1. This Court cannot review the action of the circuit court in
the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over an adjudication
of bankruptcy rendered by the district court.
2. It is immaterial whether such adjudication was upon a summary
hearing by the district court or after a trial by jury to ascertain
the fact of the alleged bankruptcy.
3.
Sandusky v. National
Bunk, 23 Wall. 289, and
Wiswall v.
Campbell, 93 U. S. 347, cited
and approved.
Thompson commenced proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy against
Hill & Leufestey in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan. Hill appeared to show cause against the petition, and,
under sec. 5026, Rev.Stat., demanded a trial by jury, "to ascertain
the fact of the alleged bankruptcy." Pursuant to this demand a
trial was had, which resulted in a verdict finding the facts set
forth in the petition to be true, and an adjudication was made
accordingly. Exceptions were taken at the trial to the rulings of
the court upon the admissibility of testimony, and also to the
charge. The proceedings were then carried by writ of error to the
circuit court, where the judgment of the district court was
affirmed, and this Court is now asked to review the action of the
circuit court by writ of error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first question presented in this case is one of
jurisdiction. In
Sandusky v. National
Bank, 23 Wall. 289, we decided that an adjudication
of bankruptcy without a trial by jury could not be brought here for
reexamination by appeal, as the circuit court could only review
such a proceeding under its supervisory jurisdiction where its
action was final. It only remains to consider, therefore, whether a
different rule must be applied when the adjudication is after a
trial by jury.
Page 94 U. S. 323
The reason why we cannot review the action of the circuit courts
in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction under the
bankrupt law is, as we have already said at the present term, in
Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U. S. 347,
"that a proceeding in bankruptcy, from its commencement to its
close upon the final settlement of the estate, is but one suit. The
several motions made and acts done in the bankrupt court in the
progress of the cause are not distinct suits at law or in equity,
but parts of one suit in bankruptcy, from which they cannot be
separated. As our jurisdiction extends only to a reexamination of
final judgments or decrees in suits at law or in equity, it follows
that we have no control over judgments and orders made by the
courts below in mere bankruptcy proceedings."
Going, then, to the bankrupt law, we find, Rev.Stat., sec. 5026,
that in cases of involuntary bankruptcy "the court shall proceed
summarily to hear the allegations of the petitioner and the
debtor," or
"shall, if the debtor . . . so demands in writing, order a trial
by jury at the first term of the court at which a jury shall be in
attendance to ascertain the fact of the alleged bankruptcy."
And also that "if upon the hearing or trial, the facts set forth
in the petition are found to be true, . . . the court shall adjudge
the debtor to be a bankrupt." Sec. 5028. From this it is clear that
the trial by jury is as much before the court "when sitting as a
court of bankruptcy," and as much a part of the suit in bankruptcy,
as the summary hearing by the court is when a jury shall not be
demanded.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the circuit court extends to all
cases and questions arising in the district court when sitting as a
court of bankruptcy, and it follows that our jurisdiction is
excluded over all such questions and cases. In
Insurance
Company v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258, we held that a
writ of error was the "proper process" for the circuit court to
employ in bringing up for reexamination under its supervisory
jurisdiction the questions arising upon a jury trial provided for
in sec. 5026; but that does not reach the question here involved,
which is whether the judgment of the circuit court in such a
proceeding is a final judgment in a civil action. If it is not,
we
Page 94 U. S. 324
have no power of review, because only such judgments of that
court can be reexamined here. Rev.Stat., sec. 691. We think it is
not, and, as the general subject has been so recently before us in
Wiswall v. Campbell, we content ourselves with a reference
in support of this conclusion to the opinion in that case,
following, as it does, that in
Sandusky v. National Bank,
supra.
Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
