Reed v. Town of Gilbert
Annotate this Case
576 US ___ (2015)
- Syllabus |
- Opinion (Clarence Thomas) |
- Concurrence (Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) |
- Concurrence (Elena Kagan) |
- Concurrence (Stephen G. Breyer)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 18, 2015]
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment.
I join Justice Kagan’s separate opinion. Like Justice Kagan I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily resolve the legal problem before us. The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as “content discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my view, the category “content discrimination” is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.
To use content discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny sometimes makes perfect sense. There are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional method for suppressing a viewpoint. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 –829 (1995); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 –319 (1988) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny where the line between subject matter and viewpoint was not obvious). And there are cases where the Court has found content discrimination to reveal that rules governing a traditional public forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of fairly managing the forum in the interest of all speakers. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972) (“Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say”). In these types of cases, strict scru-tiny is often appropriate, and content discrimination has thus served a useful purpose.
But content discrimination, while helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny. To say that it is not an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger is not to argue against that concept’s use. I readily concede, for example, that content discrimination, as a conceptual tool, can sometimes reveal weaknesses in the government’s rationale for a rule that limits speech. If, for example, a city looks to litter prevention as the rationale for a prohibition against placing newsracks dispensing free advertisements on public property, why does it exempt other newsracks causing similar litter? Cf. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410 (1993) . I also concede that, whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it places that speech at a disadvantage, potentially interfering with the free marketplace of ideas and with an individual’s ability to express thoughts and ideas that can help that individual determine the kind of society in which he wishes to live, help shape that society, and help define his place within it.
Nonetheless, in these latter instances to use the presence of content discrimination automatically to trigger strict scrutiny and thereby call into play a strong presumption against constitutionality goes too far. That is because virtually all government activities involve speech, many of which involve the regulation of speech. Regula-tory programs almost always require content discrimination. And to hold that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.
Consider a few examples of speech regulated by government that inevitably involve content discrimination, but where a strong presumption against constitutionality has no place. Consider governmental regulation of securities, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §78l (requirements for content that must be included in a registration statement); of energy conservation labeling-practices, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §6294 (requirements for content that must be included on labels of certain consumer electronics); of prescription drugs, e.g., 21 U. S. C. §353(b)(4)(A) (requiring a prescription drug label to bear the symbol “Rx only”); of doctor-patient confidentiality, e.g., 38 U. S. C. §7332 (requiring confidentiality of certain medical records, but allowing a physician to disclose that the patient has HIV to the patient’s spouse or sexual partner); of income tax statements, e.g., 26 U. S. C. §6039F (requiring taxpayers to furnish information about foreign gifts received if the aggregate amount exceeds $10,000); of commercial airplane briefings, e.g., 14 CFR §136.7 (2015) (requiring pilots to ensure that each passenger has been briefed on flight procedures, such as seatbelt fastening); of signs at petting zoos, e.g., N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law Ann. §399–ff(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2015) (requiring petting zoos to post a sign at every exit “ ‘strongly recommend[ing] that persons wash their hands upon exiting the petting zoo area’ ”); and so on.
Nor can the majority avoid the application of strict scrutiny to all sorts of justifiable governmental regulations by relying on this Court’s many subcategories and exceptions to the rule. The Court has said, for example, that we should apply less strict standards to “commercial speech.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 –563 (1980). ButI have great concern that many justifiable instancesof “content-based” regulation are noncommercial. And, worse than that, the Court has applied the heightened “strict scrutiny” standard even in cases where the less stringent “commercial speech” standard was appropriate. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op., at ___ ). The Court has also said that “government speech” escapes First Amendment strictures. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 –194 (1991). But regulated speech is typically private speech, not government speech. Further, the Court has said that, “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 388 (1992) . But this exception accounts for only a few of the instances in which content discrimination is readily justifiable.
I recognize that the Court could escape the problem by watering down the force of the presumption against constitutionality that “strict scrutiny” normally carries with it. But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment’s protection in instances where “strict scru-tiny” should apply in full force.
The better approach is to generally treat content discrimination as a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the strength of a justification. I would use content discrimination as a supplement to a more basic analysis, which, tracking most of our First Amendment cases, asks whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives. Answering this question requires examining the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1–3); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 –403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). Admittedly, this approach does not have the simplicity of a mechanical use of categories. But it does permit the government to regulate speech in numerous instances where the voters have authorized the government to regulate and where courts should hesitate to substitute judicial judgment for that of administrators.
Here, regulation of signage along the roadside, for purposes of safety and beautification is at issue. There is no traditional public forum nor do I find any general effort to censor a particular viewpoint. Consequently, the specific regulation at issue does not warrant “strict scrutiny.” Nonetheless, for the reasons that Justice Kagan sets forth, I believe that the Town of Gilbert’s regulatory rules violate the First Amendment. I consequently concur in the Court’s judgment only.