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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 12–414
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SHERRY L. BURT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. VONLEE
NICOLE TITLOW
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[November 5, 2013]
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a state prisoner
asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, our cases require
that the federal court use a “ ‘doubly
deferential’ ” standard of review that gives both
the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
17). In this case, the Sixth Circuit failed to apply that doubly
deferential standard by refusing to credit a state court’s
reasonable factual finding and by assuming that counsel was
ineffective where the record was silent. Because the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110Stat. 1214, and
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984) , do not permit
federal judges to so casually second-guess the decisions of their
state-court colleagues or defense attorneys, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision must be reversed.
I
Respondent Titlow and
Billie Rogers, respondent’s aunt, murdered Billie’s
husband Don by pouring vodka down his throat and smothering him
with a pillow. With help from attorney Richard Lustig, respondent
reached an agreement with state prosecutors to testify against
Billie, plead guilty to manslaughter, and receive a 7- to 15-year
sentence. As confirmed at a plea hearing, Lustig reviewed the
State’s evidence with respondent “over a long period of
time,” and respondent understood that that evidence could
support a conviction for first-degree murder. App. 43–44. The
Michigan trial court approved the plea bargain.
Three days before
Billie Rogers’ trial was to commence, however, respondent
retained a new lawyer, Frederick Toca. With Toca’s help,
respondent demanded a substantially lower minimum sentence (three
years, instead of seven) in exchange for the agreement to plead
guilty and testify. When the prosecutor refused to accede to the
new demands, respondent withdrew the plea, acknowledging in open
court the consequences of withdrawal (including reinstatement of
the first-degree murder charge). Without respondent’s
critical testimony, Billie Rogers was acquitted, and later
died.
Respondent subsequently
stood trial. During the course of the trial, respondent denied any
intent to harm Don Rogers or any knowledge, at the time respondent
covered his mouth or poured vodka down his throat, that Billie
intended to harm him. Indeed, respondent testified to attempting to
prevent Billie from harming her husband. The jury, however, elected
to believe respondent’s previous out-of-court statements,
which squarely demonstrated participation in the killing, and
convicted respondent of second-degree murder. The trial court
imposed a 20- to 40-year term of imprisonment.
On direct appeal,
respondent argued that Toca advised withdrawal of the guilty plea
without taking time to learn more about the case, thereby failing
to realize the strength of the State’s evidence and providing
ineffective assistance of counsel. Rejecting that claim, the
Michigan Court of Appeals found that Toca acted reasonably in light
of his client’s protestations of innocence. That court found
that respondent’s decision to hire Toca was “set in
motion” by respondent’s “statement to a
sheriff’s deputy that [respondent] did not commit the
offense.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a. Applying the standard
set forth by our decision in Strickland, which requires that
defense counsel satisfy “an objective standard of
reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 688, the Michigan Court
of Appeals concluded that “[w]hen a defendant proclaims
. . . innocence . . . , it is not objectively
unreasonable to recommend that the defendant refrain from pleading
guilty—no matter how ‘good’ the deal may
appear.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 102a.
Respondent then filed a
federal habeas petition under 28 U. S. C. §2254.
Applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the District
Court concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling
was “completely reasonable on the law and the facts”
and denied relief. No. 07–CV–13614, 2010 WL 4115410,
*15 (ED Mich., Oct. 19, 2010). In particular, the District Court
concluded that “[c]ounsel could not be ineffective by trying
to negotiate a better plea agreement for [Titlow] with Billie
Rogers’s trial imminent and [Titlow] stating at the time that
Billie Rogers had committed the murder without . . .
assistance.” Ibid.
The Sixth Circuit
reversed. It found that the factual predicate for the state
court’s decision—that the withdrawal of the plea was
based on respondent’s assertion of innocence—was an
unreasonable interpretation of the factual record, given
Toca’s explanation at the withdrawal hearing that “the
decision to withdraw Titlow’s plea was based on the fact that
the State’s plea offer was substantially higher than the
Michigan guidelines for second-degree murder.” 680 F. 3d 577,
589 (2012). Further observing that “[t]he record in this case
contains no evidence” that Toca fully informed respondent of
the possible consequences of withdrawing the guilty plea, the Sixth
Circuit held that Toca rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
that resulted in respondent’s loss of the benefit of the plea
bargain. Id., at 589–592. Citing our decision in Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U. S. ___ (2012), the Sixth Circuit remanded this
case with instructions that the prosecution must reoffer the
original plea agreement to respondent, and that the state court
should “consul[t]” the plea agreement and
“fashion” a remedy for the violation of
respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel during plea bargaining. 680 F. 3d, at 592. Chief Judge
Batchelder dissented on the grounds that the Michigan Court of
Appeals’ decision was reasonable. Id., at 593.
On remand, the
prosecution followed the Sixth Circuit’s instructions and
reoffered the plea agreement it had offered some 10 years
before—even though, in light of Billie Rogers’
acquittal and subsequent death, respondent was no longer able to
deliver on the promises originally made to the prosecution. At the
plea hearing, however, respondent balked, refusing to provide a
factual basis for the plea which the court could accept. Respondent
admitted to pouring vodka down Don Rogers’ throat, but denied
assisting in killing him or knowing that pouring vodka down his
throat could lead to his death. As at trial, respondent testified
to attempting to prevent Billie Rogers from harming her husband.
Eventually, after conferring with current counsel (not Toca),
respondent admitted to placing Don Rogers in danger by pouring
vodka down his throat with the knowledge that his death could
result. The trial court took the plea under advisement, where the
matter stands at present. We granted certiorari. 568 U. S. ___
(2013).
II
AEDPA instructs that,
when a federal habeas petitioner challenges the factual basis for a
prior state-court decision rejecting a claim, the federal court may
overturn the state court’s decision only if it was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence pre- sented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). The prisoner bears the
burden of rebutting the state court’s factual findings
“by clear and convincing evidence.” §2254(e)(1).
We have not defined the precise relationship between
§2254(d)(2) and §2254(e)(1), and we need not do so here.
See Wood v. Allen, 558 U. S. 290, 293 (2010) . For present
purposes, it is enough to reiterate “that a state-court
factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in
the first instance.” Id., at 301. AEDPA likewise imposes a
highly deferential standard for reviewing claims of legal error by
the state courts: A writ of habeas corpus may issue only if the
state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by” this Court. §2254(d)(1).
AEDPA recognizes a
foundational principle of our fed- eral system: State courts are
adequate forums for the vindi- cation of federal rights.
“[T]he States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the
Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have
consist- ently held that state courts have inherent authority, and
are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U. S. 455, 458 (1990) . This principle applies to claimed
violations of constitutional, as well as statutory, rights. See
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 443 (1977) . Indeed,
“state courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the
federal courts to safeguard constitutional rights,” and this
Court has refused to sanction any decision that would
“reflec[t] negatively upon [a] state court’s ability to
do so.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Especially
where a case involves such a common claim as ineffective assistance
of counsel under Strickland—a claim state courts have now
adjudicated in countless criminal cases for nearly 30
years—“there is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a
man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or
conscientious, or learned . . . than his neighbor in the state
courthouse.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494, n. 35
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Recognizing the duty
and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of
constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal
habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that
the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___
(2011) (slip op., at 13). “If this standard is difficult to
meet”—and it is—“that is because it was
meant to be.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). We will not
lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has
experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which
federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III
The record readily
supports the Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual finding that
Toca advised withdrawal of the guilty plea only after
respondent’s proclamation of innocence. Respondent passed a
polygraph denying planning to kill Don Rogers or being in the room
when he died. Thereafter, according to an affidavit in the record,
respondent discussed the case with a jailer, who advised against
pleading guilty if respondent was not in fact guilty. App. 298
(affidavit of William Pierson). [
1 ] That conversation “set into motion”
respondent’s decision to retain Toca. Ibid., ¶8. Those
facts, together with the timing of Toca’s hiring—on the
eve of the trial at which respondent was to
self-incriminate—strongly suggest that respondent had second
thoughts about confessing in open court and proclaimed innocence to
Toca. That conclusion is further bolstered by respondent’s
maintenance of innocence of Don Rogers’ death at trial.
Indeed, reading the
record in any other way is difficult. Respondent’s first
lawyer, Lustig, had negotiated a deal that was quite favorable in
light of the fact, admitted by respondent in open court, that the
State’s evidence could support a conviction for first-degree
murder. This deal involved a guilty plea to manslaughter and a 7-
to 15-year sentence—far less than the mandatory sentence of
life in prison that results from a conviction for first-degree
murder under Michigan law. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.316
(West Supp. 2013). Yet after a jailer advised against pleading
guilty if respondent was not guilty, something caused respondent
both to fire Lustig and hire Toca (who within a few days withdrew
the guilty plea), and then to maintain innocence at trial. If that
something was not a desire to assert innocence, it is difficult to
imagine what it was, and respondent does not offer an alternative
theory.
The only evidence the
Sixth Circuit cited for its conclusion that the plea withdrawal was
not based on respondent’s proclamation of innocence was that,
when Toca moved to withdraw the guilty plea, he “did not
refer to Titlow’s claims of innocence,” but instead
“explained that the decision to withdraw [the] plea was based
on the fact that the State’s plea offer was substantially
higher than the Michigan guidelines” for manslaughter. 680 F.
3d, at 589. The Sixth Circuit believed that this fact
“sufficiently rebuts the Michigan Court of Appeals’
finding that the plea withdrawal was based on Titlow’s
assertion of innocence.” Ibid.
But the Michigan Court
of Appeals was well aware of Toca’s representations to the
trial court, noting in its opinion that respondent “moved to
withdraw [the] plea because the agreed upon sentence exceeded the
sentencing guidelines range.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, however—unlike the Sixth
Circuit—also correctly recognized that there is nothing
inconsistent about a defendant’s asserting innocence on the
one hand and refusing to plead guilty to manslaughter accompanied
by higher-than-normal punishment on the other. Indeed, a defendant
convinced of his or her own innocence may have a particularly
optimistic view of the likelihood of acquittal, and therefore be
more likely to drive a hard bargain with the prosecution before
pleading guilty. Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that
the Sixth Circuit improperly set aside a “reasonable
state-court determinatio[n] of fact in favor of its own debatable
interpretation of the record.” Rice v. Collins, 546
U. S. 333, 335 (2006) .
Accepting as true the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual determination that
respondent proclaimed innocence to Toca, the Sixth Circuit’s
Strickland analysis cannot be sustained. Although a
defendant’s proclamation of innocence does not relieve
counsel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland, it may
affect the advice counsel gives. The Michigan Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that Toca’s advice satisfied
Strickland fell within the bounds of reasonableness under AEDPA,
given that respondent was claiming innocence and only days away
from offering self-incriminating testimony in open court pursuant
to a plea agreement involving an above-guidelines sentence. [
2 ] See Florida v. Nixon, 543
U. S. 175, 187 (2004) (explaining that the defendant has the
“ ‘ultimate authority’ ” to
decide whether to accept a plea bargain); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U. S. 1 –8 (1966) (observing that a lawyer must not
“override his client’s desire . . . to plead
not guilty”). The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion to the
contrary was error.
Even more troubling is
the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Toca was ineffective
because the “record in this case contains no evidence
that” he gave constitutionally adequate advice on whether to
withdraw the guilty plea. 680 F. 3d, at 590. We have said that
counsel should be “strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” Strickland,
466 U. S., at 690, and that the burden to “show that
counsel’s performance was deficient” rests squarely on
the defendant, id., at 687. The Sixth Circuit turned that
presumption of effectiveness on its head. It should go without
saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell]
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Id., at 689. As Chief Judge Batchelder correctly explained in her
dissent, “[w]ithout evidence that Toca gave incorrect advice
or evidence that he failed to give material advice, Titlow cannot
establish that his performance was deficient.” 680 F. 3d, at
595.
The Sixth Circuit
pointed to a single fact in support of its conclusion that Toca
failed to adequately advise respondent: his failure to retrieve
respondent’s file from Lustig before withdrawing the guilty
plea. Id., at 590. But here, too, the Sixth Circuit deviated from
Strickland’s strong presumption of effectiveness. The record
does not reveal how much Toca was able to glean about
respondent’s case from other sources; he may well have
obtained copies of the critical materials from prosecutors or the
court. (Indeed, Toca’s statement at the plea withdrawal
hearing that “[t]here’s a lot of material here”
strongly suggests that he did have access to a source of
documentation other than Lustig’s file. App. 71.)
In any event, the same
considerations were relevant to entering and withdrawing the guilty
plea, and respondent admitted in open court when initially pleading
guilty that Lustig had explained the State’s evidence and
that this evidence would support a conviction for first-degree
murder. Toca was justified in relying on this admission to conclude
that respondent understood the strength of the prosecution’s
case and nevertheless wished to withdraw the plea. With respondent
having knowingly entered the guilty plea, we think any confusion
about the strength of the State’s evidence upon withdrawing
the plea less than a month later highly unlikely.
Despite our conclusion
that there was no factual or legal justification for overturning
the state court’s decision, we recognize that Toca’s
conduct in this litigation was far from exemplary. He may well have
violated the rules of professional conduct by accepting
respondent’s publication rights as partial payment for his
services, and he waited weeks before consulting respondent’s
first lawyer about the case. But the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it promises only the right
to effective assistance, and we have held that a lawyer’s
violation of ethical norms does not make the lawyer per se
ineffective. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 171 (2002)
. Troubling as Toca’s actions were, they were irrelevant to
the narrow question that was before the Sixth Circuit: whether the
state court reasonably determined that respondent was adequately
advised before deciding to withdraw the guilty plea. Because the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision that respondent was so
advised is reasonable and supported by the record, the Sixth
Circuit’s judgment is reversed. [
3 ]
It is so ordered.
