UNITED STATES V. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. CO., 235 U. S. 314 (1914)
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U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 235 U.S. 314 (1914)
United States v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company
No. 39
Argued February 24, 25, 1913
Decided December 7, 1914
235 U.S. 314
Syllabus
The very purpose for which the Interstate Commerce Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which, from its peculiar character, would be most fitted to primarily decide whether, from facts, disputed or undisputed, in a given case preference or discrimination existed.
Where the evidence is undisputed and shows a discrimination between localities, a finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission that such discrimination is undue is a finding of fact which is not subject to review by the Commerce Court.
Quaere, and not now decided, whether the method adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission of considering, and basing its opinion upon, matter gathered in its general investigations regarding the subject matter in controversy, but not produced upon the particular proceeding against particular carriers in which an order is made requiring them to desist from practices complained of in that proceeding, amounts to a denial of a hearing and results in want of due process of law.
After the amendment to § 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act by the Act of June 18, 1910, the authority of the carriers to primarily determine for themselves the propriety of charging a higher rate for a shorter than for a longer distance ceased to exist and was taken from them and primarily vested in the Commission.
In this case, the rates and allowances involved and the grain reshipping privilege at Nashville are governed by § 4 of the act. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476.
The application of the principle of public policy embodied in § 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act is to be determined by the substance of things, and not by names; otherwise, the statute would be wholly inefficacious.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Commerce Court to review orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated in the opinion.