On proceedings under libels in the district and circuit courts
of the United States of the District of Maryland, claiming seamen's
wages from the ship
Warren and her freight, upon which, in
the circuit court, a general decree
pro forma against the
libellants was entered for the purpose of an appeal to this Court,
a decree was here made by which $32,872.30 were adjudged to be due
to the libellants from the respondents as part of their wages, to
be paid to them
pro rata, and by the mandate of this
Court, the circuit court was ordered to ascertain the sums due
respectively to each of the libellants. This was done, and on the
report of a commission fixing the several sums so due, a separate
decree was entered in the circuit court for the sum so found due to
each libellant respectively. None of the sums decreed to be due
amounted to $1,000. The amount of the several sums adjudged to be
due by the several separate decrees was $32,000 and upwards. From
these separate decrees the respondents in the circuit court prayed
an appeal to this Court, and gave a several appeal bond upon the
appeal from each decree, as well as a joint appeal bond for the
whole. The appeal was dismissed upon the ground that the sum in
controversy in each case was less than $2,000.
This is a case of wages in which there is necessarily a several
and distinct contract with each seaman for the voyage at his own
rate of wages, and though he may sign the same shipping paper, no
one is understood to contract jointly with or to incur
responsibility for any other.
The shipping articles constitute a several contract with each
seaman to all intents and purposes, and are so contemplated by the
act of Congress for the government and regulation of seamen in the
merchant service, and have been so practically interpreted in
courts of justice, as well as by merchants and mariners in all
commercial nations in modern times.
It is well known that every seaman has a right to sue severally
for his own wages in the courts of common law, and that a joint
action cannot be maintained in such courts by any number of seamen
for wages accruing under the same shipping articles for the same
voyage. The reason is that the common law will not tolerate a joint
action except by persons who have a joint interest; if the cause of
action is several, the suit must be several.
But a different course of practice has prevailed for ages in the
court of admiralty in regard to suits for seamen's wages. It is a
special favor, and a peculiar privilege allowed to the, and to them
only, and is confined strictly to demands for wages.
Although the libel is in its form joint, the contract is always
treated in the admiralty, according to the truth of the case, as a
several distinct contract with each
Page 31 U. S. 144
seaman.
Each is to stand or fall by the merits of his own claim, and is
unaffected by that of his co-libellants.
The defense which is good against one seaman may be wholly
inapplicable to another. One may have been paid, another may not
have performed the service, and another may have forfeited in whole
or in part his claim to wages. But no decree whatever which is made
in regard to such claims can possibly avail to the prejudice of the
merits of others which do not fall within the same predicament. And
wherever from the nature of the defense it is inapplicable to the
whole crew, the answer invariably contains separate averments and
is applied to each claim according to its own peculiar
circumstances.
The decree follows the same rule, and assigns to each seaman
severally the amount to which he is entitled, and dismisses the
libel as to those and those only who have maintained no right to
the interposition of the court in their favor.
The whole proceeding, though it assumes the form of a joint
suit, is in reality a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by
distinct parties growing out of the same contract, and bears some
analogy to the known practice at common law of consolidating
actions founded on the same policy of insurance. The act of
Congress adopts and sanctions the practice.
One seaman cannot appeal from a decree made in regard to the
claim of another, for he has no interest in it and cannot be
aggrieved by it.
It is very clear that no seaman can appeal from the district to
the circuit court unless his own claim exceeds $50, nor from the
circuit to the supreme court unless his claim exceeds $2,000. And
the same rule applies to the owners or other respondents, who are
not at liberty to consolidate the distinct demands of each seaman
into an aggregate, thus making the claims of the whole the matter
in dispute, but they can appeal only in regard to the demand of a
seaman which exceeds the sum required by law for that purpose as a
distinct matter in dispute.
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from certain decrees of the Circuit Court of
the district of Maryland rendered in pursuance of the mandate of
this Court when the same cause was formerly before us, the report
of which will be found in
30 U. S. 5 Pet.
675.
Page 31 U. S. 145
After the cause was remanded, the circuit court referred it to a
commissioner to ascertain and report to the court the sums
respectively due to each of the officers and seamen who were
libellants for their wages, and interest thereon. In conformity
with this order of reference, the commissioner made reports of the
amount so due to each of the libellants then before the court, and
thereupon the court, after confirming the second and final report
of the commissioner, proceeded to enter a separate decree for each
libellant for the amount so found due to him, and to apportion
pro rata the payment of the same out of the funds in the
hands of Robert Oliver and others, the assignees in whose hands the
funds were attached, and to decree the deficit to be paid by the
owners of the ship
Warren. The sums so decreed to the
libellants respectively in no case exceeded $900, and most of them
fell short of $500. From the separate decrees so rendered the
assignees prayed an appeal to this Court and give a several appeal
bond upon the appeal from each decree, as well as a joint appeal
bond for the whole. Under these circumstances, a motion has been
made to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the sum in
controversy in each decree is less than $2,000, and as such is
insufficient to give this Court appellate jurisdiction. The motion
is resisted upon the other side upon the ground that the aggregate
in controversy under the whole of the decrees taken together
greatly exceeds that value.
The question is one of great practical importance, but in our
judgment not of any intrinsic difficulty. The present is a case of
seamen's wages, in which there is necessarily a several and
distinct contract with each seaman for the voyage at his own rate
of wages, and though all may sign the same shipping paper, no one
is understood to contract jointly with or to incur responsibility
for any of the others. The shipping articles constitute a several
contract with each seaman to all intents and purposes, and are so
contemplated by the act of Congress for the government and
regulation of seamen in the merchants' service, Act of 1790, chap.
29, and have been so practically interpreted by courts of justice
as well as by merchants and mariners in all commercial nations in
modern times. It is well known that every seaman has a right to sue
severally
Page 31 U. S. 146
for his own wages in the courts of common law, and that a joint
action cannot be maintained in such courts by any number of the
seamen for wages accruing under the same shipping articles for the
same voyage. The reason is that the common law will not tolerate a
joint action except by persons who have a joint interest and upon a
joint contract. If the cause of action is several, the suit must be
several also.
But a different course of practice has prevailed for ages in the
court of admiralty in regard to suits for seamen's wages. It is a
special favor and a peculiar privilege allowed to them and to them
only, and is confined strictly to demands for wages. The reason
upon which this privilege is founded is equally wise and humane: it
is to save the parties from oppressive costs and expenses and to
enable speedy justice to be administered to all who stand in a
similar predicament; in the expressive language of the maritime
law,
velis levatis. And the benefit is equally as great to
the ship owner as to the seamen, though the burden would otherwise
fall upon the latter, from their general improvidence and poverty,
with a far heavier weight. A joint libel may therefore always be
filed in the admiralty by all the seamen who claim wages for
services rendered in the same voyage, under the same shipping
articles.
But although the libel is thus in form joint, the contract is
always treated in the admiralty according to the truth of the case,
as a several and distinct contract with each seaman. Each is to
stand or fall by the merits of his own claim, and is unaffected by
those of his co-libellants. The defense which is good against one
seaman may be wholly inapplicable to another. One may have been
paid, another may not have performed the service, and another may
have forfeited in whole or in part his claim to wages. But no
decree whatsoever which is made in regard to such claim can
possibly avail to the prejudice of the merits of others which do
not fall within the same predicament. And wherever from the nature
of the defense it is inapplicable to the whole crew, the answer
invariably contains separate averments, and is applied to each
claim according to its own peculiar circumstances. The decree
follows the same rule, and assigns to each seaman severally the
amount to which he is entitled, and dismisses the libel as to
those, and those only, who have maintained no right to the
interposition of the
Page 31 U. S. 147
court in their favor.
The whole proceeding, therefore, from the beginning to the end
of the suit, though it assumes the form of a joint suit, is in
reality a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by distinct
parties growing out of the same contract, and bears some analogy to
the known practice at the common law of consolidating actions
against different underwriters founded upon the same policy of
insurance. Be this as it may, it is the established practice of the
admiralty. The act of Congress already referred to adopts and
sanctions the practice, and it enacts that in proceedings
in
rem against the ship for mariners' wages, "all the seamen or
mariners having cause of complaint of the like kind against the
same ship or vessel shall be joined as complainants." Act of 1790,
ch. 29, sec. 6. It thus converts what by the admiralty law is a
privilege into a positive obligation, where the seamen commence a
suit at the same time in the same court, by a proceeding
in
rem for their wages. And it further directs that "the suit
shall be proceeded on in the said court, and final judgment be
given, according to the course of admiralty courts in such cases
used." Act of 1790, ch. 29, sec. 6.
From this summary view of the nature and operation of the
proceedings in the admiralty in cases of joint libels for wages it
is obvious that the claim of each seaman is distinct and several,
and the decree upon each claim is in like manner distinct and
several. One seaman cannot appeal from the decree made in regard to
the claim of another, for he has no interest in it and cannot be
aggrieved by it. The controversy, so far as he is concerned, is
confined solely to his own claim, and the matter of dispute between
him and the owners or other respondents is the sum or value of his
own claim, without any reference to the claims of others. It is
very clear, therefore, that no seaman can appeal from the district
court to the circuit court unless his own claim exceeds $50, nor
from the circuit court to the Supreme Court unless his claim
exceeds $2,000. And the same rule applies to the owners or other
respondents, who are not at liberty to consolidate the distinct
demands of each seaman into an aggregate, thus making the claims of
the whole the matter in dispute; but they can appeal only in regard
to the demand of a seaman which exceeds the sum required by law for
that purpose as a distinct
Page 31 U. S. 148
matter in dispute. If the law were otherwise, it would operate
in a most unjust and oppressive manner, for then the seamen would
be compellable to file a joint libel, and if any controversy
existed as to the claim of a single seaman, all the others would be
compellable to be dragged before the appellate tribunals and incur
enormous expenses, even when their own rights and claims were
beyond all controversy and in truth were not controverted. The form
of proceeding would thus be made an instrument to subvert the very
object for which it was instituted.
But it has been argued that this Court formerly entertained
jurisdiction of this very cause upon an appeal by the seamen, and
passed a decree in their favor, and that the present appeal is to
the erroneous proceedings of the circuit court in carrying into
effect that decree, and if the seamen may appeal, the original
respondents may appeal also. It is true that the appeal was taken
by the seamen, and jurisdiction entertained by this Court in the
manner stated at the bar, but a moment's attention to the state of
facts and posture of the case at that time will show that the
conclusion now attempted to be drawn from them is wholly
unsupported. There was nothing then upon the record to show what
were the amounts respectively claimed by and due to the seamen. The
decrees, both in the district court and in the circuit court were,
by the consent of the parties,
pro forma, dismissing the
libel as to all the libellants, without any inquiry into or
ascertainment of the claim of anyone of them, and this dismissal
was for the avowed purpose of taking an appeal to this Court in
order to settle the only real controversy between the parties to
the appeal,
viz., whether the funds in the hands of the
assignees were liable to the claims of the seamen in point of law.
Such a proceeding, assented to by all the parties in interest,
necessarily admitted that the sums in controversy between the
parties were sufficient to found the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. The argument at the bar proceeded upon this implied
admission, and there was nothing in the record before the Court
that contradicted the admission. It was not possible for the
courts, therefore, to know what was due or claimed by each seaman,
and though consent cannot give jurisdiction to this Court by way of
appeal where the matter in dispute is less than $2,000,
Page 31 U. S. 149
yet an admission of a sufficient value by the parties is
presumed to be correct where the record does not establish the
contrary. 5 Pet.
In looking into the original proceedings which are not, indeed,
now before us except for incidental purposes, but only such as have
been consequent upon the mandate, it appears that the original
libel was by Shepperd alone; that by subsequent amendments other
libellants were added; that in the year 1819, another amended libel
was filed embracing all the libellants and asserting claims on
their part to wages in the aggregate to the amount of
thirty-$1,000; and that subsequently, in December, 1825, another
amended libel or petition was filed in behalf of the libellants
making the assignees parties and making a positive claim for
interest also upon the amount of their wages. It was upon the
libels thus amended and filed that the decree of this Court, as
well as those of the court below, were founded. And the last
asserts, on the part of one of the libellants (Stephen Cassin) a
claim for $3,476.51, leaving the claims of the others in the most
general form, with no averments ascertaining the amounts which were
then respectively demanded by them. Indeed, the very loose and
inartificial structure of all the libels could not escape
observation, and might, in earlier stages of the cause, have been
open to objection for the want of due certainty and precision if
any exceptions had been specially promoted on behalf of the
respondents. But as none was made, there was an implied waiver of
all imperfections of this sort.
This Court, in its decree, affirmed the right of the seamen to
their wages and directed a separate and several decree to be
entered for the amount due to each libellant respectively as soon
as the same should be ascertained by a commissioner. So that the
decree itself severed the claims of the libellants in all future
proceedings in the cause, as in truth these claims ought to have
been severally propounded in the original libel. It is manifest,
then, that each libellant has no joint interest in the claim of any
other, and that each is in its nature and character distinct and
independent, and the amount in controversy being now ascertained by
a several decree, that constitutes, in regard to the respondents,
the sole matter in dispute
Page 31 U. S. 150
between them and the respective libellants. Neither party can,
then, claim an appeal to this Court in regard to the claim of any
libellant unless that claim exceeds $2,000. The case is not
distinguishable in principle from that of an information of seizure
or a libel on a capture as prize where various claims are
interposed for different portions of the property by persons
claiming the same by distinct and independent titles. In such a
case, though the original libel is against the whole property
jointly, yet it is severed by the several claims, and no appeal
lies by either party unless in regard to a claim exceeding the sum
of $2,000 in value. This has been the long and settled practice in
the admiralty courts of our country.
Upon the whole it is the opinion of this Court that for the want
of jurisdiction, the present appeal must be
Dismissed, no one of the decrees in the circuit court
involving a matter in dispute sufficient in value to justify the
exercise of the appellate authority of this Court.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is
the opinion of this Court that for the want of jurisdiction, the
present appeal must be dismissed, none of the decrees in the
circuit court involving a matter in dispute sufficient in value to
justify the exercise of the appellate authority of this Court.
Whereupon it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that this appeal
be and the same is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction as
aforesaid.
