VOEHL V. INDEMNITY INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, 288 U. S. 162 (1933)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 288 U.S. 162 (1933)
Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America
No. 315
Argued January 13, 1933
Decided February 6, 1933
288 U.S. 162
Syllabus
1. In a case under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as applied to employment in the District of Columbia, the issue before the deputy commissioner was whether the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. This turned on the general nature and scope of the employee's duties, the particular instructions he had received, the practice that obtained as to work in extra hours or on Sundays, and the purpose of a journey in which he was injured. Held:
(1) That Congress had power to invest the deputy commissioner with authority to determine these question after proper hearing and upon proper evidence, and
(2) That the findings of fact made by the deputy commissioner in the course prescribed by the statute and upon sufficient evidence are conclusive. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22. P. 288 U. S. 166.
2. When, by agreement, either express or implied, in the course of business, the service of an employee in extra hours or on special errands begins when he leaves his home on the duty assigned and continues until his return, the hazards of the journey may properly be regarded as hazards of the service, and hence within the Compensation Act. P. 288 U. S. 169.
61 App.D.C. 173, 58 F.2d 1074, reversed.
Supreme Court, D.C. affirmed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 592, to review the reversal of a decree dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin a deputy commissioner of compensation from enforcing a compensation order. The suit was brought by the Insurance Company, and the employee, petitioner here, was permitted to intervene.