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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–502
_________________
CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 18, 2015]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has
adopted a comprehensive code governing the manner in which people
may display outdoor signs. Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code
(Sign Code or Code), ch. 1, §4.402 (2005).[
1] The Sign Code identifies various categories of
signs based on the type of information they convey, then subjects
each category to different restrictions. One of the categories is
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying
Event,” loosely defined as signs directing the public to a
meeting of a nonprofit group. §4.402(P). The Code imposes more
stringent restrictions on these signs than it doeson signs
conveying other messages. We hold that these provisions are
content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict
scrutiny.
I
A
The Sign Code prohibits the display of outdoor
signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but it then
exempts 23 categories of signs from that requirement. These
exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to flying banners.
Three categories of exempt signs are particularly relevant
here.
The first is “Ideological Sign[s].”
This category includes any “sign communicating a message or
ideas for noncommercial purposes that is not a Construction Sign,
Directional Sign, Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a
Qualifying Event, Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign owned
or required by a governmental agency.” Sign Code, Glossary of
General Terms (Glossary), p. 23 (emphasis deleted). Of the three
categories discussed here, the Code treats ideological signs most
favorably, allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in area and to
be placed in all “zoning districts” without time
limits. §4.402(J).
The second category is “Political
Sign[s].” This includes any “temporary sign designed to
influence the outcome of an election called by a public
body.” Glossary 23.[
2]
The Code treats these signs less favorably than ideological signs.
The Code allows the placement of political signs up to 16 square
feet on residential property and up to 32 square feet on
nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal property, and
“rights-of-way.” §4.402(I).[
3] These signs may be displayed up to 60 days
before a primary election and up to 15 days following a general
election.
Ibid.
The third category is “Temporary
Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.” This
includes any “Temporary Sign intended to direct pedestrians,
motorists, and other passersby to a ‘qualifying
event.’ ” Glossary 25 (emphasis deleted). A
“qualifying event” is defined as any “assembly,
gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by
a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other
similar non-profit organization.”
Ibid. The Code
treats temporary directional signs even less favorably than
political signs.[
4] Temporary
directional signs may be no larger than six square feet.
§4.402(P). They may be placed on private property or on a
public right-of-way, but no more than four signs may be placed on a
single property at any time.
Ibid. And, they may be
displayed no more than 12 hours before the “qualifying
event” and no more than 1 hour afterward.
Ibid.
B
Petitioners Good News Community Church
(Church) and its pastor, Clyde Reed, wish to advertise the time and
location of their Sunday church services. The Church is a small,
cash-strapped entity that owns no building, so it holds its
services at elementary schools or other locations in or near the
Town. In order to inform the public about its services, which are
held in a variety of different locations, the Church began placing
15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town, frequently in the public
right-of-way abutting the street. The signs typically displayed the
Church’s name, along with the time and location of the
upcoming service. Church members would post the signs early in the
day on Saturday and then remove them around midday on Sunday. The
display of these signs requires little money and manpower, and thus
has proved to be an economical and effective way for the Church to
let the community know where its services are being held each
week.
This practice caught the attention of the
Town’s Sign Code compliance manager, who twice cited the
Church for violating the Code. The first citation noted that the
Church exceeded the time limits for displaying its temporary
directional signs. The second citation referred to the same
problem, along with the Church’s failure to include the date
of the event on the signs. Town officials even confiscated one of
the Church’s signs, which Reed had to retrieve from the
municipal offices.
Reed contacted the Sign Code Compliance
Department in an attempt to reach an accommodation. His efforts
proved unsuccessful. The Town’s Code compliance manager
informed the Church that there would be “no leni-ency under
the Code” and promised to punish any futureviolations.
Shortly thereafter, petitioners filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of
speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
District Court denied the petitioners’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Sign Code’s provision regulating
temporary directional signs did not regulate speech on the basis of
content. 587 F. 3d 966, 979 (2009). It reasoned that, even
though an enforcement officer would have to read the sign to
determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied to it, the
“ ‘kind of cursory examination’ ”
that would be necessary for an officer to classify it as a
temporary directional sign was “not akin to an officer
synthesizing the expressive content of the sign.”
Id.,
at 978. It then remanded for the District Court to determine in the
first instance whether the Sign Code’s distinctions among
temporary directional signs, political signs, and ideological signs
nevertheless constituted a content-based regulation of speech.
On remand, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Town. The Court of Appeals again affirmed,
holding that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral.
The court concluded that “the distinctions between Temporary
Directional Signs, Ideological Signs, and Political Signs
. . . are based on objective factors relevant to
Gilbert’s creation of the specific exemption from the permit
requirement and do not otherwise consider the substance of the
sign.” 707 F. 3d 1057, 1069 (CA9 2013). Relying on this
Court’s decision in
Hill v.
Colorado, 530
U. S. 703 (2000) , the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Sign Code is content neutral. 707 F. 3d, at 1071–1072.
As the court explained, “Gilbert did not adopt its regulation
of speech because it disagreed with the message conveyed” and
its “interests in regulat[ing] temporary signs are unrelated
to the content of the sign.”
Ibid. Accord-ingly, the
court believed that the Code was “content-neutral as that
term [has been] defined by the Supreme Court.”
Id., at
1071. In light of that determination, it applied a lower level of
scrutiny to the Sign Code and concluded that the law did not
violate the First Amendment.
Id., at 1073–1076.
We granted certiorari, 573 U. S. ___
(2014), and now reverse.
II
A
The First Amendment, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws
“abridging the freedom of speech.” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 1. Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal
government vested with state authority, “has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”
Police Dept. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972) . Content-based
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative
content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests.
R. A. V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377,
395 (1992) ;
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of
N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 115,
118 (1991) .
Government regulation of speech is content based
if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.
E.g., Sorrell v.
IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011)
(slip op., at 8–9);
Carey v.
Brown, 447
U. S. 455, 462 (1980) ;
Mosley,
supra, at 95.
This commonsense meaning of the phrase “content based”
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech
“on its face” draws distinctions based on the message a
speaker conveys.
Sorrell,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at
8). Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious,
defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others
are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or
purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker
conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Our precedents have also recognized a separate
and additional category of laws that, though facially content
neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech:
laws that cannot be “ ‘justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech,’ ” or that
were adopted by the government “because of disagreement with
the message [the speech] conveys,”
Ward v.
Rock
Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989)
. Those
laws, like those that are content based on their face, must also
satisfy strict scrutiny.
B
The Town’s Sign Code is content based on
its face. It defines “Temporary Directional Signs” on
the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the
public to church or some other “qualifying event.”
Glossary 25. It defines “Political Signs” on the basis
of whether a sign’s message is “designed to influence
the outcome of an election.”
Id., at 24. And it
defines “Ideological Signs” on the basis of whether a
sign “communicat[es] a message or ideas” that do not
fit within the Code’s other categories.
Id., at 23. It
then subjects each of these categories to different
restrictions.
The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to
any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of
the sign. If a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book
club will discuss John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
that sign will be treated differently from a sign expressing the
view that one should vote for one of Locke’s followers in an
upcoming election, and both signs will be treated differently from
a sign expressing an ideological view rooted in Locke’s
theory of government. More to the point, the Church’s signs
inviting people to attend its worship services are treated
differently from signs conveying other types of ideas. On its face,
the Sign Code is a content-based regulation of speech. We thus have
no need to consider the government’s justifications or
purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject
to strict scrutiny.
C
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals offered several theories to explain why the Town’s
Sign Code should be deemed content neutral. None is persuasive.
1
The Court of Appeals first determined that the
Sign Code was content neutral because the Town “did not adopt
its regulation of speech [based on] disagree[ment] with the message
conveyed,” and its justifications for regulating temporary
directional signs were “unrelated to the content of the
sign.” 707 F. 3d, at 1071–1072. In its brief to
this Court, the United States similarly contends that a sign
regulation is content neutral—even if it expressly draws
distinctions based on the sign’s communicative
content—if those distinctions can be
“ ‘justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.’ ” Brief for United States
as
Amicus Curiae 20, 24 (quoting
Ward, supra,
at 791; emphasis deleted).
But this analysis skips the crucial first step
in thecontent-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is
content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or
lack of “animus toward the ideas contained” in the
regulated speech.
Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 429 (1993) . We have thus made
clear that “ ‘[i]llicit legislative intent is not
the
sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment,’ ” and a party opposing the government
“need adduce ‘no evidence of an improper censorial
motive.’ ”
Simon & Schuster, supra, at
117. Although “a content-based purpose may be sufficient in
certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based,
it is not necessary.”
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v.
FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) . In other words, an
innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based
law into one that is content neutral.
That is why we have repeatedly considered
whether a law is content neutral on its face
before turning
to the law’s justification or purpose. See,
e.g.,
Sorrell,
supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at
8–9) (statute was content based “on its face,”
and there was also evidence of an impermissible legislative
motive);
United States v.
Eichman, 496 U. S.
310, 315 (1990) (“Although the [statute] contains no
ex-plicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited
conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government’s
asserted
interest is related to the suppression of free
expression” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Members
of City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984) (“The text of the ordinance is
neutral,” and “there is not even a hint of bias or
censorship in the City’s enactment or enforcement of this
ordinance”);
Clark v.
Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984) (requiring that a
facially content-neutral ban on camping must be “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech”);
United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367,
375, 377 (1968) (noting that the statute “on its face deals
with conduct having no connection with speech,” but examining
whether the “the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression”). Because strict scrutiny
applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the
purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court
must evaluate each question before it concludes that the law is
content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals and the United States
misunderstand our decision in
Ward as suggesting that a
government’s purpose is relevant even when a law is content
based on its face. That is incorrect.
Ward had nothing to
say about facially content-based restrictions because it involved a
facially content-
neutral ban on the use, in a city-owned
music venue, of sound amplification systems not provided by the
city. 491 U. S., at 787, and n. 2. In that context, we
looked to governmental motive, including whether the government had
regulated speech “because of disagreement” with its
message, and whether the regulation was
“ ‘justified without reference to the content of
the speech.’ ”
Id., at 791. But
Ward’s framework “applies only if a statute is
content neutral.”
Hill, 530 U. S., at 766
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Its rules thus operate “to protect
speech,” not “to restrict it.”
Id., at
765.
The First Amendment requires no less. Innocent
motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may
one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is
why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the
laws—
i.e., the “abridg[ement] of
speech”—rather than merely the motives of those who
enacted them. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. “ ‘The
vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that it is
always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it
lends itself to use for those purposes.’ ”
Hill, supra, at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For instance, in
NAACP v.
Button,
371 U. S. 415 (1963) , the Court encountered a State’s
attempt to use a statute prohibiting “ ‘improper
solicitation’ ” by attorneys to outlaw
litigation-related speech of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People.
Id., at 438. Although
Button predated our more recent formulations of strict
scrutiny, the Court rightly rejected the State’s claim that
its interest in the “regulation of professional
conduct” rendered the statute consistent with the First
Amendment, observing that “it is no answer . . . to
say . . . that the purpose of these regulations was
merely to insure high professional standards and not to curtail
free expression.”
Id., at 438–439. Likewise, one
could easily imagine a Sign Code compliance manager who disliked
the Church’s substantive teachings deploying the Sign Code to
make it more difficult for the Church to inform the public of the
location of its services. Accordingly, we have repeatedly
“rejected the argument that ‘discriminatory
. . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only
when the legislature intends to suppress certain
ideas.’ ”
Discovery Network, 507
U. S., at 429. We do so again today.
2
The Court of Appeals next reasoned that the
Sign Code was content neutral because it “does not mention
any idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential
treatment.” 587 F. 3d, at 977. It reasoned that, for the
purpose of the Code provisions, “[i]t makes no difference
which candidate is supported, who sponsors the event, or what
ideological perspective is asserted.” 707 F. 3d, at
1069.
The Town seizes on this reasoning, insisting
that “content based” is a term of art that
“should be applied flexibly” with the goal of
protecting “viewpoints and ideas from government censorship
or favoritism.” Brief for Respondents 22. In the Town’s
view, a sign regulation that “does not censor or favor
particular viewpoints or ideas” cannot be content based.
Ibid. The Sign Code allegedly passes this test because its
treatment of temporary directional signs does not raise any
concerns that the government is “endorsing or suppressing
‘ideas or viewpoints,’ ”
id., at 27,
and the provisions for political signs and ideological signs
“are neutral as to particular ideas or viewpoints”
within those categories.
Id., at 37.
This analysis conflates two distinct but related
limitations that the First Amendment places on government
regulation of speech. Government discrimination among
viewpoints—or the regulation of speech based on “the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker”—is a “more blatant” and
“egregious form of content discrimination.”
Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995) . But it is well established that
“[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an
entire topic.”
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y.
v.
Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S.
530, 537 (1980) .
Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific
subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate
among viewpoints within that subject matter.
Ibid. For
example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for political
speech—and only political speech—would be a
content-based regulation, even if it imposed no limits on the
political viewpoints that could be expressed. See
Discovery
Network, supra, at 428. The Town’s Sign Code likewise
singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment,
even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter.
Ideological messages are given more favorable treatment than
messages concerning a political candidate, which are themselves
given more favorable treatment than messages announcing an assembly
of like-minded individuals. That is a paradigmatic example of
content-based discrimination.
3
Finally, the Court of Appeals characterized
the Sign Code’s distinctions as turning on
“ ‘the content-neutral elements of who is speaking
through the sign and whether and when an event is
occurring.’ ” 707 F. 3d, at 1069. That
analysis is mistaken on both factual and legal grounds.
To start, the Sign Code’s distinctions are
not speaker based. The restrictions for political, ideological, and
temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. If
a local business, for example, sought to put up signs advertising
the Church’s meetings, those signs would be subject to the
same limitations as such signs placed by the Church. And if Reed
had decided to dis-play signs in support of a particular candidate,
he could have made those signs far larger—and kept them up
for far longer—than signs inviting people to attend hischurch
services. If the Code’s distinctions were truly speaker
based, both types of signs would receive the same treatment.
In any case, the fact that a distinction is
speaker based does not, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe,
automatically render the distinction content neutral. Because
“[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
are all too often simply a means to control content,”
Citizens United v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 558
U. S. 310, 340 (2010) , we have insisted that “laws
favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the
legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content
preference,”
Turner, 512 U. S., at 658. Thus, a
law limiting the content of newspapers, but only newspapers, could
not evade strict scrutiny simply because it could be characterized
as speaker based. Likewise, a content-based law that restricted the
political speech of all corporations would not become content
neutral just because it singled out corporations as a class of
speakers. See
Citizens United, supra, at 340–341.
Characterizing a distinction as speaker based is only the
beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.
Nor do the Sign Code’s distinctions hinge
on “whether and when an event is occurring.” The Code
does not permit citizens to post signs on any topic whatsoever
within a set period leading up to an election, for example.
Instead, come election time, it requires Town officials to
determine whether a sign is “designed to influence the
outcome of an election” (and thus “political”) or
merely “communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial
purposes” (and thus “ideological”). Glossary 24.
That obvious content-based inquiry does not evade strict scrutiny
review simply because an event (
i.e., an election) is
involved.
And, just as with speaker-based laws, the fact
that a distinction is event based does not render it content
neutral. The Court of Appeals cited no precedent from this Court
supporting its novel theory of an exception from the
content-neutrality requirement for event-based laws. As we have
explained, a speech regulation is content based if the law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.
Supra, at 6. A regulation that targets a
sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less
content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it
conveys some other idea. Here, the Code singles out signs bearing a
particular message: the time and location of a specific event. This
type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to
regulate signs, but a clear and firm rule governing content
neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of
speech, even if laws that might seem “entirely
reasonable” will sometimes be “struck down because of
their content-based nature.”
City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
III
Because the Town’s Sign Code imposes
content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand
only if they survive strict scrutiny, “ ‘which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest,’ ”
Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U. S.
___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 8) (quoting
Citizens United,
558 U. S.
, at 340). Thus, it is the Town’s burden
to demonstrate that the Code’s differentiation between
temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as
political signs and ideological signs, furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See
ibid.
The Town cannot do so. It has offered only two
governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code
draws: preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic
safety. Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling
governmental interests, the Code’s distinctions fail as
hopelessly underinclusive.
Starting with the preservation of aesthetics,
temporary directional signs are “no greater an
eyesore,”
Discovery Network, 507 U. S.
, at
425, than ideological or political ones. Yet the Code allows
unlimited proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly
limiting the number, size, and duration of smaller directional
ones. The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary
directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the
same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of signs that
create the same problem.
The Town similarly has not shown that limiting
temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate threats to
traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not. The
Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs pose a
greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs. If
anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby
church meeting.
In light of this underinclusiveness, the Town
has not met its burden to prove that its Sign Code is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest. Because a
“ ‘law cannot be regarded as protecting an
interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction
on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited,’ ”
Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U. S.
765, 780 (2002) , the Sign Code fails strict scrutiny.
IV
Our decision today will not prevent
governments from enacting effective sign laws. The Town asserts
that an “ ‘absolutist’ ”
content-neutrality rule would render “virtually all
distinctions in sign laws . . . subject to strict
scrutiny,” Brief for Respondents 34–35, but that is not
the case. Not “all distinctions” are subject to strict
scrutiny, only
content-based ones are. Laws that are
content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny. See
Clark, 468 U. S., at 295.
The Town has ample content-neutral options
available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics. For
example, its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have
nothing to do with a sign’s message: size, building
materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. See,
e.g., §4.402(R). And on public property, the Town may
go a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so
long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 817 (upholding
content-neutral ban against posting signs on public property).
Indeed, some lower courts have long held that similar content-based
sign laws receive strict scrutiny, but there is no evidence that
towns in those jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic effects.
See,
e.g., Solantic, LLC v.
Neptune Beach, 410
F. 3d 1250, 1264–1269 (CA11 2005) (sign categories
similar to the town of Gilbert’s were content based and
subject to strict scru-tiny);
Matthews v.
Needham,
764 F. 2d 58, 59–60 (CA1 1985) (law banning political
signs but not commercial signs was content based and subject to
strict scrutiny).
We acknowledge that a city might reasonably view
the general regulation of signs as necessary because signs
“take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists,
displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that
legitimately call for regulation.”
City of Ladue, 512
U. S., at 48. At the same time, the presence of certain signs
may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide
traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance
narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of
pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—such as warning signs
marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or
street numbers associated with private houses—well might
survive strict scrutiny. The signs at issue in this case, including
political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far
removed from those purposes. As discussed above, they are facially
content based and are neither justified by traditional safety
concerns nor narrowly tailored.
* * *
We reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.