The district court has not jurisdiction of a suit for wages
earned on a voyage in a steam vessel from Shippingport, in the
State of Kentucky, up the River Missouri and back again to the port
of departure as a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction over contracts for the hire of
seamen except in cases where the service is substantially performed
upon the sea or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide.
But the jurisdiction exists although the commencement or
termination of the voyage is at some place beyond the reach of the
tide. It is sufficient if the service is essentially a maritime
service.
Quaere whether, under the power to regulate commerce
among the several states, Congress may not extend the remedy by the
summary process of the admiralty to the case of voyages on the
western waters.
However this may be, the Act of 1790, c. 29, for the government
and regulation of seamen in the merchant service confines the
remedy in the district courts to such cases as ordinarily belong to
the admiralty jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought in the District Court of Kentucky for
subtraction of wages. The libel claims wages earned on a voyage
from Shippingport, in that state, up the River Missouri, and back
again to the port of departure, and the question is whether this
case as stated in the
Page 23 U. S. 429
libel is of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction or otherwise
within the jurisdiction of the district court. The court below
dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction, and the libellants
have appealed from that decree to this Court.
In the great struggles between the courts of common law and the
admiralty, the latter never attempted to assert any jurisdiction
except over maritime contracts. In respect to contracts for the
hire of seamen, the admiralty never pretended to claim nor could it
rightfully exercise any jurisdiction except in cases where the
service was substantially performed or to be performed upon the sea
or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. This is the
prescribed limit which it was not at liberty to transcend. We say
the service was to be substantially performed on the sea or on
tidewater because there is no doubt that the jurisdiction exists
although the commencement or termination of the voyage may happen
to be at some place beyond the reach of the tide. The material
consideration is whether the service is essentially a maritime
service. In the present case, the voyage, not only in its
commencement and termination, but in all its intermediate progress,
was several hundreds of miles above the ebb and flow of the tide,
and in no just sense can the wages be considered as earned in a
maritime employment.
Some reliance has been placed in argument upon that clause of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20. s. 9, which includes all
seizures made on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of
ten
Page 23 U. S. 430
or more tons burden (of which description the waters in this
case are) within the admiralty jurisdiction. But this is a
statutable provision, and limited to the cases there stated. To
make the argument available, it should be shown that some act of
Congress had extended the right to sue in courts having admiralty
jurisdiction to cases of voyages of this nature. We have for this
purpose examined the act of Congress for the government and
regulation of seamen in the merchants' service, Act of 1790, ch.
29, and though its language is somewhat general, we think that its
strict interpretation confines the remedy in the admiralty to such
cases as ordinarily belong to its cognizance, as maritime contracts
for wages. It merely recognizes the existing, and does not intend
to confer any new jurisdiction. Whether, under the power to
regulate commerce between the states, Congress may not extend the
remedy by the summary process of the admiralty to the case of
voyages on the western waters it is unnecessary for us to consider.
If the public inconvenience from the want of a process of an
analogous nature shall be extensively felt, the attention of the
legislature will doubtless be drawn to the subject. But we have now
only to declare that the present suit is not maintainable as a
cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon acknowledged
principles of law.
The decree of the circuit court dismissing the libel for want of
jurisdiction is therefore affirmed.
Decree accordingly.