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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–761
_________________
POM WONDERFUL LLC, PETITIONER v. THECOCA-COLA
COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 12, 2014]
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
POM Wonderful LLC makes
and sells pomegranate juice products, including a
pomegranate-blueberry juice blend. App. 23a. One of POM’s
competitors is the Coca-Cola Company. Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid
Division makes a juice blend sold with a label that, in describing
the contents, displays the words “pomegranate
blueberry” with far more prominence than other words on the
label that show the juice to be a blend of five juices. In truth,
the Coca-Cola product contains but 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2%
blueberry juice.
Alleging that the use
of that label is deceptive and misleading, POM sued Coca-Cola under
§43 of the Lanham Act. 60Stat. 441, as amended, 15
U. S. C. §1125. That provision allows one competitor
to sue another if it alleges unfair competition arising from false
or misleading product descriptions. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that, in the realm of labeling for food and
beverages, a Lanham Act claim like POM’s is precluded by a
second federal statute. The second statute is the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which forbids the misbranding of
food, including by means of false or misleading labeling.
§§301, 403, 52Stat. 1042, 1047, as amended, 21
U. S. C. §§331, 343.
The ruling that
POM’s Lanham Act cause of action is precluded by the FDCA was
incorrect. There is no statutory text or established interpretive
principle to support the contention that the FDCA precludes Lanham
Act suits like the one brought by POM in this case. Nothing in the
text, history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act shows the
congressional purpose or design to forbid these suits. Quite to the
contrary, the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other in the
federal regulation of misleading food and beverage labels.
Competitors, in their own interest, may bring Lanham Act claims
like POM’s that challenge food and beverage labels that are
regulated by the FDCA.
I
A
This case concerns
the intersection and complementar-ity of these two federal laws. A
proper beginning point is a description of the statutes.
Congress enacted the
Lanham Act nearly seven decades ago. See 60Stat. 427 (1946). As the
Court explained earlier this Term, it “requires no
guesswork” to ascertain Congress’ intent regarding this
federal law, for Congress included a “detailed statement of
the statute’s purposes.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 12). Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides:
“The intent of this chapter is to
regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making
actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to
prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of
registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and
foreign nations.” 15 U. S. C. §1127.
The Lanham Act’s trademark provisions are
the primary means of achieving these ends. But the Act also creates
a federal remedy “that goes beyond trademark
protection.” Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U. S. 23, 29 (2003) . The broader remedy is at
issue here.
The Lanham Act creates
a cause of action for unfair competition through misleading
advertising or labeling. Though in the end consumers also benefit
from the Act’s proper enforcement, the cause of action is for
competitors, not consumers.
The term
“competitor” is used in this opinion to indicate all
those within the class of persons and entities protected by the
Lanham Act. Competitors are within the class that may invoke the
Lanham Act because they may suffer “an injury to a commercial
interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by [a]
defendant’s misrepresentations.” Lexmark, supra, at ___
(slip op., at 22). The petitioner here asserts injury as a
competitor.
The cause of action the
Act creates imposes civil liability on any person who “uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which . . . misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities.” 15 U. S. C. §1125(a)(1). As the
Court held this Term, the private remedy may be invoked only by
those who “allege an injury to a commercial interest in
reputation or sales. A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a
disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable
under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the
Lanham Act.” Lexmark, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
13). This principle reflects the Lanham Act’s purpose of
“ ‘protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce
within the control of Congress] against unfair
competition.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
POM’s cause of action would be straightforward enough but for
Coca-Cola’s contention that a separate federal statutory
regime, the FDCA, allows it to use the label in question and in
fact precludes the Lanham Act claim.
So the FDCA is the
second statute to be discussed. The FDCA statutory regime is
designed primarily to protect the health and safety of the public
at large. See 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593,
596 (1951) ; FDCA, §401, 52Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C.
§341 (agency may issue certain regulations to “promote
honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers”). The
FDCA prohibits the misbranding of food and drink. 21
U. S. C. §§321(f), 331. A food or drink is
deemed misbranded if, inter alia, “its labeling is false or
misleading,” §343(a), information required to appear on
its label “is not prominently placed thereon,”
§343(f), or a label does not bear “the common or usual
name of the food, if any there be,” §343(i). To
implement these provisions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
promulgated regulations regarding food and beverage labeling,
including the labeling of mixes of different types of juice into
one juice blend. See 21 CFR §102.33 (2013). One provision of
those regulations is particularly relevant to this case: If a juice
blend does not name all the juices it contains and mentions only
juices that are not predominant in the blend, then it must either
declare the percentage content of the named juice or
“[i]ndicate that the named juice is present as a flavor or
flavoring,” e.g., “raspberry and cranberry flavored
juice drink.” §102.33(d). The Government represents that
the FDA does not preapprove juice labels under these regulations.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition 16. That
contrasts with the FDA’s regulation of other types of labels,
such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C. §355(d), and is
consistent with the less extensive role the FDA plays in the
regulation of food than in the regulation of drugs.
Unlike the Lanham Act,
which relies in substantial part for its enforcement on private
suits brought by injured competitors, the FDCA and its regulations
provide the United States with nearly exclusive enforcement
author-ity, including the authority to seek criminal sanctions in
some circumstances. 21 U. S. C. §§333(a), 337.
Private parties may not bring enforcement suits. §337. Also
unlike the Lanham Act, the FDCA contains a provision pre-empting
certain state laws on misbranding. That provision, which Congress
added to the FDCA in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990, §6, 104Stat. 2362–2364, forecloses a “State
or political subdivision of a State” from establishing
requirements that are of the type but “not identical
to” the requirements in some of the misbranding provisions of
the FDCA. 21 U. S. C. §343–1(a). It does not
address, or refer to, other federal statutes or the preclusion
thereof.
B
POM Wonderful LLC is
a grower of pomegranates anda distributor of pomegranate juices.
Through its POM Wonderful brand, POM produces, markets, and sells a
variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranate-blueberry
juice blend. App. 23a.
POM competes in the
pomegranate-blueberry juice market with the Coca-Cola Company.
Coca-Cola, under its Minute Maid brand, created a juice blend
containing 99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice,
0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice. Id., at 38a; Brief
for Respondent 8. Despite the minuscule amount of pomegranate and
blueberry juices in the blend, the front label of the Coca-Cola
product displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” in
all capital letters, on two separate lines. App. 38a. Below those
words, Coca-Cola placed the phrase “flavored blend of 5
juices” in much smaller type. Ibid. And below that phrase, in
still smaller type, were the words “from concentrate with
added ingredients”—and, with a line break before the
final phrase— “and other natural flavors.” Ibid.
The product’s front label also displays a vignette of
blueberries, grapes, and raspberries in front of a halved
pomegranate and a halved apple. Ibid.
Claiming that
Coca-Cola’s label tricks and deceives consumers, all to
POM’s injury as a competitor, POM brought suit under the
Lanham Act. POM alleged that the name, label, marketing, and
advertising of Coca-Cola’s juice blend mislead consumers into
believing the product consists predominantly of pomegranate and
blueberry juice when it in fact consists predominantly of less
expensive apple and grape juices. Id., at 27a. That confusion, POM
complained, causes it to lose sales. Id., at 28a. POM sought
damages and injunctive relief. Id., at 32a–33a.
The District Court
granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola on POM’s Lanham
Act claim, ruling that the FDCA and its regulations preclude
challenges to the name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend.
The District Court reasoned that in the juice blend regulations the
“FDA has directly spoken on the issues that form the basis of
Pom’s Lanham Act claim against the naming and labeling
of” Coca-Cola’s product, but has not prohibited any,
and indeed expressly has permitted some, aspects of
Coca-Cola’s label. 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871–873
(CD Cal. 2010).
The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Like the District
Court, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress decided
“to entrust matters of juice beverage labeling to the
FDA”; the FDA has promulgated “comprehensive regulation
of that labeling”; and the FDA “apparently” has
not imposed the requirements on Coca-Cola’s label that are
sought by POM. 679 F. 3d 1170, 1178 (2012). “[U]nder
[Circuit] precedent,” the Court of Appeals explained,
“for a court to act when the FDA has not—despite
regulating extensively in this area—would risk undercutting
the FDA’s expert judgments and authority.” Id., at
1177. For these reasons, and “[o]utof respect for the
statutory and regulatory scheme,” the Court of Appeals barred
POM’s Lanham Act claim. Id., at 1178.
II
A
This Court granted
certiorari to consider whether a private party may bring a Lanham
Act claim challenging a food label that is regulated by the FDCA.
571 U. S. ___ (2014). The answer to that question is based on
the following premises.
First, this is not a
pre-emption case. In pre-emption cases, the question is whether
state law is pre-empted by a federal statute, or in some instances,
a federal agency action. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555,
563 (2009) . This case, however, concerns the alleged preclusion of
a cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions of
another federal statute. So the state-federal balance does not
frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion case, any
“presumption against pre-emption,” id., at 565,
n. 3, has no force. In addition, the preclusion analysis is
not governed by the Court’s complex categorization of the
types of pre-emption. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,
530 U. S. 363 –373 (2000). Although the Court’s
pre-emption precedent does not govern preclusion analysis in this
case, its principles are instructive insofar as they are designed
to assess the interaction of laws that bear on the same
subject.
Second, this is a
statutory interpretation case and the Court relies on traditional
rules of statutory interpretation. That does not change because the
case involves multiple federal statutes. See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 –139 (2000). Nor
does it change because an agency is involved. See ibid. Analysis of
the statutory text, aided by established principles of
interpretation, controls. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001) .
A principle of
interpretation is “often countered, of course, by some maxim
pointing in a different direction.” Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001) . It is thus unsurprising
that in this case a threshold dispute has arisen as to which of two
competing maxims establishes the proper framework for decision. POM
argues that this case concerns whether one statute, the FDCA as
amended, is an “implied repeal” in part of an-other
statute, i.e., the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555
U. S. 379, 395 (2009) . POM contends that in such cases courts
must give full effect to both statutes unless they are in
“irreconcilable conflict,” see ibid., and that this
high standard is not satisfied here. Coca-Cola resists this canon
and its high standard. Coca-Cola argues that the case concerns
whether a more specific law, the FDCA, clarifies or narrows the
scope of a more general law, the Lanham Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988) ; Brief for
Respondent 18. The Court’s task, it claims, is to
“reconcil[e]” the laws, ibid., and it says the best
reconciliation is that the more specific provisions of the FDCA bar
certain causes of action authorized in a general manner by the
Lanham Act.
The Court does not need
to resolve this dispute. Even assuming that Coca-Cola is correct
that the Court’s task is to reconcile or harmonize the
statutes and not, as POM urges, to enforce both statutes in full
unless there is a genuinely irreconcilable conflict, Coca-Cola is
incorrect that the best way to harmonize the statutes is to bar
POM’s Lanham Act claim.
B
Beginning with the
text of the two statutes, it must be observed that neither the
Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in express terms, forbids or limits Lanham
Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. By
its terms, the Lanham Act subjects to suit any person who
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin” of goods or services. 15
U. S. C. §1125(a). This comprehensive imposition of
liability extends, by its own terms, to misrepresentations on
labels, including food and beverage labels. No other provision in
the Lanham Act limits that understanding or purports to govern the
relevant interaction between the Lanham Act and the FDCA. And the
FDCA, by its terms, does not preclude Lanham Act suits. In
consequence, food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA are
not, under the terms of either statute, off limits to Lanham Act
claims. No textual provision in either statute discloses a purpose
to bar unfair competition claims like POM’s.
This absence is of
special significance because the Lanham Act and the FDCA have
coexisted since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. 60Stat. 427
(1946); ch. 675, 52Stat. 1040 (1938). If Congress had concluded, in
light of experience, that Lanham Act suits could interfere with the
FDCA, it might well have enacted a provision addressing the issue
during these 70 years. See Wyeth, supra, at 574 (“If Congress
thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some
point during the FDCA’s 70-year history”). Congress
enacted amendments to the FDCA and the Lanham Act, see, e.g.,
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104Stat. 2353;
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, §132, 102Stat. 3946,
including an amendment that added to the FDCA an express
pre-emption provision with respect to state laws addressing food
and beverage misbranding, §6, 104Stat. 2362. Yet Congress did
not enact a provision addressing the preclusion of other federal
laws that might bear on food and beverage labeling. This is
“powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight
to be the exclusive means” of ensuring proper food and
beverage labeling. See Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 575.
Perhaps the closest the
statutes come to addressing the preclusion of the Lanham Act claim
at issue here is the pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in
1990 as part of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. See 21
U. S. C. §343–1. But, far from expressly
precluding suits arising under other federal laws, the provision if
anything suggests that Lanham Act suits are not precluded.
This pre-emption
provision forbids a “State or political subdivision of a
State” from imposing requirements that are of the type but
“not identical to” corresponding FDCA requirements for
food and beverage labeling. Ibid. It is significant that the
complex pre-emption provision distinguishes among different FDCA
requirements. It forbids state-law requirements that are of the
type but not identical to only certain FDCA provisions with respect
to food and beverage labeling. See
§§343–1(a)(1)–(5) (citing some but not all of
the subsections of §343); §6, 104Stat. 2362–2364
(codified at 21 U. S. C. §343–1, and note
following). Just as significant, the provision does not refer to
requirements imposed by other sources of law, such as federal
statutes. For purposes of deciding whether the FDCA displaces a
regulatory or liability scheme in another statute, it makes a
substantial difference whether that other statute is state or
federal. By taking care to mandate express pre-emption of some
state laws, Congress if anything indicated it did not intend the
FDCA to preclude requirements arising from other sources. See
Setser v. United States, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op.,
at 6–7) (applying principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius). Pre-emption of some state requirements does not suggest
an intent to preclude federal claims.
The structures of the
FDCA and the Lanham Act reinforce the conclusion drawn from the
text. When two statutes complement each other, it would show
disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress
nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation
of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144 (2001) (“[W]e can
plainly regard each statute as effective because of its different
requirements and protections”); see also Wyeth, supra, at
578–579. The Lanham Act and the FDCA complement each other in
major respects, for each has its own scope and purpose. Although
both statutes touch on food and beverage labeling, the Lanham Act
protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while the
FDCA protects public health and safety. Compare Lexmark, 572
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13), with 62 Cases of
Jam, 340 U. S., at 596. The two statutes impose
“different requirements and protections.” J. E. M. Ag
Supply, supra, at 144.
The two statutes
complement each other with respect to remedies in a more
fundamental respect. Enforcement of the FDCA and the detailed
prescriptions of its implementing regulations is largely committed
to the FDA. The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or
expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors
possess. Competitors who manufacture or distribute products have
detailed knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon certain sales
and marketing strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition
prac-tices may be far more immediate and accurate than that of
agency rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits draw upon this
market expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors
to protect their interests on a case-by-case basis. By
“serv[ing] a distinct compensatory function that may motivate
injured persons to come forward,” Lanham Act suits, to the
extent they touch on the same subject matter as the FDCA,
“provide incentives” for manufacturers to behave well.
See id., at 579. Allowing Lanham Act suits takes advantage of
synergies among multiple methods of regulation. This is quite
consistent with the congressional design to enact two different
statutes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance the protection of
competitors and consumers.
A holding that the FDCA
precludes Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels
would not only ignore the distinct functional aspects of the FDCA
and the Lanham Act but also would lead to a result that Congress
likely did not intend. Unlike other types of labels regu-lated by
the FDA, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C.
§355(d), it would appear the FDA does not preapprove food and
beverage labels under its regulations and instead relies on
enforcement actions, warning letters, and other measures. See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition 16. Because the
FDA acknowledges that it does not necessarily pursue enforcement
measures regarding all objectionable labels, ibid., if Lanham Act
claims were to be precluded then commercial interests—and
indirectly the public at large—could be left with less
effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm than
in many other, less regulated industries. It is un-likely that
Congress intended the FDCA’s protection of health and safety
to result in less policing of misleading food and beverage labels
than in competitive markets for other products.
C
Coca-Cola argues the
FDCA precludes POM’s Lanham Act claim because Congress
intended national uniformity in food and beverage labeling.
Coca-Cola notes three aspects of the FDCA to support that position:
delegation of enforcement authority to the Federal Government
rather than private parties; express pre-emption with respect to
state laws; and the specificity of the FDCA and its implementing
regulations. But these details of the FDCA do not establish an
intent or design to preclude Lanham Act claims.
Coca-Cola says that the
FDCA’s delegation of enforcement authority to the Federal
Government shows Congress’ intent to achieve national
uniformity in labeling. But POM seeks to enforce the Lanham Act,
not the FDCA or its regulations. The centralization of FDCA
enforcement authority in the Federal Government does not indicate
that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of other
federal statutes.
Coca-Cola next appeals
to the pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in 1990. See
§343–1. It argues that allowing Lanham Act claims to
proceed would undermine the pre-emption provision’s goal of
ensuring that food and beverage manufacturers can market nationally
without the burden of complying with a patchwork of requirements. A
significant flaw in this argument is that the pre-emption provision
by its plain terms applies only to certain state-law requirements,
not to federal law. See Part II–B, supra. Coca-Cola in effect
asks the Court to ignore the words “State or political
subdivision of a State” in the statute.
Even if it were proper
to stray from the text in this way, it is far from clear that
Coca-Cola’s assertions about national uniformity in fact
reflect the congressional design. Although the application of a
federal statute such as the Lanham Act by judges and juries in
courts throughout the country may give rise to some variation in
outcome, this is the means Congress chose to enforce a national
policy to ensure fair competition. It is quite different from the
disuniformity that would arise from the multitude of state laws,
state regulations, state administrative agency rulings, and
state-court decisions that are partially forbidden by the
FDCA’s pre-emption provision. Congress not infrequently
permits a certain amount of variability by authorizing a federal
cause of action even in areas of law where national uniformity is
important. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U. S. 141, 162 (1989) (“One of the fundamental
purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the
Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of
intellectual property”), with 35 U. S. C. §281
(private right of action for patent infringement); see Wyeth, 555
U. S., at 570 (“[T]he [FDCA] contemplates that federal
juries will resolve most misbranding claims”). The Lanham Act
itself is an example of this design: Despite Coca-Cola’s
protestations, the Act is uniform in extending its protection
against unfair competition to the whole class it describes. It is
variable only to the extent that those rights are enforced on a
case-by-case basis. The variability about which Coca-Cola complains
is no different than the variability that any industry covered by
the Lanham Act faces. And, as noted, Lanham Act actions are a means
to implement a uniform policy to prohibit unfair competition in all
covered markets.
Finally, Coca-Cola
urges that the FDCA, and particu-larly its implementing
regulations, addresses food and bev-erage labeling with much more
specificity than is foundin the provisions of the Lanham Act. That
is true. The pages of FDA rulemakings devoted only to juice-blend
labeling attest to the level of detail with which the FDA has
examined the subject. E.g., Food Labeling; Declaration of
Ingredients; Common or Usual Name for Nonstandardized Foods;
Diluted Juice Beverages, 58 Fed. Reg. 2897–2926 (1993).
Because, as we have explained, the FDCA and the Lanham Act are
complementary and have separate scopes and purposes, this greater
specificity would matter only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot
be implemented in full at the same time. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op.,
at 5–7). But neither the statutory structure nor the
empirical evidence of which the Court is aware indicates there will
be any difficulty in fully enforcing each statute according to its
terms. See Part II–B, supra.
D
The Government
disagrees with both Coca-Cola and POM. It submits that a Lanham Act
claim is precluded “to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations
specifically require or authorize the challenged aspects of [the]
label.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. Applying
that standard, the Government argues that POM may not bring a
Lanham Act challenge to the name of Coca-Cola’s product, but
that other aspects of the label may be challenged. That is because,
the Government argues, the FDA regulations specifically authorize
the names of juice blends but not the other aspects of the label
that are at issue.
In addition to raising
practical concerns about drawing a distinction between regulations
that “specifically . . . authorize” a course
of conduct and those that merely tolerate that course, id., at
10–11, the flaw in the Government’s intermediate
position is the same as that in Coca-Cola’s theory of the
case. The Government assumes that the FDCA and its regulations are
at least in some circumstances a ceiling on the regulation of food
and beverage labeling. But, as discussed above, Congress intended
the Lanham Act and the FDCA to complement each other with respect
to food and beverage labeling.
The Government claims
that the “FDA’s juice-naming regulation reflects the
agency’s ‘weigh[ing of] the competing interests
relevant to the particular requirement in
question.’ ” Id., at 19 (quoting Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 501 (1996) ). The rulemaking indeed
does allude, at one point, to a balancing of interests: It styles a
particular requirement as “provid[ing] manufacturers with
flexibility for labeling products while providing consumers with
information that they need.” 58 Fed. Reg. 2919–2920.
But that rulemaking does not discuss or even cite the Lanham Act,
and the Government cites no other statement in the rulemaking
suggesting that the FDA considered the full scope of the interests
the Lanham Act protects. In addition, and contrary to the language
quoted above, the FDA explicitly encouraged manufacturers to
include material on their labels that is not required by the
regulations. Id., at 2919. A single isolated reference to a desire
for flexibility is not sufficient to transform a rulemaking that is
otherwise at best inconclusive as to its interaction with other
federal laws into one with preclusive force, even on the assumption
that a federal regulation in some instances might preclude
application of a federal statute. Cf. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
Amer-ica, Inc., 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
10–11).
In addition, Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000) , does not
support the Government’s argument. In Geier, the agency
enacted a regulation deliberately allowing manufacturers to choose
between different options because the agency wanted to encourage
diversity in the industry. A subsequent lawsuit challenged one of
those choices. The Court concluded that the action was barred
because it directly conflicted with the agency’s policy
choice to encourage flexibility to foster innovation. Id., at 875.
Here, by contrast, the FDA has not made a policy judgment that is
inconsistent with POM’s Lanham Act suit. This is not a case
where a lawsuit is undermining an agency judgment, and in any event
the FDA does not have authority to enforce the Lanham Act.
It is necessary to
recognize the implications of the United States’ argument for
preclusion. The Government asks the Court to preclude private
parties from availing themselves of a well-established federal
remedy because an agency enacted regulations that touch on similar
subject matter but do not purport to displace that remedy or even
implement the statute that is its source. Even if agency
regulations with the force of law that purport to bar other legal
remedies may do so, see id., at 874; see also Wyeth, 555
U. S., at 576, it is a bridge too far to accept an
agency’s after-the-fact statement to justify that result
here. An agency may not reorder federal statutory rights without
congressional authorization.
* * *
Coca-Cola and the
United States ask the Court to elevate the FDCA and the FDA’s
regulations over the private cause of action authorized by the
Lanham Act. But the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other
in the federal regulation of misleading labels. Congress did not
intend the FDCA to preclude Lanham Act suits like POM’s. The
position Coca-Cola takes in this Court that because food and
beverage labeling is involved it has no Lanham Act liability here
for practices that allegedly mislead and trick consumers, all to
the injury of competitors, finds no support in precedent or the
statutes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no
part in the consideration or decision of this case.
