CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RY. CO. V. BROWN, 229 U. S. 317 (1913)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317 (1913)
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Brown
No. 230
Argued April 18, 1913
Decided June 10, 1913
229 U.S. 317
Syllabus
Where the case is within the class which it was the purpose of the Judiciary Act of 1891 to submit to the final jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals, this Court goes no further than to inquire whether plain error is made out. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Howell, 224 U. S. 577.
Under the Safety Appliance Acts, the failure of a coupler to work at any time sustains a charge of negligence on the part of the carrier. C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559.
Where the trial court and the circuit court of appeals have, after considering the evidence, confirmed the verdict, this Court will hesitate to say that their concurring judgments are not such as could be reasonably formed or are without foundation as matter of law.
One obliged to form a judgment in an emergency on the spot is not to be held accountable in the same measure as one able to judge the situation in cold abstraction. The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589.
The movement of trains requires prompt action, and one engaged therein should not be held guilty of contributory negligence because he did not anticipate that he might be injured if he selected one of several ways of performing his duty even though he had knowledge of the existence of that which caused his injury.
185 F. 80 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety Appliance Acts and determination of what constitutes contributory negligence on the part of a switchman in a railway yard, are stated in opinion.