Upon his convictions for one count of conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute and two counts of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, petitioner was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms on all three counts and to concurrent
special parole terms on the two possession counts. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction and one of the
possession convictions, but, applying the so-called "concurrent
sentence doctrine," declined to review the second possession
conviction because the sentences on the two possession counts were
concurrent.
Held: The judgment below is vacated, and the case is
remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider petitioner's
challenge to his second possession conviction. Since, in addition
to the concurrent prison and parole terms, the District Court
imposed a $50 assessment on petitioner on each count pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. III), and since petitioner's
liability to pay the total $150 assessment depends on the validity
of each of his three convictions, petitioner is not in fact serving
concurrent sentences.
791 F.2d 929, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and two counts of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced
to concurrent 7-year prison terms on all three counts, and to
concurrent special parole terms of five years on the two possession
counts. T he Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's
Page 481 U. S. 737
conspiracy conviction and one of his possession convictions.
United States v. Sandoval, 791 F.2d 929 (CA6 1986) (judg.
order). Applying the so-called "concurrent sentence doctrine," the
court declined to review the second possession conviction because
the sentences on the two possession counts were concurrent. We
granted certiorari to review the role of the concurrent sentence
doctrine in the federal courts. 479 U.S. 960 (1986).
It now appears, however, that petitioner is not, in fact,
serving concurrent sentences. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1982 ed.,
Supp. III) provides that district courts shall assess a monetary
charge "on any person convicted of an offense against the United
States." Pursuant to this section, the District Court imposed a $60
assessment on each count, in addition to the concurrent prison and
parole terms, for a total of $160. Since petitioner's liability to
pay this total depends on the validity of each of his three
convictions, the sentences are not concurrent. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the cause is remanded to
that court so that it may consider petitioner's challenge to his
second possession conviction.
It is so ordered.