1. Every admission upon which a party relies is to be taken as
an entirety of the fact which makes for his side, with the
qualifications which limit, modify, or destroy its effect. When,
therefore, the agent and officers of an insurance company stated to
the agent of a party claiming upon a policy of insurance that the
preliminary proofs presented were sufficient as to the death of the
insured, but that they showed that the insured had committed
suicide, the whole admission must be taken together. If sufficient
to establish the fact of the death of the insured, it was also
sufficient to show the manner of his death.
2. The preliminary proofs presented to an insurance company in
compliance with the condition of its policy of insurance are
admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein against the insured and on behalf of the company.
Mrs. Newton, widow of J. H. Newton, brought suit in the court
below, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company
Page 89 U. S. 33
of Newark, New Jersey, upon two policies of insurance on the
life of her husband issued by the company's agent at St. Louis.
The policies stipulated for the payment of the insurance money
within ninety days after due notice and proof of the death of the
party insured, but they provided also that the policies should be
void if the insured should die by his own hand.
In answer to the action, the company averred that the insured
did thus die, and that the policies thereupon ceased to be
binding.
The insured died at Los Angeles, in California, in June, 1870,
and proofs of his death were delivered by the father of the
plaintiff to the agent of the company in August following. These
proofs consisted of several affidavits giving the time, place, and
circumstances of his death, and the record of the finding of the
jury upon the coroner's inquest. The finding was that the deceased
came to his death "by a pistol shot fired by a pistol in his own
hand through the heart."
On the trial, the father of the plaintiff testified that he was
the agent, in the matter of these policies, of his daughter, and
that, acting in that capacity, he had delivered the written proofs
mentioned to the agent of the company at St. Louis, and had
demanded payment of him, and afterwards also of the officers of the
company at the home office in Newark; that at neither place was any
objection made either by the agent or the officers of the company
to the form or fullness of the proofs of the death of the insured;
that the agent had said that they were sufficient as to form, but
that at both places, objection was made at the same time that the
proofs disclosed a case of suicide, and on that account payment of
the insurance was refused.
The plaintiff having closed her case, the company offered as
evidence the preliminary proofs of the death of the party insured
and presented to the company by the father, as above said. The
court excluded them, and the company excepted. In its charge, the
court, having referred to the affidavits presented by the
plaintiff, said:
Page 89 U. S. 34
"It appears that the company, upon receiving the affidavits,
claimed that they showed that Newton had taken his own life, and
refused to pay, and the agent has so testified on the stand as a
witness, and says the company never denied or doubted the fact of
Newton's death, and that the affidavits showed it; but placed their
refusal to pay upon the distinct and specific ground that he took
his own life, and that this fact appeared (as the company claimed)
from the proofs of loss furnished by the plaintiff."
"Under these circumstances, the court instructs you that the
defense based upon want of notice and proof of death, is not
sustained."
"On the merits the company sets up the defense that the deceased
'died by his own hand' -- that is, that he purposely took his own
life. This defense is met by a denial."
"This is an affirmative defense, and hence the burden of
showing, by a fair preponderance of testimony, that Newton
purposely took his own life, rests upon the defendant."
To this charge the defendant excepted, and verdict and judgment
having been rendered for the plaintiff the company brought the case
here, on exceptions to the evidence and to the charge.
Page 89 U. S. 35
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The court below allowed the statement of the company and its
agent to the witness as to the sufficiency of the proofs of death
of the insured to be received as conclusive of that fact, but by
its charge to the jury in effect separated the admission of that
fact from its accompanying language, that the proofs disclosed a
case of suicide, and held that this latter statement was of an
independent fact to be established by the company. In this
particular, we think the court erred. Every admission is to be
taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side, with
the qualifications which limit, modify, or destroy its effect on
the other side. This is a settled principle which has passed by its
universality into an axiom of the law. Here the admission related
to the two particulars which the proofs established, the death of
the insured and the manner of his death, both of which facts appear
by the same documents. They showed the death of the insured only as
they showed that he had committed suicide, and all that the
officers of the company evidently intended by their declaration was
that they were satisfied with the proofs of the one fact because
they established the other. The whole admission should, therefore,
have been taken together. If it was sufficient to establish the
death of the insured, it was also sufficient to show that the death
was occasioned in such a manner as to relieve the company from
responsibility.
But the court also erred in excluding from the jury the proofs
presented of the death of the insured when offered by the company.
When the plaintiff was permitted to show what the agent and
officers of the company admitted the proofs established, it was
competent for the company to produce the proofs thus referred to
and use them as better evidence of what they did establish.
But independently of this position the proofs presented were
admissible as representations on the part of the party for whose
benefit the policies were taken, as to the death and the manner of
the death of the insured. They were presented to the company in
compliance with the condition
Page 89 U. S. 36
of the policy requiring notice and proof of the death of the
insured as preliminary to the payment of the insurance money. They
were intended for the action of the company, and upon their truth
the company had a right to rely. Unless corrected for mistake, the
insured was bound by them. Good faith and fair dealing required
that she should be held to representations deliberately made until
it was shown that they were made under a misapprehension of the
facts, or in ignorance of material matters subsequently
ascertained.
There are many cases which hold that where a mistake has
occurred in the preliminary proofs presented, and no corrected
statement is furnished the insurers before trial, the insured will
not be allowed on the trial to show that the facts were different
from those stated. The case of
Campbell v. Charter Oak
Insurance Company, decided by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, [
Footnote 1] and
the case of
Irving v. Excelsior Insurance Company, decided
by the Superior Court of the City of New York, [
Footnote 2] are both to this effect. It is not
necessary, however, to maintain any doctrine as strict as this in
the present case, and possibly the rule there laid down is properly
applicable only where the insurers have been prejudiced in their
defense by relying upon the statements contained in the proofs. Be
that as it may, all that we now hold is that the preliminary proofs
are admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein against the insured and on behalf of the company. No case
has come under our observation, other than the present, where the
preliminary proofs presented by the insured have been entirely
excluded as evidence when offered by the insurers, the question
being in all the cases whether these proofs estopped the insured
from impeaching the correctness of their statements, or from
qualifying them, or whether they were subject to be explained and
varied or contradicted on the trial.
The case of
Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Insurance Company,
in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, [
Footnote 3] cited by the plaintiff, is far from sustaining
his position. There, the beneficiary
Page 89 U. S. 37
had submitted in connection with the preliminary proof certain
slips cut from newspapers showing reports that the insured had died
in known violation of law. On the trial upon the issue whether the
plaintiff had, ninety days previous to the commencement of the
suit, furnished the company sufficient proof of the death of the
insured, the plaintiff put in evidence certain affidavits by which
that proof had been made, but did not offer the slips; the latter
were then offered by the company and were excluded, and the supreme
court, in reviewing the case, held that the exclusion was not a
valid ground of exception unless it plainly appeared that the
insurers were prejudiced thereby, and that they were not so
prejudiced because the fact of death was otherwise sufficiently
shown. "When an apparent ground of defense," said the court,
"is disclosed by a separate and unnecessary narration of
circumstances, and the proofs required by the policy are complete
without that narration and disclosure, it cannot be said that the
party has failed to comply with the conditions imposed upon his
right to litigate his claim; and the effect of such disclosure to
defeat the action must depend upon the degree to which the
plaintiff is bound by the statement. If not sworn to by the
plaintiff nor treated by him in such manner that he is concluded by
his conduct, the whole question will be open to explanation and
proof upon the main issue subject to the usual rules of
evidence."
In the present case, the proofs presented were sworn to; they
consisted, as already stated, of affidavits and the record of the
finding of a jury under oath. Here the narration of the manner of
the death of the deceased was so interwoven with the statement of
his death that the two things were inseparable. The fact that the
proofs were presented by the father of the plaintiff and not by the
plaintiff herself cannot change their character. They were the only
proofs presented, and without them there was no attempted
compliance with the condition of the policies. He was the agent of
the plaintiff with respect to the policies, entrusted by her with
the presentation of the preliminary proofs.
Page 89 U. S. 38
Presented in her name and by her agent in the matter, and
constituting the essential preliminary to her action, they must
stand as her acts, and the representations made therein must be
taken as true until at least some mistake is shown to have occurred
in them. As already said, no suggestion is made that these proofs
do not truly state the manner of the death of the insured. It is
sought, however, to avoid their effect in favor of the company by
taking a part of the statement of its officers as to what the
proofs showed, and rejecting the residue, and then excluding the
proofs themselves. This position cannot be sustained without
manifest injustice to the company.
The judgment must therefore be
Reversed and a new trial ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
10 Allen 213.
[
Footnote 2]
1 Bosworth 50.
[
Footnote 3]
99 Mass. 317.
