New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 1 (1799)

Syllabus

U.S. Supreme Court

New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 4 Dall. 1 1 (1799)

New York v. Connecticut

4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1

Syllabus

The prohibition contained in the Judiciary Act that writs of injunction shall not be granted without reasonable notice to the adverse party, &c., extends to injunctions granted by the Supreme Court or the circuit court, as well as to those that may be granted by a single judge.

A shorter notice is reasonable notice on an application for an injunction to a court than on an application to a single judge. What will be reasonable notice until a general rule shall be settled will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.

The Court refused to grant an injunction to parties claiming lands in the territory in dispute between the States of Connecticut and New York, as a decision upon those claims could not affect the question of sovereignty between those states.


Opinions

U.S. Supreme Court

New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 4 Dall. 1 1 (1799) New York v. Connecticut

4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1

BILL IN EQUITY

Syllabus

The prohibition contained in the Judiciary Act that writs of injunction shall not be granted without reasonable notice to the adverse party, &c., extends to injunctions granted by the Supreme Court or the circuit court, as well as to those that may be granted by a single judge.

A shorter notice is reasonable notice on an application for an injunction to a court than on an application to a single judge. What will be reasonable notice until a general rule shall be settled will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.

The Court refused to grant an injunction to parties claiming lands in the territory in dispute between the States of Connecticut and New York, as a decision upon those claims could not affect the question of sovereignty between those states.

"The State of New York, one of the United States of America, by Josiah Ogden Hoffman, the Attorney General of the said state," filed this bill in consequence of the rejection of the motion to grant writs of certiorari for the removal of Fowler v. Lindsey and Fowler v. Miller, 3 U. S. 411, [Footnote 1] from the Circuit Court of Connecticut into the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in those suits were made defendants to the present bill, and the complainant, after setting forth the title of New York to the lands in question, prayed, inter alia, for an injunction against them. The notices to the defendants that the injunction would be moved for were delivered on 25 and 26 July, but on 6 August, [Footnote 2] Ingersoll, who appeared for the individuals, though not for the state, referred to the act of Congress, which provides that

"No writ of injunction shall be granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party or his attorney of the time and place of moving for the same."

2 vol. 228, s. 5, Swift's edit. And he contended that reasonable notice had not been given in this case.

Page 4 U. S. 2

The opinion of the Court was delivered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

ELLSWORTH, CHIEF JUSTICE.

The prohibition contained in the statute that writs of injunction shall not be granted without reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney extends to injunctions granted by the Supreme Court or the circuit court, as well to those that may be granted by a single judge.

The design and effect, however, of injunctions must render a shorter notice reasonable notice in the case of an application to a court than would be so construed in most cases of an application to a single judge, and until a general rule shall be settled, the particular circumstances of each case must also be regarded.

Circumstanced as the present case is, the notice which has been given is, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient as it respects the parties against whom an injunction is prayed.

[Footnote 1]

In Fowler v. Lindsey, a certiorari was refused because the state was not a party to the record; in this case, an injunction was denied because she was not interested in the ejectments.

[Footnote 2]

The term commenced on 5 August, but a quorum of the judges did not attend till the day following, and CUSHING and IREDELL, JUSTICES, were prevented by indisposition from taking their seats on the bench during the whole term.