MECHANICS' & METALS NAT'L BANK V. ERNST, 231 U. S. 60 (1913)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Mechanics' & Metals Nat'l Bank v. Ernst, 231 U.S. 60 (1913)
Mechanics' & Metals National Bank v. Ernst
No. 44
Argued October 20, 1913
Decided November 3, 1913
231 U.S. 60
Syllabus
National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, ante, p. 231 U. S. 50, followed to effect that the delivery by the bankrupt of securities to a bank to secure a clearance loan constituted an illegal preference.
This Court approves the findings of the court below that the bank knew of the impending bankruptcy when it demanded and accepted security for an existing loan.
An unusual proceeding in the banking business, such as an officer's leaving the bank and going to the customer's office and demanding additional security for a loan made earlier the same day, indicates knowledge of the impending bankruptcy of such customer.
A general promise to give security on demand puts the creditor in no better position than an agreement to pay money, and does not justify a delivery of securities after knowledge of impending bankruptcy. It is an illegal preference.
A deposit made after the bank's officers have forbidden payment of checks against the bankrupt's deposit account is a payment and a preference, and a set-off cannot be allowed.
200 F.2d 5 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the determination of the question of whether the delivery of securities by a broker immediately preceding his bankruptcy to a bank to secure its loan was an illegal preference, are stated in the opinion.