Movius v. Arthur - 95 U.S. 144 (1877)
U.S. Supreme Court
Movius v. Arthur, 95 U.S. 144 (1877)
Movius v. Arthur
95 U.S. 144
1. The Act of Congress, approved June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. 230, does not repeal the provisions in the Acts of March 2, 1861, 12 id. 189, Aug. 6, 1861, id. 293, and July 14, 1862, id., 555, imposing duties on japanned, patent, or enameled leather or skins.
2. It is a general rule in the construction of revenue statutes, that specific provisions for duties on a particular article are not repealed or affected by the general words of a subsequent statute, although the language is sufficiently broad to cover that article.
3. The expression "not herein otherwise provided for," in the Act of June 6, 1872, supra, has reference to the provisions of that act, and not to those of some previous act.
This is an action by Joseph Movius, surviving partner of the firm of F. Wigand & Co., to recover $172.39 being the amount of certain import duties alleged to have been unlawfully demanded and collected from them by the defendant in error, as the collector of the port of New York.
Between Aug. 1 and Dec. 31, 1872, Wigand & Co. imported from foreign countries into the port of New York, and duly entered at that custom-house, several invoices of "varnished calf-skins," and a further invoice of goods, designated therein as "varnished cow-skins."
The collector of customs, under the classification of "patent, japanned, or enameled leather or skins of all kinds," in the Acts of March 2, 1861, sec. 22, and July 14, 1862, sec. 13, imposed and collected on all the said goods a duty at thirty-five percent, granting thereon the reduction of ten percent, provided by sec. 2 of the Act of June 6, 1872, for "leather not otherwise herein provided for." Wigand & Co., claiming that the goods were dutiable at twenty percent only under the provisions of sec. 1 of the Act of June 6, 1872, for "upper leather of all other kinds, and dressed and furnished skins of all kinds not herein otherwise provided for," duly protested, and appealed to the Secretary of the Treasury, who sustained the decision of the collector. This action was then brought.
The court below found for the collector, whereupon the case was removed here.