Galpin v. PageAnnotate this Case
85 U.S. 350 (1873)
U.S. Supreme Court
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 18 Wall. 350 350 (1873)
8 Wall. 350
Galpin v. Page
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350
1. Where in suits brought in a state court to settle an alleged co-partnership between the plaintiffs and a deceased partner, the supreme court of the state decided that there had been no sufficient service on an infant defendant who had succeeded to an undivided interest in the property of the deceased partner, and consequently that the lower court had had no authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for such infant, and therefore reversed a decree directing a sale of the property of the deceased, such adjudication is the law of the case, and is binding upon the circuit court of the United States in an action brought by a grantee of the heirs of the deceased against a purchaser at a sale under such decree.
2. A superior court of general jurisdiction, proceeding within the general scope of its powers, is presumed to have jurisdiction to give the judgments it renders until the contrary appears; and this presumption embraces jurisdiction not only of the cause or subject matter of the action in which the judgment is given, but of the parties also. The rule is different with respect to courts of special and limited authority; their jurisdiction must affirmatively appear by sufficient evidence or proper averment in the record, or their judgments will be deemed void on their face.
3. The presumptions which the law implies in support of the judgments of superior courts of general jurisdiction only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts, concerning which the record is silent. When the record
states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact or that the fact was otherwise than as averred.
4. The presumptions indulged in support of the judgments of superior courts of general jurisdiction are also limited to jurisdiction over persons within their territorial limits and over proceedings which are in accordance with the course of the common law.
5. The tribunals of one state have no jurisdiction over the persons of other states unless found within their territorial limits.
6. When, by legislation of a state, constructive service of process by publication is substituted in place of personal service and the court upon such constructive service is authorized to proceed against the person of an absent party, not a citizen of the state nor found within it, the statutory provisions must be strictly pursued.
7. Where special powers conferred upon a court of general jurisdiction are brought into action according to the course of the common law -- that is, in the usual form of common law and chancery proceedings, by regular
process and personal service, where a personal judgment or decree is asked, or by seizure or attachment of the property where a judgment in rem is sought, the same presumption of jurisdiction will usually attend the judgments of the court as in cases falling within its general powers. But where the special powers conferred are exercised in a special manner, not according to the course of the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its ordinary jurisdiction upon the performance of prescribed conditions, no such presumption of jurisdiction will attend the judgment of the court. The facts essential to the exercise of the special jurisdiction must appear in such cases upon the record.
8. The law imputes to an attorney knowledge of defects in legal proceedings for the sale of property taken under his direction.
9. The title of an attorney purchasing property at a judicial sale decreed in proceedings in which he acted as an attorney falls by the law of California with the reversal of the decree directing the sale, independent of defects in the proceedings, and conveyances after such reversal pass no title as against a grantee of the original owner of the property.
Philip Galpin brought an action against Lucy Page for the possession of certain real property situated in the City of San Francisco. The case was tried by the court by the stipulation of the parties without the intervention of a jury. Both parties claimed title to the premises from the same source, Franklin C. Gray deceased, who died in the City of New York, in July, 1853, intestate, possessed of a large property
in California, both real and personal. Of the real property the premises in controversy were a portion. The deceased left surviving him a widow Matilda, of whom a posthumous child was born in December afterwards, named Franklina. By the statute of California, the entire estate of the deceased vested in the widow and child in equal shares.
The plaintiff asserted title to the demanded premises through conveyances authorized by the Probate Court of the City and County of San Francisco, which administered upon the estate of the deceased. The defendant claimed title under a purchaser who bought at a commissioner's sale had under a decree of the district court of the state rendered in an action brought to settle the affairs of an alleged co-partnership between the deceased and others. It was admitted that the plaintiff acquired the title unless it had previously passed to the purchaser at the commissioner's sale. It was therefore upon the validity of the decree in the district court and the consequent sale and deed of the commissioner that the present case was to be determined.
The action in which that decree was rendered arose in this wise:
In February, 1854, William H. Gray a brother of the deceased, brought a suit in equity in the district court of the state (which embraced at the time the City of San Francisco) against Joseph C. Palmer and Cornelius J. Eaton, who had been appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased, and against the widow, Matilda, and James Gray, the father of the deceased. In his bill the complainant alleged that a co-partnership had existed between himself and the deceased which embraced commercial business in which the latter was engaged and the purchase and sale of real estate; that the co-partnership business was carried on, and the titles of the real property purchased were taken in the individual name of the deceased, but that the complainant was interested in all its business and property to the extent of one-third. The object of the suit was to have the affairs of the alleged co-partnership settled, and to obtain a decree awarding one-third of its property to the complainant.
The allegation of the bill that a dormant and universal co-partnership had existed between the complainant and the deceased was without any just foundation in fact, for, as hereinafter mentioned, it was afterwards held by the supreme court of the state to be unsupported by the evidence in the case.
The bill omitted to make the child, Franklina, a party, and accordingly, in June following, a supplemental or amendatory bill was filed by the complainant, referring to the original bill and stating the birth of the child, that she was entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, and that she was absent from the state, a resident with her mother in Brooklyn, in the State of New York and praying that she might be made a party defendant, that a guardian ad litem might be appointed for her, and that the complainant might have the same relief prayed in the original bill.
Subsequently an order was made by the court directing service of the summons upon the new defendant by publication. It was preceded by a recital that it appeared to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant resided out of the state and that she was a necessary party to the action. It was not stated in the order in what way the facts recited appeared. It seemed probable that the court might have acted upon the statements of the supplemental complaint. The statute of the state which authorizes constructive service by publication is as follows:
"When the person on whom the service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court or a judge thereof or a county judge, and it shall in like manner appear that a cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, or that he is a necessary or property party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that the service be made by the publication of the summons. [Footnote 1] "
In December following, upon the petition of the plaintiff, a guardian ad litem was appointed for the child. The other defendants appeared by attorneys and answered.
In January, 1855, Eaton, who had been a clerk of the deceased, and who, as administrator, was made defendant in the above action of Gray, resigned his trust and commenced a suit in the district court of the state against Palmer, the remaining administrator, and against the widow and child. In his bill he also alleged that a co-partnership had existed between him and the deceased, that such co-partnership embraced all the business and real estate transactions of the deceased, and that his interest in the partnership and its property was one-fourth.
In this action, publication was made of the summons issued against the defendant Franklina, but it nowhere appeared in the record that any application was ever made to the court or judge thereof for an order directing the publication, or that any such order was ever made. So far as appeared from the record, it was the voluntary act of the complainant without judicial authority or sanction. The supreme court afterwards held that no sufficient service was ever made of the summons issued. In September following, after the publication thus made, upon application of the complainant, the same person was appointed guardian ad litem for the infant defendant in this action, who had previously been appointed such guardian ad litem in the other action. The other defendants appeared by attorney and answered.
On the 23d of October following, upon the stipulation of the guardian thus appointed and the attorneys of the other defendants, the two actions were consolidated into one. Four days subsequently, a decree was entered in this consolidated action, and from a certificate of the judge appended to the decree, it would seem to have been entered without trial and by consent and agreement of the parties. By this decree it was adjudged that a co-partnership had existed between Eaton and the deceased, which embraced all the property, real and personal, and all the business of each
of them, and that in this co-partnership Eaton had an interest of one-fourth; that there had also existed at the same time a co-partnership between Gray and the deceased, which also embraced all the property, real and personal, and all the business of each, and that in this co-partnership Gray had an interest of one-third; that the latter co-partnership was subject to the co-partnership with Eaton, and that therefore Eaton should take one-fourth of the estate, and Gray one-third of the remaining three-fourths, and that the residue should be equally divided between the widow and child. By the decree, a reference was also ordered to a commissioner to take and state an account of the business profits and property of the two co-partnerships, with directions upon the confirmation of his report to sell all the property, real and personal, of both co-partnerships, and upon the confirmation of the sales to execute proper conveyances to the purchasers.
The commissioner stated an account as required, his report was confirmed, and by a decree of the court, made in April, 1856, a sale of the entire property of the two alleged co-partnerships was ordered. The sale was had under this decree in May following. At that, sale the premises in controversy were bid off by Gwyn Page, one of the attorneys of the plaintiff, Gray and to him the commissioner executed a deed. Page subsequently sold and conveyed an undivided half of the premises to J. B. Crockett, his law partner, also one of the attorneys of the plaintiff, Gray and the latter in June, 1863, conveyed his interest to Lucy Page, the defendant in the case. The interest of Gwyn Page in the remaining half passed by devise to the defendant.
On appeal to the supreme court of the state, the decree of the district court was, at the October Term of 1857, reversed on the ground that no sufficient service of summons was made upon the infant Franklina under the statute, in the case of Eaton against Palmer, and that until such service, no guardian ad litem could be appointed for her, and on the further ground that the evidence presented had not established a co-partnership between William H. Gray and the
deceased. The case was accordingly remanded to the district court, and afterwards both suits were dismissed.
The circuit court gave judgment in the suit below for the defendant, and the plaintiff thereupon brought the case here on writ of error. In its opinion, which accompanied the record and in which the circuit court went into an elaborate argument to show that the District Court of California had, when its decree was rendered, apparently, jurisdiction, the circuit court held that the record in the state court could not be attacked collaterally unless it affirmatively showed that the court did not have jurisdiction. Its language was as follows:
"The record in the consolidated action is here attacked collaterally, and not on appeal, or in a direct proceeding of any kind to reverse, set aside, or vacate the decree. The rule is different in the two cases. When attacked collaterally, it is not enough that the record does not affirmatively show jurisdiction, but, on the contrary, it must affirmatively show that the court did not have jurisdiction, or the decree will be valid until reversed on appeal, or vacated on some direct proceeding taken for that purpose. "
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