flores, No. 13-1535, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2024). 2 12936, at *4 (10th Cir. July 9, 2014) (unpublished) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). (h) does not adequately link each element of an equal-protection claim to specific named defendant(s). See Hale v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 759 F. App'x 741, 752 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that--to state equal-protection claim--plaintiff must allege facts showing (a) prison officials treated him differently from similarly situated inmates and (b) disparate treatment was not reasonably related to penological interests). (i) raises issues of classification change/programming in way that does not support a cause of action. (See below.) (j) does not adequately link each element of a failure-to-protect claim to specific named defendant(s). (See below.) GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991). Pro se litigants are not excused from meeting these minimal pleading demands. "This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff should consider these general points before filing an amended complaint: 3 (i) The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any part of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). Also an amended complaint may not be added to after filing without moving for amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. (ii) Each defendant must be named in the complaint's caption, listed in the section of the complaint setting forth names of each defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims within the "cause of action" section of the complaint. (iii) The complaint must clearly state what each individual defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App'x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred. (iv) Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the "who," "what," "where," "when," and "why" of each claim. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly Court was particularly critical of complaints that 'mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the alleged [claim].' [550 U.S. 544, 565] n.10 (2007). Given such a complaint, 'a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiff's conclusory allegations . . . would have little idea where to begin.' Id."). 4 (v) Plaintiff may not name an individual as a defendant based solely on supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability). (vi) Grievance denial alone with no connection to "violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983." Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). (vii) "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2024). However, Plaintiff need not include grievance details in the complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). • Affirmative link [A] plaintiff who brings a constitutional claim under § 1983 can't obtain relief without first satisfying the personal-participation requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant "personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation" at issue. Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018). Indeed, because § 1983 is a "vehicle[] for imposing personal liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants." Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that when plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against multiple defendants, "it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom"); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1998)) (holding that district court's analysis of plaintiff's § 1983 claims was "infirm" where district court "lump[ed]" together plaintiff's claims against multiple defendants--"despite the fact that each of the defendants had different powers and duties and took different actions with respect to [plaintiff]"--and "wholly failed to identify specific actions taken 5 by particular defendants that could form the basis of [a constitutional] claim"). Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App'x 784, 790-91 (10th Cir. 2019). "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger swift and certain dismissal." Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has "gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff's claim frivolous." Id. • Retaliation Claim To properly assert a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege facts supporting three elements: (1) Plaintiff was involved in "constitutionally protected activity"; (2) Defendants' behavior injured Plaintiff in a way that "would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity"; and (3) Defendants' injurious behavior was "substantially motivated" as a reaction to Plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007). • Legal-Access Claim It is true that prison inmates "have a constitutional right to 'adequate, effective, and meaningful' access to the courts and that the states have 'affirmative obligations' to assure all inmates such access." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir. 1980). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court expounded on the obligation to provide legal access by stating "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828 (footnote omitted & emphasis added). 6 However, to successfully assert a constitutional claim for denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must allege not only inadequacy of the library or legal assistance provided but also "that the denial of legal resources hindered [the plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim." Penrod v. Zavaras, 84 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995). In other words, a plaintiff must show that "denial or delay of access to the court prejudiced him in pursuing litigation." Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the non-frivolous litigation involved must be "habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding current confinement." Carper, 54 F.3d at 616; accord Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). • Classification An inmate’s transfer to different housing does not necessarily mean that prison administrators were deliberately indifferent to conditions with substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Nor is it, per se, '"atypical [of] ... the ordinary incidents of prison life."' See Adams v. Negron, 94 F. App’x 676, 678 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (unpublished) (holding placement in highly structured, restrictive prison housing not deliberate indifference)). Rather, for instance, "[a]dministrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). • Failure to Protect Here are the standards governing this type of claim: The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotations omitted). This 7 obligation includes a duty "to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Id. at 833 (quotations omitted). "To prevail on a failure to protect claim, an inmate must show (1) that the conditions of his incarceration present[ed] an objective substantial risk of serious harm and (2) prison officials had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm." Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). To satisfy the second prong, the inmate must show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official will not be liable unless he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. Pittman v. Kahn, No. 23-1153, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (unpublished). ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint's deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, "Amended Complaint," that does not refer to or include any other document. (ECF No. 5.) (2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-rights complaint which Plaintiff must use to pursue an amended complaint. (3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. (4) The amended complaint shall not include any claims outside the dates and allegations of transactions and events contained in the Complaint, filed December 27, 2022, (ECF No. 5). The Court will not address any such new claims or outside allegations, which will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to raise other claims and allegations, Plaintiff may do so only in a new 8 complaint in a new case. If an amended complaint is filed, the Court will screen each claim and defendant for dismissal or an order effecting service upon valid defendants who are affirmatively linked to valid claims. (5) Plaintiff shall not try to serve an amended complaint on any defendants; instead, the Court will perform its screening function and determine itself whether the amended complaint warrants service or dismissal (in part or in full). No motion for service of process is needed. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d) (2024) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [in forma pauperis] cases."). (6) Plaintiff must tell the Court of any address change and timely comply with Court orders. See D. Utah Civ. R. 83-1.6(b) ("An unrepresented party must immediately notify the Clerk's Office in writing of any name, mailing address, or email address changes."). Failure to do so may result in this action's dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits."). (7) Extensions of time are disfavored, though reasonable extensions may be granted. Any motion for time extension must be filed no later than fourteen days before the deadline to be extended. (8) No direct communication is to take place with any judge. All relevant information, letters, documents, and papers, labeled with case number, are to be directed to the court clerk. 9 (9) Plaintiff must observe this District of Utah local rule: "A party proceeding without an attorney (unrepresented party or pro se party) is obligated to comply with: (1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) these Local Rules of Practice; (3) the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility; and (4) other laws and rules relevant to the action." DUCivR 83-1.6(a). Signed April 29, 2024. BY THE COURT ________________________________________ David Nuffer United States District Judge 10
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