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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–1209
_________________
JOHN STURGEON, PETITIONER v. BERT
FROST, in his official capacity as ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONALPARK SERVICE, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 22, 2016]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.
For almost 40 years, John Sturgeon has hunted
moose along the Nation River in Alaska. Because parts of the river
are shallow and difficult to navigate, Sturgeon travels by
hovercraft, an amphibious vehicle capable of gliding over land and
water. To reach his preferred hunting grounds, Sturgeon must pilot
his hovercraft over a stretch of the Nation River that flows
through the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a 1.7 million
acre federal preservation area managed by the National Park
Service. 16 U. S. C. §410hh(10).
Alaska law permits the use of hovercraft.
National Park Service regulations do not. See 36 CFR §2.17(e)
(2015). After Park Service rangers informed Sturgeon that he was
prohibited from using his hovercraft within the boundaries of the
preserve, Sturgeon filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. He argues that the Nation River is owned by the State, and
that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)
prohibits the Park Service from enforcing its regulations on
state-owned land in Alaska. The Park Service disagrees, contending
that it has authority to regulate waters flowing through federally
managed preservation areas. The District Court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the Park Service. We granted
certiorari.
I
In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward,
serving under President Andrew Johnson, negotiated a treaty to
purchase Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million. Treaty Concerning the
Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867,
15Stat. 539. In a single stroke, the United States gained 365
million acres of land—an area more than twice the size of
Texas. Despite the bargain price of two cents an acre, however, the
purchase was mocked by contemporaries as “Seward’s
Folly” and President Johnson’s “Polar Bear
Garden.” See C. Naske & H. Slotnick, Alaska: A History
92–94 (2011) (Naske & Slotnick); S. Rep. No. 1163, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1957).
The monikers didn’t stick. In 1898, the
“Three Lucky Swedes”—Jafet Lindeberg, Eric
Lindblom, and Jon Brynteson—struck gold in Nome, Alaska. As
word of their discovery spread, thousands traveled to Alaska to try
their hand at mining. Once the gold rush subsided, settlers turned
to other types of mining, fishing, and trapping, fueling an
emerging export economy. See Naske & Slotnick 128–129,
155, 249–251; D. Wharton, The Alaska Gold Rush 186–187
(1972).
Despite newfound recognition of Alaska’s
economic potential, however, it was not until the 1950’s that
Congress seriously considered admitting Alaska as a State. By that
time, it was clear that Alaska was strategically important both in
the Pacific and Arctic, and that the Territory was rich in natural
resources, including oil. Moreover, the people of Alaska favored
statehood. See Naske & Slotnick 201, 224–235. But there
was a problem: Out of the 365 million acres of land in Alaska, 98
percent were owned by the Federal Government. As a result, absent a
land grant from the Federal Government to the State, there would be
little land available to drive private economic activity and
contribute to the state tax base. See S. Rep. No. 1163, at 2, 12
(“The expenses of the State of Alaska will be comparatively
high, partially due to the vast land areas within the State; but
the State would be able to realize revenues from only 2 percent of
this vast area unless some provision were made to modify the
present land-ownership conditions”).
A solution was struck. The 1958 Alaska Statehood
Act permitted Alaska to select 103 million acres of “vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved” federal land—just over
a quarter of all land in Alaska—for state ownership.
§§6(a)–(b), 72Stat. 340. That land grant included
“mineral deposits,” which were “subject to lease
by the State as the State legislature may direct.”
§6(i), id., at 342. Upon statehood, Alaska also gained
“title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters” within the State, in addition to “the natural
resources within such lands and waters,” including “the
right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the
said lands and natural resources.” §3(a), 67Stat. 30, 43
U. S. C. §1311(a); §6(m), 72Stat. 343. With
over 100 million acres of land now available to the new State,
Alaska could begin to fulfill its state policy “to encourage
the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by
making them available for maximum use consistent with the public
interest.” Alaska Const., Art. VIII, §1 (2014).
The Statehood Act did not, however, determine
the rights of the Alaska Natives, who asserted aboriginal title to
much of the same land now claimed by the State. Naske &
Slotnick 287–289. To resolve the dispute, Congress in 1971
passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which
extinguished aboriginal land claims in Alaska. 85Stat. 688, as
amended, 43 U. S. C. §1601 et seq. In
exchange, Congress provided for a $960 million settlement and
permitted corporations organized by groups of Alaska Natives to
select 40 million acres of federal land to manage within the State.
§§1605, 1610–1615; Naske & Slotnick
296–297. Congress sought to implement the settlement
“rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real
economic and social needs” of Alaska Natives.
§1601(b).
In addition to settling the claims of the Alaska
Natives, ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior to select up
to 80 million acres of unreserved federal land in Alaska for
addition to the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and Wild
and Scenic Rivers Systems, subject to congressional approval.
§1616(d)(2). When Congress failed to approve the
Secretary’s selections, however, President Carter
unilaterally designated 56 million acres of federal land in Alaska
as national monuments. See Presidential Proclamation Nos.
4611–4627, 3 CFR 69–104 (1978 Comp.).
President Carter’s actions were unpopular
among many Alaskans, who were concerned that the new monuments
would be subject to restrictive federal regulations. Protesters
demonstrated in Fairbanks, and more than 2,500 Alaskans
participated in the “Great Denali-McKinley Trespass.”
The goal of the trespass was to break over 25 Park Service rules in
a two-day period—including by camping, hunting, snowmobiling,
setting campfires, shooting guns, and unleashing dogs. During the
event, a “rider on horseback, acting the part of Paul Revere,
galloped through the crowd yelling, ‘The Feds are coming! The
Feds are coming!’ ” N. Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1979, p. A8; Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 15, 1979,
pp. 1–2.
Congress once again stepped in to settle the
controversy, passing the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act. 94Stat. 2371, 16 U. S. C. §3101
et seq. ANILCA had two stated goals: First, to provide
“sufficient protection for the national interest in the
scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values on the public
lands in Alaska.” §3101(d). And second, to provide
“adequate opportunity for satisfaction of the economic and
social needs of the State of Alaska and its people.”
Ibid.
ANILCA set aside 104 million acres of land in
Alaska for preservation purposes, in the process creating ten new
national parks, preserves, and monuments—including the
Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve—and tripling the
number of acres set aside in the United States for federal
wilderness preservation. See §410hh; Naske & Slotnick
315–316. At the same time, ANILCA specified that the Park
Service could not prohibit on those lands certain activities of
particular importance to Alaskans. See, e.g., §3170(a)
(Secretary must permit reasonable use of vehicles “for travel
to and from villages and homesites”); §3201 (Secretary
must permit “the taking of fish and wildlife for sport
purposes and subsistence uses” within National Preserves in
Alaska, subject to regulation and certain exceptions). President
Carter’s earlier land designations were rescinded. See
§3209(a).
Under ANILCA, federal preservation lands in
Alaska were placed into “conservation system units,”
which were defined to include “any unit in Alaska of the
National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National
Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest
Monument.” §3102(4). Congress drew the bound-aries of
those units to “follow hydrographic divides or em-brace other
topographic or natural features,” however, rather than to map
the Federal Government’s landholdings. §3103(b). As a
consequence, in addition to federal land, over 18 million acres of
state, Native Corporation, and private land ended up inside the
boundaries of conservation system units. See Brief for Petitioner
6.
This brings us back to Sturgeon and his
hovercraft.
II
A
One fall day in 2007, Sturgeon was piloting
his hovercraft on the Nation River, which rises in the Ogilvie
Mountains in Canada and joins the Yukon River within the boundaries
of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve conservation system
unit (Yukon-Charley). Sturgeon was headed to a hunting ground
upstream from the preserve, just shy of the Canadian border. To
reach that hunting ground, dubbed “moose meadows,”
Sturgeon had to travel on a portion of the river that flows through
the preserve.
About two miles into his trip on the Nation
River, Sturgeon stopped on a gravel bar to repair the steering
cable of his hovercraft. As he was performing the repairs, Sturgeon
was approached by three Park Service rangers. The rangers informed
him that hovercraft were prohibited under Park Service regulations,
and that he was committing a crime by operating his hovercraft
within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Despite
Sturgeon’s protests that Park Service regulations did not
apply because the river was owned by the State of Alaska, the
rangers ordered Sturgeon to remove his hovercraft from the
preserve. Sturgeon complied, heading home without a moose.
Sturgeon now fears that he will be criminally
prosecuted if he returns to hunt along the Nation River in his
hovercraft. To avoid prosecution, Sturgeon sued the Park Service
and several federal officials in the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska. He seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief permitting him to operate his hovercraft within the
boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Alaska intervened in support of
Sturgeon, and the Park Service opposed the suit.
The District Court granted summary judgment to
the Park Service. Sturgeon v. Masica, 2013 WL 5888230
(Oct. 30, 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in pertinent part. Sturgeon v. Masica, 768
F. 3d 1066 (2014).
We granted certiorari. 576 U. S. ___
(2015).
B
The Secretary of the Interior has authority to
“prescribe regulations” concerning “boating and
other activities on or relating to water located within System
units, including water subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.” 54 U. S. C. §100751(b) (2012 ed.,
Supp. II). “System units” are in turn defined as
“any area of land and water administered by the Secretary,
acting through the Director [of the Park Service], for park,
monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other
purposes.” §§100102, 100501.
The Park Service’s hovercraft regulation
was adopted pursuant to Section 100751(b). The hovercraft ban
applies not only within “[t]he boundaries of federally owned
lands and waters administered by the National Park Service,”
but also to “[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of
theUnited States located within the boundaries of the National Park
System, including navigable waters . . . withoutregard to
the ownership of submerged lands.” 36 CFR §1.2(a). The
hovercraft ban is not limited to Alaska, but instead has effect in
federally managed preservation areas across the country.
Section 103(c) of ANILCA, in contrast, addresses
the scope of the Park Service’s authority over lands within
the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. The first
sentence of Section 103(c) specifies the property included as a
portion of those units. It states: “Only those lands within
the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public
lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be
included as a portion of such unit.” 16 U. S. C.
§3103(c). ANILCA defines the word “land” to
include “lands, waters, and interests therein,” and the
term “public lands” to include “lands the title
to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980,”
with certain exceptions. §3102. In sum, only “lands,
waters, and interests therein” to which the United States has
“title” are considered “public” land
“included as a portion” of the conservation system
units in Alaska.
The second sentence of Section 103(c) concerns
the Park Service’s authority to regulate
“non-public” lands in Alaska, which include state,
Native Corporation, and private property. It provides: “No
lands which, before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to
the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall
be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands
within such units.” §3103(c).
The third sentence of Section 103(c) explains
how new lands become part of conservation system units: “If
the State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to convey
any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in accordance
with applicable law (including this Act), and any such lands shall
become part of the unit, and be administered accordingly.”
Ibid.
C
The parties dispute whether Section 103(c) of
ANILCA created an Alaska-specific exception to the Park
Service’s general authority over boating and related
activities in federally managed preservation areas. Sturgeon, the
Park Service, and the Ninth Circuit each adopt a different reading
of Section 103(c), reaching different conclusions about the scope
of the Park Service’s powers.
Sturgeon, joined by the State, understands
Section 103(c) to stand for a simple proposition: The Park Service
is prohibited from regulating “non-public” land in
Alaska as if that land were owned by the Federal Government. He
contends that his reading is consistent with the history of federal
land management in Alaska, beginning with the Alaska Statehood Act
and culminating in ANILCA.
Sturgeon’s argument proceeds in two steps.
First, he asserts that the Nation River is not “public
land” for purposes of ANILCA and is therefore not part of the
Yukon-Charley. As discussed, ANILCA defines “public
lands” as lands to which the United States has
“title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. And Section
103(c) provides that “[o]nly those lands within the
boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands
(as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be
included as a portion of such unit.” §3103(c).
Sturgeon argues that the Nation River is not
“public land” because it is owned by the State and not
by the Federal Government. To support his argument, Sturgeon relies
on the Alaska Statehood Act, which granted ownership of the
submerged lands beneath the navigable waters in Alaska, and the
resources within those waters, to the State. See §6(m),
72Stat. 343; 43 U. S. C. §1311(a). He also cites
this Court’s decision in United States v.
California, 436 U. S. 32 (1978) , which stated that
“the Submerged Lands Act transferred title to and ownership
of the submerged lands and waters” to the States. Id.,
at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State and not
the Federal Government owns the Nation River, Sturgeon urges, it is
not “public” land under ANILCA and is therefore not
part of the Yukon-Charley.
Second, Sturgeon asserts that because the Nation
River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service lacks
authority to regulate it. His argument rests on the second sentence
of Section 103(c), which states that “[n]o lands which,
before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State,
to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject
to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such
units.” 16 U. S. C. §3103(c).
Sturgeon argues that the phrase
“regulations applicable solely to public lands within such
units” refers to those regulations that apply
“solely” by virtue of the Park Service’s
“authority to manage national parks.” Brief for
Petitioner 18, 26–27. The word “solely,” Sturgeon
contends, simply ensures that “non-public” lands within
the boundaries of those units remain subject to laws generally
“applicable to both public and private lands (such as the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act).” Id., at 19.
Because the hovercraft regulation was adopted pursuant to the Park
Service’s authority over federally managed preservation
areas, and is not a law of general applicability like the Clean Air
Act or the Clean Water Act, Sturgeon concludes that Section 103(c)
bars enforcement of the regulation.
The Park Service, in contrast, reads Section
103(c) more narrowly. In its brief in this Court, the Park Service,
while defending the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, relies
primarily on very different arguments. The agency stresses that it
has longstanding authority to regulate waters within federally
managed preservation areas, and that Section 103(c) does not take
any of that authority away. In reaching its conclusion, the Park
Service disagrees with Sturgeon at each step.
First, the Park Service contends that the Nation
River is part of the Yukon-Charley. To support that contention, the
agency cites ANILCA’s definition of “public
lands,” which—as noted—includes “lands,
waters, and interests therein” to which the United States has
“title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. The Park
Service argues that the United States has “title” to an
“interest” in the water within the boundaries of the
Yukon-Charley under the reserved water rights doctrine.
The reserved water rights doctrine specifies
that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the
public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then
unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of
the reservation.” Cappaert v. United States,
426 U. S. 128, 138 (1976) . By creating the Yukon-Charley, the
Park Service urges, the Federal Government reserved the water
within the boundaries of the conservation system unit to achieve
the Government’s conservation goals. As a result, the Federal
Government has “title” to an “interest” in
the Nation River, making it “public” land subject to
Park Service regulations.
Second, the Park Service contends that even if
the Nation River is not “public” land, the agency still
has authority to regulate it. According to the Park Service, the
second sentence of Section 103(c) imposes only a limited
restriction on the agency’s power, prohibiting it from
enforcing on “non-public” lands only those regulations
that explicitly apply “solely to public lands.” The
hovercraft regulation applies both within “[t]he boundaries
of feder-ally owned lands and waters administered by the National
Park Service” and to “[w]aters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States located within the boundaries of
the National Park System, including navigable waters
. . . without regard to the ownership of submerged
lands.” 36 CFR §1.2(a). Accordingly, the Park Service
asserts, the hovercraft regulation does not apply “solely to
public lands,” and Section 103(c) therefore does not prevent
enforcement of the regulation. See Brief for Respondents
56–58.
The Ninth Circuit, for its part, adopted a
reading of Section 103(c) different from the primary argument
advanced by the Park Service in this Court. The Court of Appeals
did not reach the question whether the Nation River counts as
“public” land for purposes of ANILCA. Instead, it held
that the phrase “regulations applicable solely to public
lands within such units” distinguishes between Park Service
regulations that apply solely to “public” lands in
Alaska, and Park Service regulations that apply to federally
managed preservation areas across the country. In the Ninth
Circuit’s view, the Park Service may enforce nationally
applicable regulations on both “public” and
“non-public” property within the boundaries of
conservation system units in Alaska, because such regulations do
not apply “solely to public lands within such units.”
The Park Service may not, however, apply Alaska-specific
regulations to “non-public” lands within the boundaries
of those units.
According to the Ninth Circuit, because the
hovercraft regulation “applies to all federal-owned lands and
waters administered by [the Park Service] nationwide, as well as
all navigable waters lying within national parks,” the
hovercraft ban does not apply “solely” within
conservation system units in Alaska. 768 F. 3d, at 1077. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the Park Service therefore has
authority to enforce its hovercraft regulation on the Nation River.
Id., at 1078. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is subject
to some interpretation, but Sturgeon, the State, the Alaska Native
Corporations, and the Park Service (at least at times) concur in
our understanding of the decision below. See Brief for Petitioner
25; Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae 23; Brief for
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation et al. as Amici
Curiae 12–13; Brief for Doyon, Ltd., et al. as
Amici Curiae 31–32; Brief for Respondents 20; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 61; 80 Fed. Reg. 65573 (2015).
III
We reject the interpretation of Section 103(c)
adopted by the Ninth Circuit. The court’s reading of the
phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands within
such units” may be plausible in the abstract, but it is
ultimately inconsistent with both the text and context of the
statute as a whole. Statutory language “cannot be construed
in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with
a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S.
___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Under the reading of the statute adopted below,
the Park Service may apply nationally applicable regulations to
“non-public” lands within the boundaries of
conservation system units in Alaska, but it may not apply
Alaska-specific regulations to those lands. That is a surprising
conclusion. ANILCA repeatedly recognizes that Alaska is
different—from its “unrivaled scenic and geological
values,” to the “unique” situation of its
“rural residents dependent on subsistence uses,” to
“the need for development and use of Arctic resources with
appropriate recognition and consideration given to the unique
nature of the Arctic environment.” 16 U. S. C.
§§3101(b), 3111(2), 3147(b)(5).
ANILCA itself accordingly carves out numerous
Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general
authority over federally managed preservation areas. For example,
ANILCA requires the Secretary of the Interior to permit “the
exercise of valid commercial fishing rights or privi-leges”
within the National Wildlife Refuge System in Alaska, including the
use of “campsites, cabins, motorized vehicles, and aircraft
landings directly incident to the exercise of such rights or
privileges,” with certain exceptions. 94Stat. 2393. ANILCA
also requires the Secretary to “permit on the public lands
appropriate use for subsistence purposes of snowmobiles,
motorboats, and other means of surface transportation traditionally
employed for such purposes by local residents, subject to
reasonable regulation.” 16 U. S. C. §3121(b).
And it provides that National Preserves “in Alaska shall be
administered and managed as a unit of the National Park System in
the same manner as a national park except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and
wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping
shall be allowed” pursuant to applicable law. §3201
(emphasis added).
Many similar examples are woven throughout
ANILCA. See, e.g., 94Stat. 2393 (Secretary must administer
wildlife refuge “so as to not impede the passage of
navigation and access by boat on the Yukon and Kuskokwim
Rivers,” subject to reasonable regulation); id., at
2388 (Secretary must allow reindeer grazing uses in certain areas,
including construction of necessary facilities); 16
U. S. C. §3203(a) (Alaska-specific rules for
wilderness management apply “in recognition of the unique
conditions in Alaska”); §3170(a) (Secretary must permit
reasonable use of snowmachines, motorboats, and airplanes within
conserva-tion system units “for travel to and from villages
and homesites”).
All those Alaska-specific provisions reflect the
simple truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule. Yet
the reading below would prevent the Park Service from recognizing
Alaska’s unique conditions. Under that reading, the Park
Service could regulate “non-public” lands in Alaska
only through rules applicable outside Alaska as well. Thus,
for example, if the Park Service elected to allow hovercraft during
hunting season in Alaska—in a departure from its nationwide
rule—the more relaxed regulation would apply only to the
“public” land within the boundaries of the unit.
Hovercraft would still be banned from the “non-public”
land, even during hunting season. Whatever the reach of the Park
Service’s authority under ANILCA, we cannot conclude that
Section 103(c) adopted such a topsy-turvy approach.
Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws
a distinction between “public” and
“non-public” lands within the boundaries of
conservation system units in Alaska. See §3103(c) (“Only
those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit
which are public lands . . . shall be deemed to be
included as a portion of such unit”); ibid. (No lands
“conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any
private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely
to public lands within such units”). And yet, according to
the court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate
between that “public” and “non-public” land
in an Alaska-specific way, it would have to regulate the
“non-public” land pursuant to rules applicable outside
Alaska, and the “public” land pursuant to
Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has authority
over “non-public” land in Alaska (an issue we do not
decide), that strikes us as an implausible reading of the
statute.
Looking at ANILCA both as a whole and with
respect to Section 103(c), the Act contemplates the possibility
that all the land within the boundaries of conservation system
units in Alaska may be treated differently from federally managed
preservation areas across the country, and that
“non-public” lands within the boundaries of those units
may be treated differently from “public” lands within
the unit. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Section
103(c), however, the former is not an option, and the latter would
require contorted and counterintuitive measures.
We therefore reject the interpretation of
Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. That reading of the
statute was the sole basis for the disposition of this case by the
Court of Appeals. We accordingly vacate the judgment of that court
and remand for further proceedings.
We do not reach the remainder of the
parties’ arguments. In particular, we do not decide whether
the Nation River qualifies as “public land” for
purposes of ANILCA. Sturgeon claims that it does not; the Park
Service that it does. The parties’ arguments in this respect
touch on vital issues of state sovereignty, on the one hand, and
federal authority, on the other. We find that in this case those
issues should be addressed by the lower courts in the first
instance.
Given this determination, we also do not decide
whether the Park Service has authority under Section 100751(b) to
regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River, even if
the river is not “public” land, or whether—as
Sturgeon argues—any such authority is limited by ANILCA.
Fin-ally, we do not consider the Park Service’s alternative
ar-gument that it has authority under ANILCA over both
“public” and “non-public” lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, to the extent a
regulation is written to apply specifically to both types of land.
We leave those arguments to the lower courts for consideration as
necessary.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
