Jones v. AndrewsAnnotate this Case
77 U.S. 327
U.S. Supreme Court
Jones v. Andrews, 77 U.S. 10 Wall. 327 327 (1869)
Jones v. Andrews
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 327
1. Allegation of citizenship is sufficiently made when it appears fairly, and in such a way as to leave no room for reasonable doubt, from the bill or declaration, of what states the respective parties are citizens.
2. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, in a case where jurisdiction of the circuit court depended on citizenship, every defendant must have resided or been served with process in the district where the suit was brought; but by the act of 1839 this is not necessary: a nonresident defendant may either voluntarily appear or, if not a necessary party, his appearance may be dispensed with.
3. Appearing by counsel and moving to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction and also for want of equity is a waiver of a nonresident's privilege, and amounts to a voluntary appearance.
4. A bill for injunction to restrain proceedings of garnishment against the complainant's property instituted in the circuit court, and also praying the benefit of a setoff against the garnishing creditor's demand, is not an original suit, but is a defensive or supplementary suit in which the jurisdiction of the court does not depend on the citizenship of the parties, but on the cognizance of the original case.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 [Footnote 1] gives the circuit courts jurisdiction where the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state, and enacts that no civil suit shall be brought in them against an inhabitant of the United States by original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant or in which he may be found at the time of serving the writ.
By the Act of February 28, 1839, [Footnote 2] it is, however, enacted
"That where in any suit in law or equity, commenced in any court of the United States, there shall be several defendants, any one or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of, or found within, the district where the suit is brought or shall not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction and proceed to the trial and adjudication of such suit between the parties who may be properly before it; but the judgment or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice other parties not regularly served with process, or not voluntarily appearing to answer,"
These provisions as to jurisdiction being in force, one Joseph J. Andrews, owner of a hotel in Memphis, leased it for five years, from 1st of January, 1859, to P. Reed and H. W. Bryson, these last giving their notes for the amount of the rent. After Reed and Bryson had possession for some time, they sublet it to a certain Stephen M. Jones at the same rent which they had paid and took his notes to themselves for the same sum that they were bound to pay Andrews by their own. The troubles of the rebellion coming on, matters got disarranged. Jones, according to his own account, having left Memphis, temporarily got shut out of the town by the federal army, and during this enforced absence was dispossessed of the hotel and greatly injured by Andrews, who seized and sold very valuable personal property of his left on the premises. However these facts
(which Andrews denied) might have been, it was admitted that the rent not being long paid in form, Andrews sued Reed and Bryson on their notes given to him, and got judgment by default. On this judgment so got, he sued out a writ of garnishment for the professed purpose of seizing in their hands the notes of Jones. Hereupon Jones filed a bill in the same court, the court below, alleging that Reed and Bryson had transferred his notes (Jones'), given to them for the sublease, to Andrews in payment of their own notes to him for the lease in chief; that Andrews had thus no claim against Reed and Bryson when he sued them; that the judgment recovered by him against them was by collusion, and was contrived for the purpose of garnisheeing his, Jones', notes, pretended to be in their hands, and that all this was done to avoid on the part of Andrews a direct suit against him, the complainant, Jones, by reason of the fact that as against Andrews, he, the complainant, Jones, had a good defense to the notes and a setoff (on account of the seizure and sale of his furniture, and expulsion of him from the premises), that would largely exceed the amount of the notes. His bill accordingly prayed for an injunction against the garnishee proceedings, for the delivery up of his notes, and for the establishment of his setoff against Andrews.
The suit was entitled at the beginning,
"Stephen M. Jones, citizen and resident of Richmond County, Georgia"
"Joseph Andrews, citizen and resident of City and County and"
"State of New York; P. Reed and H. W. Bryson, both citizens"
"and residents of Shelby County, Tennessee"
And the prayer of the bill began thus:
"The premises considered, complainant prays that Joseph Andrews, a resident and citizen of the City, County, and State of New York, and the said Reed and Bryson, both of whom are residents of Shelby County, in the State of Tennessee, be made parties defendant, by due process and publication,"
Andrews (the resident of New York) was not served with process; but, as the record stated,
"Comes and moves the Court here to dismiss the bill of the plaintiff for want of jurisdiction, apparent on the face of it,"
and for causes for such motion showed (among others),
"(1) The bill does not aver the citizenship of the plaintiff, nor does it show such facts in regard to the citizenship or residence of the defendant as gives the court jurisdiction."
"(2) The plaintiff shows by his bill that he has an adequate remedy at law."
The court below dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction over the parties as well as for want of equitable jurisdiction over the subject matter of the bill, but without prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute proper proceedings to assert his rights. And from the decree of dismissal this writ was taken.