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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–6368
_________________
MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN
HENDRICKSON, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 22, 2015]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In this case, an individual detained in a jail
prior to trial brought a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C. §1983, against several jail officers,
alleging that they used excessive force against him, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The
officers concede that they intended to use the force that they
used. Butthe parties disagree about whether the force used was
excessive.
The question before us is whether, to prove an
excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the
officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was
unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force
was objectively unreasonable. We conclude that the latter
standard is the correct one.
I
A
Some but not all of the facts are undisputed:
Michael Kingsley, the petitioner, was arrested on a drug charge and
detained in a Wisconsin county jail prior to trial. On the evening
of May 20, 2010, an officer performing a cell check noticed a piece
of paper covering the light fixture above Kingsley’s bed. The
officer told Kingsley to remove it; Kingsley refused; subsequently
other officers told Kingsley to remove the paper; and each time
Kingsley refused. The next morning, the jail administrator,
Lieutenant Robert Conroy, ordered Kingsley to remove the paper.
Kingsley once again refused. Conroy then told Kingsley that
officers would remove the paper and that he would be moved to a
receiving cell in the interim.
Shortly thereafter, four officers, including
respondents Sergeant Stan Hendrickson and Deputy Sheriff Fritz
Degner, approached the cell and ordered Kingsley to stand, back up
to the door, and keep his hands behind him. When Kingsley refused
to comply, the officers handcuffed him, forcibly removed him from
the cell, carried him to a receiving cell, and placed him face down
on a bunk with his hands handcuffed behind his back.
The parties’ views about what happened
next differ. The officers testified that Kingsley resisted their
efforts to remove his handcuffs. Kingsley testified that he did not
resist. All agree that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his knee in
Kingsley’s back and Kingsley told him in impolite language to
get off. Kingsley testified that Hendrickson and Degner then
slammed his head into the concrete bunk—an allegation the
officers deny.
The parties agree, however, about what happened
next: Hendrickson directed Degner to stun Kingsley with a Taser;
Degner applied a Taser to Kingsley’s back for approximately
five seconds; the officers then left the handcuffed Kingsley alone
in the receiving cell; and officers returned to the cell 15 minutes
later and removed Kingsley’s handcuffs.
B
Based on these and related events, Kingsley
filed a §1983 complaint in Federal District Court claiming
(among other things) that Hendrickson and Degner used excessive
force against him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. The officers moved for summary judgment, which
the District Court denied, stating that “a reasonable jury
could conclude that [the officers] acted with malice and intended
to harm [Kingsley] when they used force against him.”
Kingsley v. Josvai, No.
10–cv–832–bbc (WD Wis., Nov. 16, 2011), App to
Pet. for Cert. 66a–67a. Kingsley’s excessive force
claim accordingly proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the
trial, the District Court instructed the jury as follows:
“Excessive force means force
applied recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances of the time. Thus, to succeed on his claim
of excessive use of force, plaintiff must prove each of the
following factors by a preponderance of the evidence:
“(1) Defendants used force on
plaintiff;
“(2) Defendants’ use of force
was unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at the
time;
“(3) Defendants knew that using force
presented a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly
disregarded plaintiff’s safety by failing to take reasonable
measures to minimize the risk of harm to plaintiff; and
“(4) Defendants’ conduct
caused some harm to plaintiff.
“In deciding whether one or more
defendants used ‘unreasonable’ force against plaintiff,
you must consider whether it was unreasonable from the perspective
of a reasonable officer facing the same circumstances that
defendants faced. You must make this decision based on what
defendants knew at the time of the incident, not based on what you
know now.
“Also, in deciding whether one or
more defendants used unreasonable force and acted with reckless
disregard of plaintiff’s rights, you may consider
factors such as:
“• The need to use
force;
“• The relationship
between the need to use force and the amount of force used;
“• The extent of
plaintiff’s injury;
“• Whether defendants
reasonably believed there was a threat to the safety of staff or
prisoners; and
“• Any efforts made by
defendants to limit the amount of force used.” App.
277–278 (emphasis added).
The jury found in the officers’ favor.
On appeal, Kingsley argued that the correct
standard for judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive force
claim is objective unreasonableness. And, the jury instruction, he
said, did not hew to that standard. A panel of the Court of Appeals
disagreed, with one judge dissenting. The major-ity held that the
law required a “subjective inquiry” into the
officer’s state of mind. There must be “ ‘an
actual intent to violate [the plaintiff’s] rights or reckless
disregard for his rights.’ ” 744 F. 3d 443,
451 (CA7 2014) (quoting Wilson v. Williams, 83
F. 3d 870, 875 (CA7 1996)). The dissent would have used
instructions promulgated by the Committee on Pattern Civil Jury
Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, which require a pretrial
detainee claiming excessive force to show only that the use of
force was objectively unreasonable. 744 F. 3d, at 455 (opinion
of Hamilton, J.); see Pattern Civ. Jury Instr. §7.08 (2009).
The dissent further stated that the District Court’s use of
the word “reckless” in the jury instruction added
“an unnecessary and confusing element.” 744 F. 3d,
at 455.
Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking
us to determine whether the requirements of a §1983 excessive
force claim brought by a pretrial detainee must satisfy the
subjective standard or only the objective standard. In light of
disagreement among the Circuits, we agreed to do so. Compare,
e.g., Murray v. Johnson No. 260, 367 Fed. Appx. 196,
198 (CA2 2010); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F. 3d 1265,
1271 (CA11 2005) (per curiam), with Aldini v.
Johnson, 609 F. 3d 858, 865–866 (CA6 2010);
Young v. Wolfe, 478 Fed. Appx. 354, 356 (CA9
2012).
II
A
We consider a legally requisite state of mind.
In a case like this one, there are, in a sense, two separate
state-of-mind questions. The first concerns the defendant’s
state of mind with respect to his physical acts—i.e.,
his state of mind with respect to the bringing about of certain
physical consequences in the world. The second question concerns
the defendant’s state of mind with respect to whether his use
of force was “excessive.” Here, as to the first
question, there is no dispute. As to the second, whether to
interpret the defendant’s physical acts in the world as
involving force that was “excessive,” there is a
dispute. We conclude with respect to that question that the
relevant standard is objective not subjective. Thus, the
defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a plaintiff is
required to prove.
Consider the series of physical events that take
place in the world—a series of events that might consist, for
example, of the swing of a fist that hits a face, a push that leads
to a fall, or the shot of a Taser that leads to the stunning of its
recipient. No one here denies, and we must assume, that, as to the
series of events that have taken place in the world, the defendant
must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state
of mind. That is because, as we have stated, “liability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 849 (1998)
(emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474
U. S. 327, 331 (1986) (“Historically, this guarantee of
due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of
government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property”). Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by
accident or if an officer unintentionally trips and falls on a
detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot prevail on
an excessive force claim. But if the use of force is
delib-erate—i.e., purposeful or knowing—the
pretrial detainee’s claim may proceed. In the context of a
police pursuit of a suspect the Court noted, though without so
holding, that recklessness in some cases might suffice as a
standard for imposing liability. See Lewis, supra, at
849. Whether that standard might suffice for liability in the case
of an alleged mistreatment of a pretrial detainee need not be
decided here; for the officers do not dispute that they acted
purposefully or knowingly with respect to the force they used
against Kingsley.
We now consider the question before us
here—the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the
proper interpretation of the force (a series of events in
the world) that the defendant deliberately (not accidentally or
negligently) used. In deciding whether the force deliberately used
is, constitutionally speaking, “excessive,” should
courts use an objective standard only, or instead a subjective
standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind?
It is with respect to this question that we hold that courts
must use an objective standard. In short, we agree with the
dissenting appeals court judge, the Seventh Circuit’s jury
instruction committee, and Kingsley, that a pretrial detainee must
show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him
was objectively unreasonable.
A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this
standard mechanically. See Lewis, supra, at 850.
Rather, objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) . A court must make
this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See ibid. A court must also
account for the “legitimate interests that stem from [the
government’s] need to manage the facility in which the
individual is detained,” appropriately deferring to
“policies and practices that in th[e] judgment” of jail
officials “are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 540, 547 (1979)
.
Considerations such as the following may bear on
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount
of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any
effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of
force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat
reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was
actively resisting. See, e.g., Graham, supra,
at 396. We do not consider this list to be exclusive. We mention
these factors only to illustrate the types of objective
circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive
force.
B
Several considerations have led us to conclude
that the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claim is solely an objective one. For one thing, it
is consistent with our precedent. We have said that “the Due
Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of
excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham,
supra, at 395, n. 10. And in Bell, we explained
that such “punishment” can consist of actions taken
with an “expressed intent to punish.” 441 U. S.,
at 538. But the Bell Court went on to explain that, in the
absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can
nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in
relation to that purpose.” Id., at 561. The
Bell Court applied this latter objective standard to
evaluate a variety of prison conditions, including a prison’s
practice of double-bunking. In doing so, it did not consider the
prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy.
Id., at 541–543. Rather, the Court examined objective
evidence, such as the size of the rooms and available amenities,
before concluding that the conditions were reasonably related to
the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial and did not
appear excessive in relation to that purpose. Ibid.
Bell’s focus on
“punishment” does not mean that proof of intent (or
motive) to punish is required for a pretrial detainee to prevail on
a claim that his due process rights were violated. Rather, as
Bell itself shows (and as our later precedent affirms), a
pretrial detainee can prevail by providing only objective evidence
that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in
relation to that purpose. Cf. Block v. Rutherford,
468 U. S. 576 –586 (1984) (where there was no suggestion
that the purpose of jail policy of denying contact visitation was
to punish inmates, the Court need only evaluate whether the policy
was “reasonably related to legitimate governmental
objectives” and whether it appears excessive in relation to
that objective); Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253
–271 (1984) (similar); see also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747 (1987) (“[T]he
punitive/regulatory distinction turns on ‘whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it]’ ” (quoting Schall,
supra, at 269; emphasis added and some internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Court did not suggest in any of these cases,
either by its words or its analysis, that its application of
Bell’s objective standard should involve subjective
considerations. Our standard is also consistent with our use of an
objective “excessive force” standard where officers
apply force to a person who, like Kingsley, has been accused but
not convicted of a crime, but who, unlike Kingsley, is free on
bail. See Graham, supra.
For another thing, experience suggests that an
objective standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern
jury instructions used in several Circuits. We are also told that
many facilities, including the facility at issue here, train
officers to interact with all detainees as if the officers’
conduct is subject to an objective reasonableness standard. See
Brief for Petitioner 26; App. 247–248; Brief for Former
Corrections Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae
8–18.
Finally, the use of an objective standard
adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith. We recognize
that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult
undertaking,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S.
78 –85 (1987), and that “safety and order at these
institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who
must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to
the problems they face,” Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. ___,
___ (2012) (slip op., at 5). Officers facing disturbances
“are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 397. For these
reasons, we have stressed that a court must judge the
reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the
knowledge of the defendant officer. We have also explained that a
court must take account of the legitimate interests in managing a
jail, acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness
analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to
maintain order and institutional security is appropriate. See Part
II–A, supra. And we have limited liability for
excessive force to situations in which the use of force was the
result of an intentional and knowing act (though we leave open the
possibility of including a “reckless” act as well).
Ibid. Additionally, an officer enjoys qualified immunity and
is not liable for excessive force unless he has violated a
“clearly established” right, such that “it would
[have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001) ; see also Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 27–28. It is unlikely
(though theoretically possible) that a plaintiff could overcome
these hurdles where an officer acted in good faith.
C
Respondents believe that the relevant legal
standard should be subjective, i.e., that the plaintiff must
prove that the use of force was not “applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline” but, rather, was
applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Brief for Respondents 27. And they refer to several cases that they
believe support their position. See id., at 26–31
(citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986)
; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992) ;
Lewis, 523 U. S. 833 ; Johnson v. Glick,
481 F. 2d 1028 (CA2 1973)).
The first two of these cases, however, concern
excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, not
claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Whitley, supra,
at 320; Hudson, supra, at 6–7. The language of
the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often
differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less
“maliciously and sadistically.” Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 –672, n. 40 (1977);
Graham, supra, at 395, n. 10 (1989); see also 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300 (“[I]f the offence be not
bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is to be committed to
the county [jail] . . . [b]ut . . . only for
safe custody, and not for punishment”). Thus, there is no
need here, as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case, to
determine when punishment is unconstitutional. Whitley and
Hudson are relevant here only insofar as they address the
practical importance of taking into account the legitimate
safety-related concerns of those who run jails. And, as explained
above, we believe we have done so.
Lewis does not prove respondents’
point, either. There, the Court considered a claim that a police
officer had violated due process by causing a death during a
high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. We
wrote that “[j]ust as a purpose to cause harm is needed for
Eighth Amendment liability in a [prison] riot case, so it ought to
be needed for due process liability in a pursuit case.” 523
U. S., at 854. Respondents contend that this statement
shows that the Court embraced a standard for due process claims
that requires a showing of subjective intent. Brief for Respondents
30–31. Other portions of the Lewis opinion make clear,
however, that this statement referred to the defendant’s
intent to commit the acts in question, not to whether the
force intentionally used was “excessive.” 523
U. S., at 854, and n. 13. As explained above, the parties
here do not dispute that respondents’ use of force was
intentional. See Part II–A, supra.
Nor does Glick provide respondents with
significant support. In that case Judge Friendly, writing for the
Second Circuit, considered an excessive force claim brought by a
pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Judge Friendly pointed out that the
“management by a few guards of large numbers of
prisoners” in an institution “may require and justify
the occasional use of a degree of intentional force.” 481
F. 2d, at 1033. He added that, in determining whether that
intentional use of force “crosse[s]” the
“constitutional line,” a court should look:
“to such factors as [(1)] the need
for the application of force, [(2)] the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used, [(3)] the extent of
in-jury inflicted, and [(4)] whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
Ibid.
This statement does not suggest that the fourth
factor (malicious and sadistic purpose to cause harm) is a
necessary condition for liability. To the contrary, the
words “such . . . as” make clear that the
four factors provide examples of some considerations, among others,
that might help show that the use of force was excessive.
Respondents believe these cases nonetheless help
them make a broader point—namely, that a subjective standard
“protects against a relative flood of claims,” many of
them perhaps unfounded, brought by pretrial detainees. Brief for
Respondents 38. But we note that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 42 U. S. C. §1997e, which is designed to
deter the filing of frivolous litigation against prison officials,
applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. Nor is
there evidence of a rash of unfounded filings in Circuits that use
an objective standard.
We acknowledge that our view that an objective
standard is appropriate in the context of excessive force claims
brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the
context of excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners.
We are not confronted with such a claim, however, so we need not
address that issue today.
III
We now consider the lawfulness of the jury
instruction given in this case in light of our adoption of an
objective standard for pretrial detainees’ excessive force
claims. See Part II–A, supra. That jury instruction
defined “excessive force” as “force applied
recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances of the time.” App. 277. It required Kingsley to
show that the officers “recklessly disregarded
[Kingsley’s] safety.” Id., at 278. And it
suggested that Kingsley must show the defendants “acted with
reckless disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights,” while
telling the jury that it could consider several objective factors
in making this determination. Ibid.
Kingsley argues that the jury instruction is
faulty because the word “reckless” suggests a need to
prove that respondents acted with a certain subjective state of
mind with respect to the excessive or nonexcessive nature of the
force used, contrary to what we have just held. Reply Brief
20–22. Respondents argue that irrespective of our holding,
any error in the instruction was harmless. Brief for Respondents
57–58. And the Solicitor General suggests that, because the
instructions defined “recklessness” with reference to
objective factors, those instructions effectively embody our
objective standard and did not confuse the jury. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 28–32.
We agree with Kingsley that the instructions
were erroneous. “[R]eckles[s] disregar[d] [of
Kingsley’s] safety” was listed as an additional
requirement, beyond the need to find that
“[respondents’] use of force was unreasonable in light
of the facts and circumstances at the time.” App. 278. See
also ibid. (Kingsley had to show respondents “used
unreasonable force and acted with reckless disregard of
[Kingsley’s] rights” (emphasis added)). And in
determining whether respondents “acted with reckless
disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights,” the jury was
instructed to “consider . . . [w]hether [respondents]
reasonably believed there was a threat to the safety of
staff or prisoners.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Together,
these features suggested the jury should weigh respondents’
subjective reasons for using force and subjective views about the
excessiveness of the force. As we have just held, that was error.
But because the question whether that error was harmless may depend
in part on the detailed specifics of this case, we leave that
question for the Court of Appeals to resolve in the first
instance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–6368
_________________
MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN
HENDRICKSON, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 22, 2015]
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The Constitution contains no freestanding
prohibition of excessive force. There are, however, four
constitutional provisions that we have said forbid the use of
excessive force in certain circumstances. The Fourth Amendment
prohibits it when it makes a search or seizure
“unreason-able.” The Eighth Amendment prohibits it when
it constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment. The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit it (or, for that matter,
any use of force) when it is used to “deprive” someone
of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”
This is a Fourteenth Amendment case. The Fifth
Amendment applies only to federal actors; Kingsley forfeited any
argument under the Fourth Amendment by failing to raise it below;
and he acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment standard is
inapplicable, Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 8. The only question
before us is whether a pretrial detainee’s due process rights
are violated when “the force purposely or knowingly used
against him [is] objectively unreasonable.” Ante, at
6. In my view, the answer is no. Our cases hold that the
intentional infliction of punishment upon a pretrial detainee may
violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but the infliction of
“objectively unreasonable” force, without more, is not
the intentional infliction of punishment.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.
520 (1979) , we held that the Due Process Clause forbids holding
pretrial detainees in conditions that “amount to
punishment.” Id., at 535. Conditions amount to
punishment, we explained, when they are “imposed for the
purpose of punishment.” Id., at 538. Acting with the
intent to punish means taking a “ ‘deliberate act
intended to chastise or deter.’ ” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 300 (1991) (quoting
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645, 652 (CA7
1985)); see also Bell, supra, at 537–538. The
Court in Bell recognized that intent to punish need not be
“expressed,” 441 U. S. at 538, but may be
established with circumstantial evidence. More specifically, if the
condition of confinement being challenged “is not reasonably
related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or
purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of
the governmental action is punishment.” Id., at 539.
We endorsed the same inference when we applied Bell’s
intent-to-punish test in challenges brought by pretrial detainees
against jailhouse security policies, id., at 560–562;
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 –584
(1984), and statutes permitting pre-trial detention, Schall
v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 255, 269 (1984) ; United
States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 –747
(1987).
In light of these cases, I agree with the Court
that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee
from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395, n. 10
(1989) (citing Bell, supra, at 535–539). I
disagree, however, that any intentional application of force that
is objectively unreasonable in degree is a use of excessive force
that “amount[s] to punishment.” Bell, 441
U. S., at 535. The Court reaches that conclusion by misreading
Bell as forbidding States to take any harmful action
against pretrial detainees that is not “reasonably related to
a legitimate goal.” Id., at 539.
Bell endorsed this “reasonable
relation” inference in the context of a challenge to
conditions of a confinement—specifically, challenges to
the State’s policy of housing two people in each cell,
id., at 528, and various security policies, id., at
548–549, 553, 555, 558, 560–562. The conditions in
which pretrial detainees are held, and the security policies to
which they are subject, are the result of considered deliberation
by the authority imposing the detention. If those conditions and
policies lack any reasonable relationship to a legitimate,
nonpunitive goal, it is logical to infer a punitive intent. And the
same logic supports finding a punitive intent in statutes
authorizing detention that lacks any reasonable relationship to a
valid government interest. Schall, supra, at 269;
Salerno, supra, at 746–747.
It is illogical, however, automatically
to infer punitive intent from the fact that a prison guard used
more force against a pretrial detainee than was necessary. That
could easily have been the result of a misjudgment about the degree
of force required to maintain order or protect other inmates,
rather than the product of an intent to punish the detainee for his
charged crime (or for any other behavior). An officer’s
decision regarding how much force to use is made “in haste,
under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance,” Hudson v. Mc-Millian, 503 U. S.
1, 6 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), not after the
considered thought that precedes detention-policy determinations
like those at issue in Bell, Block, Schall,
and Salerno. That an officer used more force than necessary
might be evidence that he acted with intent to punish, but
it is no more than that.
In sum: Bell makes intent to punish the
focus of its due-process analysis. Objective reasonableness of the
force used is nothing more than a heuristic for identifying this
intent. That heuristic makes good sense for considered decisions by
the detaining authority, but is much weaker in the context of
excessive-force cl+aims. Kingsley does not argue that respondents
actually intended to punish him, and his reliance on Bell to
infer such an intent is misplaced.
Kingsley claims that “the protections of
due process . . . extend beyond the narrow context of
‘punishment.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 15.
Unquestionably. A State would plainly violate the Due Process
Clause if it extended a detainee’s confinement because it
believed him mentally ill (not as “punishment”),
without giving him the constitutionally guaranteed processes that
must precede the deprivation of liberty. But Kingsley does not
claim deprivation of liberty in that normal sense of that
word—the right to walk about free. He claims that the Due
Process Clause confers, on pretrial detainees, a substantive
“liberty” interest that consists of freedom from
objectively unreasonable force. Kingsley seeks relief, in other
words, under the doctrine of “substantive due process,”
through which we have occasionally recognized “liberty”
interests other than freedom from incarceration or detention, that
“cannot be limited at all, except by provisions that are
‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.’ ” Kerry v. Din, ante, at
6 (plurality opinion) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U. S. 292 –302 (1993)).
Even if one believed that the right to process
can confer the right to substance in particular cases,
Kingsley’s interest is not one of the “fundamental
liberty interests” that substantive due process protects. We
have said that that doctrine protects only those liberty interests
that, carefully described, are “objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702 –721 (1997) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Carefully described, the
liberty interest Kingsley asserts is the right of pretrial
detainees to be free from the application of force that is more
than is objectively required to further some legitimate,
nonpunitive, governmental interest. He does not argue (nor could
he) that this asserted interest could pass the test announced in
Glucksberg.
I conclude by emphasizing that our Constitution
is not the only source of American law. There is an immense body of
state statutory and common law under which individuals abused by
state officials can seek relief. Kingsley himself, in addition to
suing respondents for excessive force under 42 U. S. C.
§1983, brought a state-law claim for assault and battery. 744
F. 3d 443, 446, n. 6 (CA7 2014). The Due Process Clause
is not “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon”
that state system. Daniels v. Williams, 474
U. S. 327, 332 (1986) (quoting Paul v. Davis,
424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976) ). Today’s majority overlooks
this in its tender-hearted desire to tortify the Fourteenth
Amendment.