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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–378
_________________
STEPHEN DOMINICK McFADDEN, PETITIONER
v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[June 18, 2015]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement
Act of 1986 (Analogue Act) identifies a category of substances
substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled
substance schedules, 21 U. S. C. §802(32)(A), and
then instructs courts to treat those analogues, if intended for
human consumption, as controlled substances listed on schedule I
for purposes of federal law, §813. The Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) in turn makes it unlawful knowingly to manufacture,
distribute, or possess with intent to distribute controlled
substances. §841(a)(1). The question presented in this case
concerns the knowledge necessary for conviction under
§841(a)(1) when the controlled substance at issue is in fact
an analogue.
We hold that §841(a)(1) requires the
Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with
“a controlled substance.” When the substance is an
analogue, that knowledge requirement is met if the defendant knew
that the substance was controlled under the CSA or the Analogue
Act, even if he did not know its identity. The knowledge
requirement is also met if the defendant knew the specific features
of the substance that make it a “ ‘controlled
substance analogue.’ ” §802(32)(A). Because
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved a
jury instruction that did not accurately convey this knowledge
requirement, we vacate its judgment and remand for that court to
determine whether the error was harmless.
I
In 2011, law enforcement officials in
Charlottesville, Virginia, began investigating individuals at a
Charlottesville video store for suspected distribution of
“bath salts”—various recreational drugs used to
produce effects similar to those of cocaine, methamphetamine, and
other controlled substances. The owner of the store, Lois McDaniel,
had been purchasing bath salts from petitioner Stephen McFadden for
several months. McFadden had marketed the substances to her as
“Alpha,” “No Speed,”
“Speed,” “Up,” and “The New
Up,” and had compared them to cocaine and crystal meth. He
had often sold those products with labels borrowing language from
the Analogue Act, asserting that the contents were “not for
human consumption” or stating that a particular product
“does not contain any of the following compounds or analogues
of the following compounds” and listing controlled
substances. McDaniel purchased the bath salts for $15 per gram and
resold them for $30 to $70 per gram.
After investigators had conducted two controlled
buys from the store and confronted McDaniel, she agreed to
cooperate in their investigation by making five controlled buys
from McFadden. The Government intercepted the substances McFadden
sent when they arrived at the local FedEx store. Like the
substances sold in the video store, these substances were white and
off-white powders packaged in small plastic bags. Chemical analysis
identified the powders as containing, among other substances,
3,4-Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, also known as MDPV;
3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methylcathinone, also known as Meth-ylone or
MDMC; and 4-Methyl-N-ethylcathinone, also known as 4-MEC. When
ingested, each of these sub-stances is capable of producing effects
on the centralnervous system similar to those that controlled
substances (such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and methcathinone)
produce.
A federal grand jury indicted McFadden on eight
counts of distribution of controlled substance analogues and one
count of conspiracy. At trial, McFadden argued that he did not know
the substances he was distributing were regulated as controlled
substances under the Analogue Act. He and the Government also
disagreed about what knowledge was required for a conviction. The
Government sought an instruction requiring only “[t]hat the
defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or
substance . . . [t]hat . . . was a controlled
substance analogue . . . with the intent that it be
consumed by humans.” App. 26–27. McFadden sought a more
demanding instruction requiring that he “knew that the
substances that he was distributing possessed the characteristics
of controlled substance analogues,” including their chemical
structures and effects on the central nervous system.
Id.,
at 29–30. The District Court compromised, instructing the
jury that the statute required that “the defendant knowingly
and intentionally distributed a mixture or substance that
has” substantially similar effects on the nervous system as a
controlled substance and “[t]hat the defendant intended for
the mixture or substance to be consumed by humans.”
Id., at 40.
The jury convicted McFadden on all nine counts.
On appeal, McFadden insisted that the District Court “erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that the government was required
to prove that he knew, had a strong suspicion, or deliberately
avoided knowledge that the [substances] possessed the
characteristics of controlled substance analogues.” 753
F. 3d 432, 443 (CA4 2014). Rejecting that argument, the Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Id., at 444, 446. Stating that it was
bound by Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the
“intent element [in the Act] requires [only] that the
government prove that the defendant meant for the substance at
issue to be consumed by humans.”
Id., at 441; see
id., at 444.
We granted a writ of certiorari, 574 U. S
___ (2015), and now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand.
II
A
The Analogue Act requires a controlled
substance analogue, if intended for human consumption, to be
treated “as a controlled substance in schedule I” for
purposes of federal law. §1201, 100Stat. 3207–13, 21
U. S. C. §813. We therefore must turn first to the
statute that addresses controlled substances, the CSA. The CSA
makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
. . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance.” §401(a)(1), 84Stat. 1260, 21
U. S. C. §841(a)(1). Under the most natural reading
of this provision, the word “knowingly” applies not
just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those
verbs—“
a controlled substance.” See
Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 556 U. S. 646,
650 (2009) ;
id., at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment);
id., at 660–661 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). When used as an
indefinite article, “a” means “[s]ome
undetermined or unspecified particular.” Webster’s New
International Dictionary 1 (2d ed. 1954). And the CSA defines
“controlled substance” as “a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III,
IV, or V.” §802(6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ordinary meaning of §841(a)(1) thus requires a defendant
to know only that the substance he is dealing with is some
unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules. The
Courts of Appeals have recognized as much. See,
e.g., United
States v.
Andino, 627 F. 3d 41, 45–46 (CA2
2010);
United States v.
Gamez-Gonzalez, 319
F. 3d 695, 699 (CA5 2003);
United States v.
Martinez, 301 F. 3d 860, 865 (CA7 2002).
That knowledge requirement may be met by showing
that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the
schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was. Take,
for example, a defendant whose role in a larger drug organization
is to distribute a white powder to customers. The defendant may
know that the white powder is listed on the schedules even if he
does not know precisely what substance it is. And if so, he would
be guilty of knowingly distributing “a controlled
substance.”
The knowledge requirement may also be met by
showing that the defendant knew the identity of the substance he
possessed. Take, for example, a defendant who knows he is
distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the
schedules, 21 CFR §1308.11 (2014). Because ignorance of the
law is typically no defense to criminal prosecution,
Bryan
v.
United States, 524 U. S. 184, 196 (1998) , this
defendant would also be guilty of knowingly distributing “a
controlled substance.”[
1]
The Analogue Act extends the framework of the
CSA to analogous substances. 21 U. S. C. §813. The
Act defines a “controlled substance analogue” as a
substance:
“(i) the chemical structure of which is
substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
substance in schedule I or II;
“(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
“(iii) with respect to a particular
person, which such person represents or intends to have a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or
II.” §802(32)(A).
It further provides, “A controlled
substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for human
consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a
controlled substance in schedule I.” §813.
The question in this case is how the mental
state requirement under the CSA for knowingly manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute “a
controlled substance” applies when the controlled substance
is in fact an analogue. The answer begins with §841(a)(1),
which expressly requires the Government to prove that a defendant
knew he was dealing with “a controlled substance.” The
Analogue Act does not alter that provision, but rather instructs
courts to treat controlled substance analogues “as
. . . controlled substance[s] in schedule I.”
§813. Applying this statutory command, it follows that the
Government must prove that a defendant knew that the substance with
which he was dealing was “a controlled substance,” even
in prosecutions involving an analogue.[
2]
That knowledge requirement can be established in
two ways. First, it can be established by evidence that a defendant
knew that the substance with which he was dealing is some
controlled substance—that is, one actually listed on the
federal drug schedules or treated as such by operation of the
Analogue Act—regardless of whether he knew the particular
identity of the substance. Second, it can be established by
evidence that the defendant knew the specific analogue he was
dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an
analogue. The Analogue Act defines a controlled substance analogue
by its features, as a substance “the chemical structure of
which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II”; “which has a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater
than” the effect of a controlled substance in schedule I or
II; or which is represented or intended to have that effect with
respect to a particular person. §802(32)(A). A defendant who
possesses a substance with knowledge of those features knows all of
the facts that make his conduct illegal, just as a defendant who
knows he possesses heroin knows all of the facts that make his
conduct illegal. A defendant need not know of the existence of the
Analogue Act to know that he was dealing with “a
controlledsubstance.”
B
The Court of Appeals did not adhere to
§813’s command to treat a controlled substance analogue
“as a controlled substance in schedule I,” and,
accordingly, it did not apply the mental-state requirement in
§841(a)(1). Instead, it concluded that the only mental state
requirement for prosecutions involving controlled substance
analogues is the one in §813—that the analogues be
“intended for human consumption.” metricconverter753
F. 3d, at 436 (citing
United States v.
Klecker,
metricconverter348 F. 3d 69, 71 (CA4 2003)). Because that
interpretation is inconsistent with the text and structure of the
statutes, we decline to adopt it.
Unsurprisingly, neither the Government nor
McFadden defends the Court of Appeals’ position. But their
alternative interpretations fare no better. The Government agrees
that the knowledge requirement in §841(a)(1) applies to
prosecutions involving controlled substance analogues, yet contends
that it is met if the “defendant knew he was dealing with an
illegal or regulated substance” under some law. Brief for
United States 15. Section 841(a)(1), however, requires that a
defendant knew he was dealing with “a controlled
substance.” That term includes only those drugs listed on the
federal drug schedules or treated as such by operation of the
Analogue Act. §§802(6), 813. It is not broad enough to
include all substances regulated by any law.[
3]
For his part, McFadden contends that, in the
context of analogues, knowledge of “a controlled
substance” can
only be established by knowledge of the
characteristics that make a substance an “analogue”
under the Act. In support of that argument, he relies heavily on
our conclusion in
Staples v.
United States, 511
U. S. 600 (1994) , that a statute making it
“ ‘unlawful for any person . . . to
receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer
Record,’ ”
id., at 605 (quoting 26
U. S. C. §5861(d)), required proof that a defendant
“knew of the features of his AR–15 that brought it
within the scope of the Act,” 511 U. S., at 619.
McFadden reasons by analogy that a defendant convicted under
§841(a)(1) must also know the features of the substance that
brought it within the scope of the Analogue Act. But that position
ignores an important textual distinction between §841(a)(1)
and the statute at issue in
Staples. The statute at issue in
Staples defined “a firearm” by its physical
features such as the length of its barrel and its capacity to shoot
more than one shot with a single function of the trigger. Unlike
those physical features that brought the firearm “within the
scope of” that statute, the fea-ture of a substance
“that br[ings] it within the scope of” §841(a)(1)
is the fact that it is
“ ‘controlled.’ ” §802(6).
Knowledge of
that fact can be established in the twoways
previously discussed: either by knowledge that a substance is
listed or treated as listed by operation ofthe Analogue Act,
§§802(6), 813, or by knowledge of the physical
characteristics that give rise to that treatment.
Supra, at
7.
McFadden also invokes the canon of
constitutional avoidance, arguing that we must adopt his
interpretation of the statute lest it be rendered
unconstitutionally vague. But that argument fails on two grounds.
Under our precedents, this canon “is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of a provision.”
Warger v.
Shauers, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). It “has
no application” in the interpretation of an unambiguous
statute such as this one. See
ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even if this statute were ambiguous,
McFadden’s argument would falter. Under our precedents, a
scienter requirement in a statute “alleviate[s] vagueness
concerns,” “narrow[s] the scope of the [its]
prohibition[,] and limit[s] prosecutorial discretion.”
Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 149, 150
(2007) . The scienter requirement in this statute does not, as
McFadden suggests, render the statute vague. More-over, to the
extent McFadden suggests that the substantial similarity test for
defining analogues is itself indeterminate, his proposed
alternative scienter requirement would do nothing to cure that
infirmity.
III
The District Court’s instructions to the
jury did not fully convey the mental state required by the Analogue
Act. The jury was instructed only that McFadden had to
“knowingly and intentionally distribut[e] a mixture or
substance that has an actual, intended, or claimed stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system” substantially similar to that of a controlled
substance. App. 40.
The Government contends that any error in the
jury instructions was harmless because no rational jury could have
concluded that McFadden was unaware that the substances he was
distributing were controlled. We have recognized that even the
omission of an element from a jury charge is subject to
harmless-error analysis.
Neder v.
United States, 527
U. S. 1, 15 (1999) . Because the Court of Appeals did not
address that issue, we remand for that court to consider it in the
first instance.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
