Lentils and white medium beans in a dry state, both mature and
ordinarily used for food, though sometimes sold for seed, imported
into New York in the years 1887 and 1888, were properly classified
by the collector as
Page 159 U. S. 418
vegetables under paragraph 286 of Schedule G of the Act of March
3, 1883, c. 121, and as such were subject to a duty of ten percent
ad valorem.
Maddock v. Mayone, 152 U. S. 368,
affirmed to the point that
"in construing a tariff act, when it is claimed that the
commercial use of a word or phrase in it differs from the ordinary
signification of such word or phrase, in order that the former
prevail over the latter, it must appear that the commercial
designation is the result of established usage in commerce and
trade, and that, at the time of the passage of the act, that usage
was definite, uniform, and general, and not partial, local, or
personal."
Whether the lentils and beans were properly classified by the
collector was a matter for the court to decide.
This was an action to recover duties exacted by the collector of
customs of the port of New York, and paid by the importers under
protest in order to get their goods. The importations were made in
the years 1887 and 1888, and the articles were invoiced in four of
the six invoices as "white hand-picked Danubian beans," in one as
"haricots," and in another as "Bohemia lentils."
By section 2502 of the Customs Duties Act passed March 3, 1883,
22 Stat. 488, c. 121, as a substitute for Title XXXIII of the
Revised Statutes, duties were levied on the following articles:
under Schedule A, entitled "Chemical Products," paragraph 94:
"All barks, beans, berries, balsams, buds, bulbs, and bulbous
roots and excrescences, such as nut-galls, fruits, flowers, dried
fibers, grains, gums, and gum-resins, herbs, leaves, lichens,
mosses, nuts, roots and stems, spices, vegetables, seeds (aromatic,
not garden seeds), and seeds of morbid growth, weeds, woods used
expressly for dyeing, and dried insects, any of the foregoing of
which are not edible, but which have been advanced in value or
condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of
manufacture, and not specifically enumerated or provided for in
this act, ten percentum
ad valorem."
Paragraph 16: "Castor beans, or seeds, fifty cents per bushel of
fifty pounds."
Under Schedule G, entitled "Provisions," paragraph 259: "Wheat,
twenty cents per bushel." Paragraph 260: "Rye and barley, ten cents
per bushel." Paragraph 263: "Indian corn or maize, ten cents per
bushel." Paragraph 264: "Oats, ten cents
Page 159 U. S. 419
per bushel." Paragraph graph 285: "Potatoes, fifteen cents per
bushel of sixty pounds." Paragraph 286: "Vegetables, in their
natural state, or in salt or brine, not specially enumerated or
provided for in this act, ten percentum
ad valorem."
Paragraph 287: "Vegetables, prepared or preserved, of all kinds,
not otherwise provided for, thirty percentum
ad
valorem."
Under Schedule N, entitled "Sundries," paragraph 452: "Hemp seed
and rape seed, and other oil seeds of like character, other than
linseed or flaxseed, one quarter of one cent per pound." Paragraph
465: "Garden seeds, except seeds of the sugar beet, twenty
percentum
ad valorem." Paragraph 466: "Linseed or
flaxseed, twenty cents per bushel of fifty-six pounds, but no
drawback shall be allowed on oil cake made from imported
seeds."
By section 2503 the following articles were exempted from
duty:
"Par. 636. Drugs, barks, beans, berries, balsams, buds, bulbs,
and bulbous roots and excrescences, such as nut-galls, fruits,
flowers, dried fibers; grains, gums, and gum-resin; herbs, leaves,
lichens, mosses, nuts, roots, and stems; spices, vegetables, seeds
aromatic, and seeds of morbid growth; weeds, woods used expressly
for dyeing, and dried insects, any of the foregoing of which are
not edible and are in a crude state, and not advanced in value or
condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of
manufacture, and not specially enumerated or provided for in this
act."
"Par. 760. Plants, trees, shrubs, and vines of all kinds not
otherwise provided for, and seeds of all kinds except medicinal
seeds not specially enumerated or provided for in this act."
"Par. 761. Plants, trees, shrubs, roots, seed cane, and seeds
imported by the Department of Agriculture or the United States
Botanical Garden."
"Par. 778. Seed of the sugar beet."
"Par. 808. Tonquin, Tonqua, or Tonka beans."
The importations were classified by the collector as vegetables
under paragraph 286, and subjected to duty accordingly, while the
importers claimed that they should have been classified as seeds
under paragraph 760 and admitted free. The circuit court directed a
verdict for the defendant, and, judgment
Page 159 U. S. 420
having been rendered thereon, this writ of error was
brought.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
These articles were not string beans or beans in the pod, but
mature beans in a dry state, consisting of two varieties -- 1entils
and white medium beans. It appeared that the main use of both
lentils and beans was for food, though sometimes they were sold for
seed, and that they were never bought and sold under the name of
"vegetables" or under the name of "seeds," but simply as "beans" or
"lentils," as the case might be. Some evidence was adduced to the
effect that although the seed, root, or top of the plant might
properly be called a vegetable if green, yet that if the article
were mature and dried, it thereupon ceased to be a vegetable and
became a seed. But, as the circuit judge well said, the testimony
did not deal in the commercial designation of the article or what
it was called in trade and commerce, but only tended to show how
the witnesses though it should be classified. It is true that one
of the plaintiffs stated that if a customer inquired for a certain
kind of field bean, he would ask him whether he wanted the "field
pea bean," or "the seed of the field pea bean," or "the seed of the
white medium bean," or what kind of beans he wanted, and that they
imported the seeds of the lentil and the seeds of the bean, though
they did not import the seed of the wheat plant, of the rye plant,
or of the oat plant. It would be absurd to regard this as tending
to establish a commercial designation.
In construing a tariff act when it is claimed that the
commercial use of a word or phrase in it differs from the ordinary
signification of such word or phrase, in order that the former
Page 159 U. S. 421
prevail over the latter, it must appear that the commercial
designation is the result of established usage in commerce and
trade, and that, at the time of the passage of the act, that usage
was definite, uniform, and general, and not partial, local, or
personal.
Maddock v. Magone, 152 U.
S. 368.
The articles were known in trade and commerce as lentils and
beans. They did not come within the paragraphs of the tariff
specially enumerating certain beans and seed, or referring to
inedible beans, seeds, and vegetables, but the words "seeds" and
"vegetables" are employed in other paragraphs, and it is conceded
that these articles fell under the one or the other. The word
"seeds," as found in paragraph 760 in the free list, is joined with
"plants, trees, shrubs and vines," the obvious intention being to
encourage agriculture, horticulture, and arboriculture by
facilitating seeding and transplanting, and the words being
applicable to seeds used for seeding purposes -- in common
understanding, for propagation. The word "vegetables" is found in
paragraph 286, under the heading "Provisions," and in common
parlance applies to articles of food. The predominant use of
lentils and beans is for food, and, as so used, they are commonly
called "vegetables," although they may be regarded botanically as
seeds, and may sometimes be used for seeding purposes. Under such
circumstances, ordinary use, not occasional or subsequent use,
furnishes the guide for classification.
Maillard
v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251;
Worthington v.
Robbins, 139 U. S. 337;
Magone v. Heller, 150 U. S. 70. The
words "seeds" and "vegetables" are words of common speech, and
there is no room here for the contention that they had acquired a
special signification by usage or had a scientific, different from
the popular, meaning. Whether the articles were properly classified
as vegetables was a matter for the court to decide. The
interpretation of words of common speech is within the judicial
knowledge and matter of law.
Marvel v. Merritt,
116 U. S. 11;
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U. S. 304;
Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U. S. 171;
Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.
S. 601.
As stated by counsel for the government, a verdict should
Page 159 U. S. 422
not be directed where, before the meaning of the statute can be
known, it is necessary to learn from conflicting evidence the
controlling use of the article in question, or its similitude to
some other article, or the values of its component materials, or
its weight and fitness, or whether labor is necessary to fit it for
use by the consumer, or its commercial designation; but we have no
such case before us.
We entirely concur with the circuit court in the course pursued,
which was in harmony with the ruling in
Robertson v.
Salomon, 130 U. S. 412.
There, practically the same question was raised -- that is, whether
beans were free of duty as seeds or dutiable at ten percent as
vegetables, and Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion of
the Court, after stating that beans were "seeds" in the language of
botany and natural history, but not in commerce or in common
parlance, said:
"On the other hand, in speaking generally of provisions, beans
may well be included under the term 'vegetables.' As an article of
food on our tables, whether baked or boiled or forming the basis of
soup, they are used as a vegetable, as well when ripe as when
green. This is the principal use to which they are put. Beyond the
common knowledge which we have on this subject, very little
evidence is necessary or can be produced. But on the trial, the
parties deemed it important to introduce a great deal of testimony.
The court, however, did not allow the defendant to prove the common
designation of beans as an article of food. . . . The common
designation, as used in every-day life, when beans are used as food
(which is the great purpose of their production), would have been
very proper to be shown in the absence of further light from
commercial usage. We think that the evidence on this point ought to
have been admitted. In addition to this, the court told the jury
that"
"the commercial designation of the article, or what the article
is called in trade and commerce, or the name 'been,' has nothing to
do with the question."
"We think the court erred in this instruction. The commercial
designation, as we have frequently decided, is the first and most
important designation to be ascertained in settling the meaning and
application of the tariff law. But if the commercial
Page 159 U. S. 423
designation fails to give an article its proper place in the
classifications of the law, then resort must necessarily be had to
the common designation. We think, therefore, that the court erred
both in its charge and in the exclusion of the evidence offered --
especially as, without any evidence, and with the common knowledge
which we all possess, the court might almost have been justified in
directing a verdict for the defendant."
In this case, the court was not only almost, but altogether,
justified in such direction, and while there are expressions in
that opinion which have been laid hold of as qualifying the general
rule as to judicial knowledge, they must be treated as induced by
the state of the record, and are not to be regarded as having that
effect.
Many exceptions were taken to the exclusion and admission of
evidence and to the refusal of the court to give instructions asked
on plaintiffs' behalf, but we find no reversible error in either of
the rulings thus questioned, and they need not be discussed.
Judgment affirmed.
