Hannibal Railroad v. SwiftAnnotate this Case
79 U.S. 262
U.S. Supreme Court
Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 79 U.S. 12 Wall. 262 262 (1870)
Hannibal Railroad v. Swift
79 U.S. 262
1. The obligations and liabilities of a common carrier are not dependent upon contract, though they may be modified and limited by contract; they are imposed by the law, from the public nature of his employment.
2. If a common carrier of passengers and of goods and merchandise have reasonable ground for refusing to receive and carry persons applying for passage, and their baggage and other property, he is bound to insist
at the time upon such ground if desirous of avoiding responsibility. If not thus insisting, he receives the passengers and their baggage and other property, his liability is the same as though no ground for refusal existed.
3. The liability of a common carrier of goods and merchandise attaches when the property passes, with his assent, into his possession, and is not affected by the carriage in which it is transported or the fact that the carriage is loaded by the owner. The common carrier is an insurer of the property carried, and upon him the duty rests to see that the packing and conveyance are such its to secure its safety.
4. It is not a ground for limiting the responsibility of a common carrier, where no interference is attempted with his control of the property carried, that the owner of the property accompanies it and keeps watch for its safety.
5. Where a railroad company receives for transportation, in cars which accompany its passenger trains, property of a passenger other than his baggage, in relation to which no fraud or concealment is practiced or attempted upon its employees, it assumes with reference to the property the liability of a common carrier of merchandise.
6. Surgical instruments, in the case of a surgeon in the army traveling with troops, constitute part of his baggage.
Swift, a surgeon in the army of the United States, brought a suit in the court below against the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company, to recover the value of certain baggage and personal property, owned by him, and lost when in a course of transportation on the said road.
The case, which was agreed on by the parties, and tried by the court without a jury, was thus:
The plaintiff had been stationed as a surgeon in the army, with his wife and family, previous to the rebellion, at Fort Randall, Dacotah Territory. A part of the garrison, with the plaintiff, having been ordered to report for duty at Cincinnati,
arrived in December, 1861, at St. Joseph, Missouri, where they were to take the cars of the railroad of the company now sued, for Hannibal, on the Mississippi River, the eastern end of the road. The plaintiff was accompanied by his wife and family, and they carried with them their wearing apparel, some household outfit, and other property.
On their arrival at St. Joseph, the commanding officer gave notice to the railroad company that he required transportation for the troops, their baggage, camp equipments, arms, munitions, and the chattels of himself, as well as those of the plaintiff, from St. Joseph to Hannibal. At that time, nearly all that portion of the state of Missouri through which the railroad ran, was in a state of rebellion against the United States. For some months previously, armed bands of rebels had committed frequent depredations on the railroad by firing into trains, burning bridges, trains of cars, and station houses, destroying culverts, and tearing up the track. The railroad agents at St. Joseph communicated these facts to the commanding officer of the troops, and so did the officer who was then in command of United States troops at St. Joseph. On account of the great danger to the command along the line of the road from these bands, the officers of the road refused to make any contract for the transportation of the command over the road, and none was made or signed until after the command had arrived at Hannibal, at which place the amount of compensation for transportation was agreed upon.
On demand of the commanding officer the railroad company furnished transportation for the troops, their baggage, camp equipments, arms, munitions of war, and the chattels of himself as well as those of the plaintiff. Out of several cars standing in the yard of the railroad company at St. Joseph, the commanding officer selected the car in which the baggage belonging to the officers and men of the command, its camp equipage, arms, and munitions, also the property of the plaintiff, for which this action was brought, were loaded. In the said car 9,000 cartridges were placed. The car was well built and in a secure condition, and the plaintiff was
aware that his property was placed in that car. The commanding officer, as is customary where troops are moving by public conveyance from one point to another, detailed some men from his command to guard that car, while another portion packed and loaded it with the property mentioned. The soldiers carried their arms in their hands for use in case of an attack from the enemy. None of the railroad company's officers, agents, or servants had anything to do with selecting, packing, or loading the car selected, but after the same was completed, and the car locked up by the commanding officer, the agents of the railroad company placed the car in the train next to the tender of the engine that moved the car, and the train upon which the command were transported from St. Joseph to Hannibal. The train in which the car was placed was a regular passenger train of the railroad company, and was well manned and equipped. It had a baggage car attached to it and a baggage master in charge of the car, whose duty it was to receive and take charge of all baggage of passengers transported on said train, and who did take charge of all baggage of passengers on the train that was offered him, checks being given therefor. There was ample room in the baggage car for the plaintiff's baggage, and the baggage car and its contents were not burned or destroyed. The car containing the property sued for was the only one burnt, and no part of the train was attacked or molested by armed rebels or otherwise as known. The plaintiff did not place the property sued for in charge of the baggage master or other agent or servant of the defendant, except as above stated, nor was the same ever received by the defendant, except as thus stated, that is, by taking possession of the car and placing it in the train. It did not appear, from anything in the agreed case, that the control and management of the car or of the train by the agents and servants of the defendant were subsequently interfered with by the commanding officer, or the plaintiff, or any of the troops.
The car in which the property was loaded as above mentioned, whilst on the way from St. Joseph to Hannibal,
from some cause unknown, and, so far as known, without any fault of the agents, or servants of the railroad company, except as disclosed above, took fire and, with most of its contents, was consumed. After the discovery of the fire most of the contents of the car could have been saved, but from fear of injury be explosion of the cartridges known to be therein.
A surgeon in the United States Army is entitled by army regulations to 800 pounds of baggage.
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the case went to a referee under the stipulation of the parties to ascertain the damages sustained.
The property lost, for which the action was brought, consisted of the wearing apparel of plaintiff and family; table furniture, including silverware to the value of $204.50; three buffalo robes, two deer robes, hair mattresses and pillows, writing desks, tables, engravings, pictures, and statuary, and numerous articles of a household outfit; besides jewelry to the value of $787.50; a set of surgical instruments of the value of $350, and an unpublished manuscript on veterinary surgery. The property weighed twenty-seven hundred pounds.
The value of the jewelry, as above stated, and $1,000 as the value of the manuscript, were allowed by the referee in assessing the damages. He also allowed interest on the damages from the time of the loss to the filing of his report.
The circuit court, however, on exception, disallowed the value of the jewelry and the manuscript, as well as the interest given by the referee, allowing interest on the principal sum only from commencement of the suit.
The following exceptions of the defendant to the referee's report were overruled by the court: (1) to the allowance of the value of more than 800 pounds of baggage; (2) to the allowance of the value of the silverware; (3) to the allowance of the value of plaintiff's surgical instruments.
The court sustained the assessment for the sum of $3,129.60, for which judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the railroad company brought the case here.
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