On April 4, 2001, petitioner Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255, claiming that his conviction for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846, should be set aside because it was contrary to Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813, 815, which held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that together constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court held that, because Richardson had been decided more than one year before Dodd filed his motion, the motion was untimely under §2255, ¶6(3), which provides that §2255's 1-year limitation period begins to run on "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." On appeal, Dodd argued that ¶6(3)'s limitation period began to run on April 19, 2002, the date the Eleventh Circuit recognized Richardson's retroactive application to cases on collateral review. The Eleventh Circuit held that the period began to run on June 1, 1999, the date that this Court initially decided Richardson.

Held:

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