In a suit against New Orleans, where jurisdiction rested on
diverse citizenship, the district court, through a receiver, sold
certain land to satisfy a money judgment previously recovered by
the plaintiff against the city on certain drainage warrants, the
sale being decreed upon the ground that, under acts of Louisiana,
the city held the land in trust to secure such warrants.
Held that the proceeding was not
in rem, passed
only such title as the city had, and afforded no basis for
ancillary jurisdiction of a suit in the same court to protect the
title sold against a later judgment of the state courts which
adjudged it inferior to another title, derived by independent grant
from the state, whose holder and its predecessors were not parties
to the receivership proceedings.
Affirmed.
This was a direct appeal from a decree of the district court,
Eastern District of Louisiana, dismissing for want of jurisdiction
a bill to restrain enforcement of a judgment of the supreme court
of the state. In addition to the decisions cited in the opinion,
see Peake v. New Orleans (1889), 38 F. 779; s.c.
139 U. S. 139 U.S.
342;
New Orleans v. Peake (C.C.A. 1892), 52 F. 74, the latter
being in the case in which the receiver's sale occurred. The
case is stated in the opinion.
Page 255 U. S. 267
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Having recovered a judgment upon certain drainage warrants
issued under Act La. No. 30 of 1871, James W. Peake, of New York,
instituted a second suit in the United States Circuit Court,
Eastern District of Louisiana, May 30, 1891, against New Orleans,
seeking sale of land which that city held as trustee to secure all
such warrants.
See Peake v. New Orleans (1891),
139 U. S. 342.
Neither the appellee nor any of its predecessors in interest was
party to the proceeding. By direction of the court a duly appointed
receiver sold the land, January 15, 1892, to Dr. Gaudet, who
shortly thereafter transferred it to appellant, a Louisiana
corporation, which took immediate possession.
Setting up superior title to some of the land under patent from
the state issued June 3, 1874, appellee, also a Louisiana
corporation, brought suit against appellant in the state court
December 8, 1909, and obtained a favorable judgment, afterwards
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Leader Realty Co. v. New Orleans
Land Co., 142 La. 169. Thereupon appellant began this
proceeding to restrain enforcement of the judgment of the state
court or interference with its possession, and alleged that the
district court's jurisdiction was invoked solely in aid of the
decree for sale in
Peake v. New Orleans. No diversity of
citizenship existed, and, deeming the bill not ancillary, but
original, the court below dismissed it for want of
jurisdiction.
"The rule is well settled that a sale of real estate under
judicial proceedings concludes no one who is not in some form a
party to such proceedings."
Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Loan & Trust Co.,
172 U. S. 493,
172 U. S. 515.
Clearly
Peake v. New Orleans (1891) was not a proceeding
in rem to which all persons having an interest in the
land
Page 255 U. S. 268
were deemed parties with the right to intervene. Its only
purpose was to secure sale and transfer of such right and title as
the city held. Rights of third parties were not subject to
adjudication therein. High on Receivers (4th ed.) ยง 199a. The
subsequent action by the state court did not interfere with
anything done by the federal court (
Dupasseur
v. Rocherau, 21 Wall. 130,
88 U. S.
136-137), and the relief now sought by appellant is not
necessary to protect or render effectual any former decree
(
Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S.
93, and similar cases are not pertinent). Their purpose
was to protect or enforce some right theretofore duly adjudicated,
while here the defendant's claim in no way conflicts with any right
arising under the former adjudication, and nothing is required in
order to render that effectual.
The decree below is
Affirmed.
