United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. ___ (2015)
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless presented to the appropriate federal agency for review within two years after the claim accrues,” 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). If the agency denies the claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court within six months of the denial. Wong failed to file her FTCA claim in federal court within six months, but argued that the district court had not permitted her to file until after the period expired. June failed to present her FTCA claim to a federal agency within two years, but argued that her untimely filing should be excused because the government concealed facts vital to her claim. In each case, the district court dismissed the FTCA claim, holding that those time bars are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Section 2401(b)’s time limits are subject to equitable tolling. Congress must do something special to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and prohibit a court from tolling it, but did no such thing in section 2401(b). Separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not jurisdictional; the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears in another section and is not expressly linked to the limitations periods. The phrase “shall be forever barred” was commonplace in statutes of limitations enacted around the time of the FTCA, and does not carry jurisdictional significance.
The time limits on suing the federal government under Section 2401(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act are subject to equitable tolling, since they have not been expressly tagged by Congress as jurisdictional.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
united states v. kwai fun wong
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13-1074. Argued December 10, 2014—Decided April 22, 2015
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless the claimant meets two deadlines. First, a claim must be presented to the appropriate federal agency for administrative review “within two years after [the] claim accrues.” 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). Second, if the agency denies the claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court “within six months” of the agency’s denial. Ibid.
Kwai Fun Wong and Marlene June, respondents in Nos. 13–1074 and 13-1075, respectively, each missed one of those deadlines. Wong failed to file her FTCA claim in federal court within 6 months, but argued that that was only because the District Court had not permitted her to file that claim until after the period expired. June failed to present her FTCA claim to a federal agency within 2 years, but argued that her untimely filing should be excused because the Government had, in her view, concealed facts vital to her claim. In each case, the District Court dismissed the FTCA claim for failure to satisfy §2401(b)’s time bars, holding that, despite any justification for delay, those time bars are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed in both cases, concluding that §2401(b)’s time bars may be equitably tolled.
Held: Section 2401(b)’s time limits are subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 4–18.
(a) Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 , provides the framework for deciding the applicability of equitable tolling to statutes of limitations on suits against the Government. There, the Court adopted a “rebuttable presumption” that such time bars may be equitably tolled. Id., at 95. Irwin’s presumption may, of course, be rebutted. One way to do so—pursued by the Government here—is to demonstrate that the statute of limitations at issue is jurisdictional; if so, the statute cannot be equitably tolled. But this Court will not conclude that a time bar is jurisdictional unless Congress provides a “clear statement” to that effect. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. ___, ___. And in applying that clear statement rule, this Court has said that most time bars, even if mandatory and emphatic, are nonjurisdictional. See id., at ___. Congress thus must do something special to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Congress did no such thing in enacting §2401(b). The text of that provision speaks only to a claim’s timeliness; it does not refer to the jurisdiction of the district courts or address those courts’ authority to hear untimely suits. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 . Instead, it “reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 . Statutory context confirms that reading. Congress’s separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not jurisdictional, and here the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears not in §2401(b) but in another section of Title 28, §1346(b)(1). That jurisdictional grant is not expressly conditioned on compliance with §2401(b)’s limitations periods. Finally, assuming it could provide the clear statement that this Court’s cases require, §2401(b)’s legislative history does not clearly demonstrate that Congress intended the provision to impose a jurisdictional bar. Pp. 7–9.
(c) The Government’s two principal arguments for treating §2401(b) as jurisdictional are unpersuasive and foreclosed by this Court’s precedents. Pp. 9–17.
(1) The Government first points out that §2401(b) includes the same “shall be forever barred” language as the statute of limitations governing Tucker Act claims, which this Court has held to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 –126. But that phrase was a commonplace in statutes of limitations enacted around the time of the FTCA, and it does not carry talismanic jurisdictional significance. Indeed, this Court has construed the same language to be subject to tolling in the Clayton Act’s statute of limitations. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 . And in two decisions addressing the Tucker Act’s statute of limitations, the Court has dismissed the idea that that language is jurisdictionally significant. See Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130 . The “shall be forever barred” phrase is thus nothing more than an ordinary way to set a statutory deadline. Pp. 9–14.
(2) The Government next argues that §2401(b) is jurisdictional because it is a condition on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. But that argument is foreclosed by Irwin, which considered an identical objection but concluded that even time limits that condition a waiver of immunity may be equitably tolled. See 498 U. S., at 95–96. The Government’s invocation of sovereign immunity principles is also peculiarly inapt here. Unlike other waivers of sovereign immunity, the FTCA treats the Government much like a private party, and the Court has accordingly declined to construe the Act narrowly merely because it waives the Government’s immunity from suit. There is no reason to do differently here. Pp. 14–17.
No. 13-1074, 732 F. 3d 1030, and No. 13-1075, 550 Fed. Appx. 505, affirmed and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Our task in these cases is to interpret and enforce a federal statute that specifies the limits of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA waives the immunity of the United States for certain tort claims but provides that any â€œtort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unlessâ€ it is filed with the appropriate agency â€œwithintwo years after such claim accruesâ€ and in federal court â€œwithin six months afterâ€ the agencyâ€™s final decision.28 U.Â S.Â C. Â§2401(b). The statutory text, its historical roots, and more than a century of precedents show that this absolute bar is not subject to equitable tolling. I would enforce the statute as Congress intended and reverse. I The FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be understood in that context. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress was reluctant to allow individual tort claims against the United States. Instead, it granted relief to individuals through private laws enacted solely for those individualsâ€™ benefit. These waivers of sovereign immunity were surgical and sporadic, but â€œnotoriously clumsy,â€ and by 1946 Congress thought it better to adopt a â€œsimplifiedâ€ approach. Dalehite v. United States,346 U.Â S. 15â€“25 (1953). The FTCA thus waived sovereign immunity for tort claims against the Government and set out a procedure for adjudicating those claims. This waiver of sovereign immunity was no trivial matter. Long before the FTCA, Congress authorized suits against the Government for contract and property claims under the Tucker Act and a number of predecessor statutes, but the Tucker Act excluded tort claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity. The concern was obvious: As opposed to the more predictable nature of contractual and property claims, tort-based harms are sometimes unperceived and open-ended. Even frivolous claims require the Federal Government to expend administrative and litigation costs, which ultimately fall upon society at-large. For every dollar spent to defend against or to sat-isfy a tort claim against the United States, the Government must either raise taxes or shift funds originally allocated to different public programs. To reduce these risks, Congress placed strict limits on the FTCAâ€™s waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute â€œexempts from [its] waiver certain categories of claims,â€ Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,552 U.Â S. 214,218 (2008), and includes a broad exemption for claims â€œarising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.â€28 U.Â S.Â C. Â§2680(h); see also Â§Â§2680(a)â€“(n). In addition, in order to limit the scope and unpredictability of the Governmentâ€™s potential liability, the Act exempts from the waiver of sovereign immunity certain types of recovery, such as prejudgment interest and punitive damages. See Â§2674. Most relevant here, the FTCA â€œcondition[s]â€ its waiver of sovereign immunity on strict filing deadlines. United States v. Kubrick,444 U.Â S. 111,117 (1979). As enacted in 1946, the Act granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against the Government, â€œ[s]ubject to the [other] provisions ofâ€ the Act. FTCA, ch. 753, Â§410(a),60Stat.843â€“844. One of those provisions stated that â€œ[e]very claim against the United States cognizable under this title shall be forever barred, unless within one year after such claim accrued .Â .Â . it is presented in writing to the [relevant] Federal agency .Â .Â . or .Â .Â . an action is begunâ€ in federal court. Â§420, id., at 845. The current version provides in full as follows: â€œA tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.â€28 U.Â S.Â C. Â§2401(b). II The question presented in these two cases is whether the FTCAâ€™s filing deadlines are subject to equitable tolling. We must therefore decide (1) whether the deadlines are â€œjurisdictionalâ€ in nature, so that courts are without power to adjudicate claims filed outside their strict limits and (2) if they are not jurisdictional, whether the statute nonetheless prohibits equitable tolling. Both of these inquiries require close attention to the text, context, and history of the Act. And both lead to the conclusion that the FTCA allows no equitable tolling. A The FTCAâ€™s filing deadlines are jurisdictional. The statuteâ€™s plain text prohibits adjudication of untimely claims. Once the Actâ€™s filing deadlines have run, all untimely claims â€œshall be forever barred.â€ Ibid. These words are not qualified or aspirational. They are absolute. If not filed with the agency within two years, or with a federal court within six months, a claim â€œshall beâ€ â€œbarredâ€ â€œfor-ever.â€ â€œShall be forever barredâ€ is not generally understood to mean â€œshould be allowed sometimes.â€ The statute brooks no exceptions. And because the filing deadlines restrict the FTCAâ€™s waiver of sovereign immunity, they impose a limit on the courtsâ€™ jurisdiction that â€œwe should not take it upon ourselves to extend.â€ Kubrick, supra, at 117â€“118. For over 130 years, we have understood these terms as jurisdictional. When crafting the FTCAâ€™s limitations provision, Congress did not write on a clean slate. Rather, it borrowed language from limitations provisions in the Tucker Act and its predecessor statutes. The 1911 version of the Tucker Act included language that was nearly identical to that in the 1946 version of the FTCA: â€œEvery claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court .Â .Â . within six years after the claim first accrues.â€ Â§156,36Stat.1139. That statutory language came, in turn, from the 1863 predecessor to the Tucker Act. See Â§10,12Stat.767. As early as 1883, we interpreted these precise terms to impose a â€œjurisdiction[al]â€ requirement that the â€œcourt may not disregard.â€ Kendall v. United States,107 U.Â S. 123. We emphasized that, when waiving sovereign immunity, Congress â€œmay restrict the jurisdiction of the [courts] to certain classes of demands.â€ Ibid. And we held that â€œ[t]he express words of the statute leave no room for contention.â€ Ibid. The Court thus had no â€œauthority to engraftâ€ an equitable tolling provision where Congress had so clearly constrained the judiciaryâ€™s authority. Ibid. Over the ensuing decades, we repeatedly reaffirmed our interpretation of the phrase. In Finn v. United States,123 U.Â S. 227,232 (1887), we held that the Government could not waive the jurisdictional time bar and thus that the â€œduty of the courtâ€ was â€œto dismiss the petitionâ€ when a plaintiff raised an untimely claim. We reached the same conclusion in De Arnaud v. United States,151 U.Â S. 483â€“496 (1894). We reaffirmed the rule in United States v. New York,160 U.Â S. 598â€“619 (1896), while holding that there was jurisdiction where the plaintiff presented its claim before the statutory deadline. And in Munro v. United States,303 U.Â S. 36, n.Â 1, 41 (1938), we held that a District Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve un-timely claims, even if the Government waived any objection, under a different statute that incorporated the Tucker Actâ€™s time limits. All the while, the lower courts similarly enforced the deadline as â€œa jurisdictional requirement, compliance with which is necessary to enable suit to be maintained against the sovereign.â€ Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. United States, 51 F.Â 2d 1053, 1056 (CA2 1931). Thus, by 1946, the phrase â€œshall be forever barredâ€ was well understood to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over untimely claims. The FTCAâ€™s statutory terms must be understood in this context. When Congress crafted the FTCA as a tort-based analogue to the Tucker Act, it consciously borrowed the well-known wording of the Tucker Actâ€™s filing deadline. Then, as now, it was settled that â€œ[i]n adopting the language used in an earlier act, Congress must be considered to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of the enactment.â€ Hecht v. Malley,265 U.Â S. 144,153 (1924); see also Shapiro v. United States,335 U.Â S. 1,16 (1948); Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.Â S. ___, ___â€“___ (2013) (slip op., at 3â€“4) (â€œÂ â€˜[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with itâ€™Â â€ (quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.Â Rev. 527, 537 (1947))). Indeed, Congress considered departing from the Tucker Actâ€™s prohibition on equitable tolling, but decided against it. Proposals to include an equitable tolling provision were â€œincluded in nine of the thirty-one bills prior to the enactment of the FTCA,â€ but â€œthe Act passed by the 1946 Congress did not provide for any equitable tolling of the limitations periods.â€ Colella & Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 31 Seton Hall L.Â Rev. 174, 195â€“196 (2000). Instead, it was understood that individuals with claims outside those deadlines could turn to Congress for relief through private bills, as they did before the FTCAâ€™s enactment. See id., at 195. The evidence of statutory meaning does not end there. We reaffirmed the phaseâ€™s jurisdictional nature in the decades following the FTCAâ€™s enactment. In Soriano v. United States,352 U.Â S. 270 (1957), we rejected a request to allow equitable tolling under the Tucker Act. Confirming the connection between the Tucker Act and the FTCA, we noted that â€œstatutes permitting suits for tax refunds, tort actions, alien property litigation, patent cases, and other claims against the Government would be affectedâ€ if the Court allowed equitable tolling under the Tucker Act. Id., at 275 (emphasis added). And in Kubrick, 444 U.Â S., at 117â€“118, we cited Sorianoâ€™s warning while emphasizing that the FTCAâ€™s time limits are a condition of the Actâ€™s waiver of sovereign immunity. The lower courts also quickly recognized the statutesâ€™ common heritage and enforced Â§2401(b) as a jurisdictional requirement. In Anderegg v. United States, 171 F.Â 2d 127, 128 (1948) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit cited Finn and Munro while holding that the FTCAâ€™s filing deadline is a jurisdictional limit that the Government cannot waive. The Fifth Circuit, in Simon v. United States, 244 F.Â 2d 703, 705, n. 4 (1957), held that the FTCAâ€™s deadline is a jurisdictional condition on the Actâ€™s waiver of sovereign immunity and cited Carpenter v. United States, 56 F.Â 2d 828, 829 (CA2 1932), a Tucker Act case, to support its holding. And in Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.Â 2d 411 (1959), the Ninth Circuit similarly relied on Tucker Act precedents to hold that â€œthe District Court has no jurisdiction over [an untimely FTCA] action,â€ because no waiver of sovereign immunity exists once the filing deadline â€œhas run.â€ Id., at 412 (citing Edwards v. United States, 163 F.Â 2d 268, 269 (CA9 1947), in turn citing Finn and Munro). When Congress amended the FTCA in 1966, it readopted the â€œforever barredâ€ language against the backdrop of Soriano and the lower courtsâ€™ interpretation of the phrase. We must therefore assume that Congress meant to keep the universally recognized meaning of those words. See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,540 U.Â S. 581â€“594 (2004). That meaning, of course, cannot change over time. But even if there were any doubt, we recently reaffirmed our view in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,552 U.Â S. 130 (2008). We explained that, unlike run-of-the-mill statutes of limitation, jurisdictional time limits â€œseek .Â .Â . to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency.â€ Id., at 133 (citations omitted). Recounting our decisions in Kendall, Finn, De Arnaud, New York, and Soriano, we â€œreiteratedâ€ our understanding of the â€œabsolute nature of the court of claims limitations statute.â€ 552 U.Â S., at 135. And we rejected an invitation to abandon that interpretation, noting that Congress has long accepted our interpretation of the statute. Id., at 139. The same must be said of the FTCA. As we have often explained, â€œ[w]hen a long line of this Courtâ€™s decisions left undisturbed by Congress has treated a similar requirement as â€˜jurisdictional,â€™ we will presume that Congress intended to follow that course.â€ Henderson v. Shinseki,562 U.Â S. 428,436 (2011) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,559 U.Â S. 154,168 (2010); Union Pacific R.Â Co. v. Locomotive Engineers,558 U.Â S. 67,82 (2009). Every single decision from this Court interpreting the Tucker Actâ€™s â€œsimilar requirementâ€ has treated it as jurisdictional. And there is strong historical evidence that Congress â€œintended to follow that course.â€ That should be the end of the matter: Section 2410(b)â€™s filing deadlines are jurisdictional limits that are not subject to equitable tolling. B Even if the FTCAâ€™s filing deadlines are not jurisdic-tional, they still prohibit equitable tolling. To be sure, in recent years, we have grown reluctant to affix the â€œjurisdictionalâ€ label. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,546 U.Â S. 500,510 (2006); Henderson, supra, at 434â€“436. â€œBut calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory.â€ Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.Â S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 10). Where Congress imposes an inflexible claims processing rule, it is our duty to enforce the law and prohibit equitable tolling, whether it is jurisdictional or not. Here, Congressâ€™ intent is clear. The words of the statute leave no doubt that untimely claims are never allowed: They are â€œforever barred.â€ This is no weak-kneed command. The history underlying the text only bolsters its apparent meaning, and our repeated reaffirmation of the phraseâ€™s meaning should remove any doubt. Congress never meant for equitable tolling to be available under the FTCA. The only factor pointing in the opposite direction is our suggestion in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,498 U.Â S. 89â€“96 (1990), that we would thenceforth apply a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling in suits against the Government. But it is beyond me how Irwinâ€™s judge-made presumption announced in 1990 can trump the obvious meaning of a statute enacted many decades earlier. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago,441 U.Â S. 677,718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In any event, Irwinâ€™s rebuttable presumption is overcome in this case. For well over a century, we have recognized the inflexible nature of the Tucker Actâ€™s provision. Since its adoption, we have recognized that the FTCAâ€™s language bears the same meaning as its Tucker Act companion. See Soriano, supra, at 275; Kubrick, supra, at 118. And in John R. Sand & Gravel, we held that our â€œdefinitive ear-lier interpretation of theâ€ Tucker Act is a â€œsufficient rebuttalâ€ to Irwinâ€™s presumption. 552 U.Â S., at 138. There is no principled way to distinguish this case. Section 2401(b) allows no equitable tolling. III The Courtâ€™s contrary conclusion is wrong at every step. In its view, Â§2401(b)â€™s statutory text is â€œmundaneâ€ language that â€œÂ â€˜reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations.â€™Â â€ Ante, at 8. But â€œordinaryâ€ nonjurisdictional time limits are typically directed at claimants. The deadline in Henderson, for example, required that â€œa person adversely affected by [a Board of Veteransâ€™ Appeals] decision shall file a notice of appeal .Â .Â . within 120 days afterâ€ the decision.38 U.Â S.Â C. Â§7266(a) (emphasis added); 562 U.Â S, at 438. The â€œrun-of-the-millâ€ limitations provision in Holland v. Florida,560 U.Â S. 631,647 (2010), likewise applied to the â€œpersonâ€ responsible for filing: â€œA1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.â€28 U.Â S.Â C. Â§2244(d)(1) (emphasis added); 560 U.Â S., at 635. And the provision at issue in Irwin was similar, if not an even weaker command. It provided that â€œÂ â€˜[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by .Â .Â . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission .Â .Â . an employee or applicant for employment .Â .Â . may file a civil action.â€™Â â€ 498 U.Â S., at 94 (quoting42 U.Â S.Â C. Â§2000eâ€“16(c) (1998 ed.); emphasis added). Section 2401(b), by contrast, never mentions the claimant, and it is phrased in emphatically absolute terms. It says unequivocally that untimely tort claims against the United States â€œshall be forever barred.â€ Although it does not use the word â€œjurisdiction,â€ it speaks at least as much to the courts (who are â€œforever barredâ€ from considering untimely claims) as it does to claimants (who are â€œforever barredâ€ from bringing stale claims). More important, though, the words in Â§2401(b) have a well-known meaning that ipse dixit labels cannot overcome. The majority tells us this â€œold â€˜adÂ hoc,â€™ law-by-law approachâ€â€”also known as statutory interpretationâ€”has been replaced with a broad presumption in favor of equitable tolling and a judicial preference against jurisdictional labels. Ante, at 4. I dispute the premise. But in any event, as I explained above, and as six Members of the current Court held in John R. Sand & Gravel, the overwhelming evidence of congressional intent here easily overtakes Irwinâ€™s rebuttable presumption. Even if we would rather not call Â§2401(b)â€™s deadlines â€œjurisdictional,â€ with all that label entails, we must nonetheless recognize that Congress never meant to allow equitable tolling. The majority avoids this latter point by declining to give it any separate attention. See ante, at 5, n. 2. But we cannot conflate the two questions because, though the relevant evidence is the same, the analysis is different. In particular, the majority is wrong to rely on Irwin when assessing the jurisdictional question, which is the only question it really decides. We do not indulge Irwinâ€™s presumption when determining whether a requirement is jurisdictional. Instead, we typically invoke Irwin only after finding that a requirement is not jurisdictional, to decide whether Congress nonetheless intended to prohibit equitable tolling. In Henderson, for instance, we never mentioned Irwin because the parties did not ask us to address whether the rule was â€œsubject to equitable tolling if it [was] not jurisdictional.â€ 562 U.Â S., at 442, n.Â 4. Likewise, in Bowles v. Russell,551 U.Â S. 205 (2007), we held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, without a word about Irwin. In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U.Â S. ___, ___â€“___, ___â€“___, (2013) (slip op., at 6â€“7, 11â€“13), we considered Irwin only after deciding that a deadline was not jurisdictional. And in Holland, we held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996â€™s time limits are not jurisdictional, without relying on Irwin, and then stated that â€œ[w]e have previously made clear that a nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a â€˜rebuttable presumptionâ€™ in favor â€˜of equitable tolling.â€™Â â€ 560 U.Â S., at 645â€“646 (quoting Irwin, supra, at 95â€“96) (emphasis deleted); cf. Young v. United States,535 U.Â S. 43â€“50 (2002) (invoking Irwin after concluding that a limitations period was not a â€œsubstantiveâ€ component of the Bankruptcy Code). This error matters because the majorityâ€™s jurisdictional analysis literally begins and ends with Irwin, see ante, at 4â€“5, 18, and thus relies on a presumption that should have no bearing on the question. Without that presumption, the majority could not so readily ignore the unmistakable evidence that Â§2401(b)â€™s limits are jurisdictional. *â€ƒâ€ƒ*â€ƒâ€ƒ* For these reasons, I would hold that Â§2401(b) does not allow equitable tolling, and I therefore respectfully dissent.