1. In California, a judgment in ejectment has the same
conclusiveness as a judgment in any common law action, and in
determining its effect, the same principles are applied which
control the result of the like inquiry in other cases. A defeated
plaintiff may bring a new action upon an after-acquired title with
the same effect as a stranger, in whom, such title
Page 76 U. S. 593
might have been vested, and the former judgment will not be a
bar to the new action.
2. If a party who has entered into possession of land as a
tenant under another is threatened with suit upon a paramount
title, the threat, under such circumstances is equivalent to
eviction. He may thereupon submit in good faith, and attorn to the
party holding a valid title, to avoid litigation. In such case, it
is incumbent upon him, and those who have profited by his
submission, to show the existence and superiority of the title in
question.
3. In this case, W. had recovered in ejectment upon an adverse
title against some of the parties in possession of the premises
holding under one F., and he threatened suit against the others,
who to avoid expensive litigation acknowledged the title of W., and
took leases from him, and at the expiration of the leases
surrendered the possession to him. This possession is found to have
been fairly and honestly acquired, without force, fraud, or
surprise.
Held that if the holding of the parties under F.
was that of tenants, the relation of landlord and tenant between
them was thus extinguished; but if the holding by them was as
grantees in fee, they were not estopped from denying F.'s title.
Grantees in fee hold adversely to all the world, and have the same
right to deny the title of their vendors as the title of any other
party.
4. The alcalde was the chief executive officer of the pueblo of
San Francisco, and as such had authority to make grants of the
pueblo lands subject to the authority lodged in the ayuntamiento,
and the still higher authority of the departmental governor and
assembly.
5. The ordinance of the Common Council of San Francisco known as
the Van Ness ordinance gave to parties holding alcalde grants
within certain defined limits in that city, where the grants had
been recorded in the proper books, deposited with the recorder of
the County of San Francisco, on or before April 3, 1850, a new
title upon which an action would lie, if the grants were by
themselves without that ordinance ineffectual to pass the
title.
6. The Act of Congress of July 1, 1864, is a confirmation of the
title held under the Van Ness ordinance, and took effect by
relation as of the time when the act of the legislature of the
state confirming the ordinance was passed.
Merryman brought ejectment, in April, 1860, against Bourne and
several others for a parcel of land situated within the corporate
limits of the City of San Francisco, as defined by her charter of
1851. The case was tried by the court without a jury, by
stipulation of parties in writing. The facts found by the court,
and its conclusions of law, were as follows:
Page 76 U. S. 594
1st. That on the 15th day of April, 1847, there was duly issued
by Edwin Bryant, then alcalde of the Town of San Francisco, to S.
E. Woodworth, one of the defendants, in due form, a grant in fee of
a one hundred vara lot, [
Footnote
1] within the corporate limits of said town, which embraced the
premises described in the complaint in this action, and which grant
was registered and recorded in a proper book of records deposited
in the office, or custody, or control of the recorder of the County
of San Francisco, on or before the 3d day of April, A.D. 1850.
2d. That soon after this grant was issued the said S. E.
Woodworth entered into possession of the said lot, and enclosed the
same with a fence, and so continued in possession for some months
then next ensuing.
3d. That subsequently the fence, having either fallen down or
been removed by trespassers, one Fulton, claiming under a grant
issued by one Colton, a justice of the peace, for said lot, entered
on a portion of the lot; and thereupon Woodworth, in the year 1850,
brought an action of ejectment against Fulton in the Court of First
Instance, at San Francisco, to recover the possession of the
premises, in which action judgment was rendered in favor of
Woodworth, on which a writ of restitution issued, by virtue of
which Woodworth was restored to the possession, after which Fulton
appealed to the supreme court of the State of California, by which
court the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded, whereupon a
final judgment was afterwards rendered in the lower court in favor
of Fulton, and by virtue of process issued thereon Fulton was
restored to his possession, and he and those claiming under him
continued in possession until they were ejected as hereinafter
stated.
4th. That in January, 1852, the said S. E. Woodworth, by a good
and sufficient deed of bargain and sale, conveyed the said one
hundred vara lot, including the premises in controversy, to F. A.
Woodworth, now deceased, who, in the years 1853 and 1854,
instituted in the District Court of
Page 76 U. S. 595
the 4th Judicial District in San Francisco, actions of ejectment
against some of the parties in possession of the premises claiming
under Fulton, and recovered judgments on which writs of restitution
were issued and served, by virtue of which F. A. Woodworth was
restored to the possession of the premises occupied by the
defendants in said writs, and the remaining persons in possession
of said premises under said Fulton, and who were not included in
said ejectment suits, on being threatened with suits by said F. A.
Woodworth to recover the possession of the premises held by them,
and with a view to avoid expensive litigation, acknowledged the
said Woodworth's title and took leases from him, at the expiration
of which leases they surrendered the possession to him, Woodworth;
and the possession of said Woodworth, so obtained under writs of
restitution and by surrender, was fairly and honestly acquired,
without force, fraud, or surprise.
5th. That on the 12th December, 1849, Colton, justice of the
peace, already mentioned, issued a grant to one Atwill for the said
one hundred vara lot, and on the 11th February, 1850, Atwill
conveyed to the said Fulton whatever title he acquired by the grant
in and to the premises in controversy; and the plaintiff, before
and at the time of the institution of this suit, had acquired and
held by regular mesne conveyances all the title of Fulton.
6th. That at the time of the commencement of this action the
said F. A. Woodworth, and the other defendants under a license from
him, were in possession of the premises in controversy.
And as conclusions of law from the facts aforesaid, the court
found:
1st. That the grant from Colton, the justice of the peace, to
Atwill was void, and conveyed no title to the premises; and that
the judgment in the suit of
Woodworth v. Fulton was in no
respect an affirmance of the validity of the title of Fulton, but
only a disaffirmance of the validity of the title of Woodworth, the
plaintiff in that suit, as the title was then set up and held by
him.
Page 76 U. S. 596
2d. That as against the defendants in this suit, peaceably in
possession of the premises in controversy, the plaintiff must
recover on the strength of his own title; that the title set up by
him was invalid, and the judgment aforesaid did not estop the
defendants to deny the validity of said plaintiff's title.
3d. That the judgment aforesaid was a decision that the
defendant Woodworth's title, as then held by him, was invalid, but
it did not estop him to set up any title to said premises acquired
since the said judgment.
4th. That by virtue of an act of the Legislature of the State of
California, entitled "An act concerning the City of San Francisco,
and to ratify and confirm certain ordinances of the common council
of said city," approved March 11, 1858, and by virtue of the
ordinances referred to in said act, and of the 5th section of the
act of Congress entitled "An act to expedite the settlement of
titles to lands in the State of California," approved July 1, 1864,
all the title of the United States, and of the City of San
Francisco, in and to the premises in controversy, became and was
vested in F. A. Woodworth, and by virtue thereof the defendant, S.
E. Woodworth, as executor of the said F. A. Woodworth, deceased,
was entitled to the possession of the premises described in the
complaint and every part thereof. [
Footnote 2]
Judgment was accordingly rendered for the defendants, and the
plaintiffs brought the case to this Court on writ of error.
Page 76 U. S. 598
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is brought before us by a writ of error to the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of California.
The plaintiff in error was the plaintiff in the court below. The
suit was ejectment, brought to recover the premises described in
the plaintiff's declaration. They are situated in the City of San
Francisco. The parties stipulated in writing that the cause should
be tried by the court without a jury, and it was tried accordingly.
The court found the facts specially, pursuant to the statute which
governs the practice in such cases, and they are set forth in the
record. Judgment was given for the defendants, and the plaintiff
thereupon sued out this writ of error. So far as the facts of the
case are concerned the findings of the court are conclusive between
the parties. The only questions open for our consideration are
questions of law, arising upon the facts as thus presented in the
record.
Three grounds are relied upon for the reversal of the
judgment.
Two of them are substantially the same, and will be considered
together.
It is insisted that the rights of the parties, touching the
premises in controversy, were settled in favor of the plaintiff in
error, in the case of
Woodworth v. Fulton, reported in 1st
California Reports 295.
This is an error. Woodworth prosecuted the action. The premises
were the same with those involved in the present suit. The supreme
court of the state decided two points, and none other: (1) That the
alcalde grant to S. E. Woodworth was void for want of the requisite
authority in the officer who made it -- the court holding that an
alcalde was incompetent to give any title; (2) that if a recovery
could
Page 76 U. S. 599
be had in an action of ejectment, upon mere prior possession, no
sufficient possession was shown on the part of the plaintiff.
Nothing was decided or said by the court as to the title of the
defendant.
In California, a judgment in ejectment has the same
conclusiveness as a judgment in any common law action, and in
determining its effect, the same principles are applied which
control the result of the like inquiry in other cases. A defeated
plaintiff may bring a new action upon an after-acquired title with
the same effect as a stranger in whom such title might have been
vested, and the former judgment will no more bar one than the
other. [
Footnote 3]
It appears by the finding of facts that F. A. Woodworth did
bring a new action against a part of those in possession. He
recovered and ousted the defendants by writs of restitution. The
other parties in possession thereupon surrendered and attorned to
him. He thus acquired possession of the entire premises, and he, or
those claiming under him, held it when this suit was
instituted.
The cases in which the judgments were recovered are not before
us. Who the defendants were, and what title was developed by the
plaintiff, we do not know. For all the purposes of this case, the
judgments must be held to have been properly rendered, and to be
valid. They cannot be collaterally questioned in this
proceeding.
It is insisted also that Woodworth obtained possession of a part
of the premises by tampering with the tenants of Fulton, under whom
the plaintiffs in error claim, and thus became such tenant himself,
and hence is estopped from denying the validity of the alleged
Fulton title.
The language of the finding upon this subject is as follows:
"And the remaining persons in possession of said premises under
said Fulton, and who were not included in said ejectment suits, on
being threatened with suits by said F. A. Woodworth to recover
possession of the premises held by them and with a view to avoid
expensive litigation, acknowledged
Page 76 U. S. 600
said Woodworth's title, and took leases from him, at the
expiration of which leases they surrendered the possession to the
said Woodworth, and the possession of said Woodworth so obtained
under said writs of restitution, and by surrender, was fairly and
honestly acquired, without force, fraud, or surprise."
How many such parties were in possession, what portion of the
premises their possession embraced, and whether their possession
under Fulton was as vendees, lessees, or otherwise, does not
appear.
If they were grantees in fee, the principle relied upon has no
application. It is one of the incidents of subinfeudation, and was
brought into the common law from the feudal system. It does not
reach the relation of vendor and such a vendee. The latter holds
adversely to all the world, and has the same right to deny the
title of his vendor as the title of any other party. [
Footnote 4]
Error is not to be presumed. It must be affirmatively shown.
Doubts are to be resolved in favor of the judgment rather than
against it. But if the parties were the tenants of Fulton, the fact
would not avail the plaintiff in error. The principle sought to be
applied is subject to several well settled qualifications. It may
be shown that the landlord's title has ceased by expiration or
transfer. If the tenant be evicted, he may take a new lease from
the party evicting him. It has been held, that if threatened with
suit upon a paramount title, the threat, under such circumstances,
is equivalent to eviction. He may, thereupon, submit in good faith,
and attorn to the party holding a valid title, to avoid litigation.
In such case it is incumbent upon him, and those who have profited
by his submission, to show the existence and superiority of the
title in question. [
Footnote
5]
Page 76 U. S. 601
Upon the disavowal of the landlord's title the relation of
landlord and tenant ceases, and, as between them, the tenant
becomes a trespasser. The statute of limitations begins to run, and
the landlord may sue at once to recover possession. He need not
wait for the end of the leasehold term. [
Footnote 6]
In the case under consideration, Woodworth had recovered upon
the adverse title against a part of those in possession, and
threatened suit against the others. They yielded, to avoid the
inevitable adverse consequences of a contest. This they had a right
to do. The court found that the possession was obtained by
Woodworth "fairly and honestly," "without force, fraud, or
surprise." This is conclusive as to the integrity and validity of
the transaction, and brings the case within the authorities
referred to. The relation of landlord and tenant between Fulton and
those parties, if it subsisted before, was thus extinguished.
Woodworth claimed title under an alcalde grant of the 15th of
April, 1847. Fulton, under a grant from a justice of the peace, of
the 21st of December, 1849. It is not claimed that the latter grant
is of any validity.
Emanating, at the time it bears date, from such a source, it is
as if it came from any other person unauthorized to give it, and
did not carry with it even color of title. It is utterly void. It
may, therefore, be laid out of view, as an element in the case of
no moment.
The conquest of California by the arms of the United States is
regarded as having become complete on the 7th of July, 1846. On
that day, the government of the United States succeeded to the
rights and authority of the government of Mexico. The dominion of
the latter sovereignty was then finally displaced, and succeeded by
that of the former. Before that time, the pueblo or village of San
Francisco existed, and under the laws of the country was entitled
to the territory within certain prescribed limits, known as pueblo
lands. It had also an ayuntamiento or town council, and an alcalde.
The alcalde was the chief
Page 76 U. S. 602
executive officer of the pueblo, and, as such, had authority to
make grants of the pueblo lands.
The exercise of this function was subject to the authority
lodged in the ayuntamiento, and to the still higher authority of
the departmental governor and assembly. In the case of
Woodworth v. Fulton, [
Footnote 7] it was held by the supreme court of the state
that, from the time of the conquest, these pueblo lands, so far as
they had not been granted to individuals, became a part of the
public domain of the United States, and, as such, subject to the
exclusive control and disposition of Congress. This doctrine was
subsequently overruled in the case of
Cohas v. Raisin.
[
Footnote 8] It was there held
that the conquest had no such effect, but that the lands continued
to be the public property of the municipality, as before the war;
and that the laws of Mexico relating to the subject continued in
force until changed by the legislative authority of the state. It
was further held that an alcalde grant, made after the conquest,
was to be presumed valid, and was competent to convey title. These
doctrines are now firmly established as a part of the rules of
property of the state. [
Footnote
9]
But it is insisted, in behalf of the plaintiffs in error, that
these adjudications cannot affect the prior unreversed judgment in
the case of
Woodworth v. Fulton, in which the rulings were
otherwise. Conceding this to be so, the result of this case must
still be against the plaintiff in error. The Common Council of San
Francisco, by an ordinance of the 20th of June, 1855, known as the
Van Ness ordinance, relinquished all her rights in the pueblo lands
of the city to the parties respectively within the category of
Woodworth, and to those claiming under them by competent mesne
conveyances. This ordinance was confirmed by an act of the
legislature of the state of the 11th of March, 1858. [
Footnote 10]
This gave to Woodworth, and those claiming under him, a new and
after-acquired title, upon which, according to the
Page 76 U. S. 603
later adjudications referred to, he was entitled to recover, and
to an action upon which the prior judgment in
Woodworth v.
Fulton was not and could not be a bar. The act of Congress of
July 1, 1864, was a further confirmation of the Woodworth title,
and operated in the same manner as the ordinance of the city
council and the act of the legislature before mentioned.
It is said that the act of Congress was passed after the
institution of this suit, and cannot, therefore, be considered. To
this there are two answers. It is by no means clear that the act
was necessary to the completeness and validity of the title in
question. The later adjudications referred to, made before the
passage of the act, held by necessary implication that it was not.
But if it were necessary, we have no difficulty in holding that it
took effect by relation, as of the time when the act of the
legislature confirming the ordinance of the council was passed.
[
Footnote 11]
We think the facts found by the court below fully sustain the
judgment given, and it is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
A one hundred vara lot is a lot 275 feet square.
[
Footnote 2]
For a more minute statement of the provisions of the Van Ness
ordinance and act of Congress,
see Lynch v. Bernal, supra,
p. <|76 U.S. 315|>315.
[
Footnote 3]
Barrows v.
Kindred, 4 Wall. 399.
[
Footnote 4]
Blight's Lessee v.
Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535;
Watkins
v. Holman, 16 Pet. 26;
Croxall v.
Shererd, 5 Wall. 268;
Osterhout v.
Shoemaker, 3 Hill 518;
Barker v. Soloman, 2 Metcalf
32.
[
Footnote 5]
Mayor of Poole v. Whitt, 15 Meeson & Welsby 577;
Emery v. Barnett, 4 Common Bench, N.S. 423;
Lunsford
v. Turner, 5 J. J. Marshall 106;
Cutbertson v.
Irving, 4 Hurlstone & Norman 758;
Jordan v.
Twells, Cases
tempore Hardwicke 172.
[
Footnote 6]
Willison v.
Watkins, 3 Pet. 43.
[
Footnote 7]
1 Cal. 295.
[
Footnote 8]
3 Cal. 434.
[
Footnote 9]
Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530;
Payne & Dewey v.
Treadwell, 16
id. 221;
White v. Moses, 21
id. 34.
[
Footnote 10]
15 Cal. 627, note 3.
[
Footnote 11]
Poole v.
Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185;
Jackson v.
Dickenson, 15 Johnson 309;
Hammond v. Warfield, 2
Harris & Johnson 155;
McConnell v. Brown, Littell's
Select Cases, 460;
Pearson v. Darrington, 21 Ala. 175.
