Sturgis v. CloughAnnotate this Case
68 U.S. 269 (1863)
U.S. Supreme Court
Sturgis v. Clough, 68 U.S. 1 Wall. 269 269 (1863)
Sturgis v. Clough
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 269
1. Although the language of a decree in admiralty may declare a decision which might not, if it were construed by its exact words, be capable of being supported, still, if it is obvious from subsequent parts of the record that no error has been committed, the court will not reverse for this circumstance.
Ex. gr., where a decree allowed a certain sum for repairs to a vessel, and rejected (improperly, perhaps,) a claim for demurrage, the decree was not reversed on that account; it appearing from a subsequent part of the record that the judge had in fact considered the sum lie allowed for repairs eo nomine was too large for repairs simply, but was "about just" for repairs and demurrage together.
The steamer Mabey had injured the steamer Hector in a collision, and had been libeled for damages. It being referred by the court to a commissioner to assess these damages, the owners of the Hector claimed the whole cost of the repairs and also damages for fourteen days' demurrage,
during which the repairs were getting done. The commissioner awarded
For repairs, being the full cost of them . . . $2,162.80
For demurrage, fourteen days, as claimed . . . 1,099.50
The Hector was an old vessel -- twenty years old, it was testified -- her guards and deck, which were now repaired, having been in a very decayed condition, and her whole hull, comparatively, worthless. Still she was a navigating vessel, and was engaged, at the time of the collision, in towing vessels to and from sea, about the harbor of New York. Several witnesses were brought, who testified that there was a great demand for labor at that time, and who gave their opinions as to what the vessel might have made per day, if engaged. But the owner did not exhibit, nor offer to exhibit, his books, to show what she actually had made previously; and some of the testimony was of a general, rather than of a special kind. The court below, in deciding the case, said as follows:
"We are not satisfied that the proofs bring the case upon the question of damages within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, in Williamson v. Barrett.* A good deal of the testimony was general, and turned upon mere opinion as to the probability of employment in the towing business, and the amount of the earnings, if employed. This kind of proof is too speculative and contingent to be the foundation of any rule of damages: it is, at best, but conjecture. The true question within the case of Williamson v. Barrett was what could the tug have been chartered for per day in the business of towing, regard being had to the market price in the City of New York? This would have brought the question down to some degree of certainty, and afforded ground for an intelligible allowance or not, of the loss which the libellant had actually sustained by the delay during the repairs. We shall therefore strike out the item for demurrage, $1,099.50, and confirm the decree for $2,162.80. "
Application was afterwards made to the court to reconsider this decision, which it did, and after advisement said as follows:
"In passing upon the question of demurrage and in refusing the taking of further testimony in respect to it, I was influenced, as to the latter result, from a conviction that the repairs allowed were greater than justified upon the proofs. These have to be watched, as in cases of collision there is an opportunity, and not unfrequently a disposition, by the successful party to aggravate them. I should have been obliged therefore to set aside the whole report, and the withholding of the reference in the demurrage satisfied me the result would be about just between the parties on the whole case."
The refusal in the decree below to allow anything for the detention of the vessel for the time she was detained, was the error assigned by the libellant.