Secombe v. SteeleAnnotate this Case
61 U.S. 94 (1857)
U.S. Supreme Court
Secombe v. Steele, 61 U.S. 20 How. 94 94 (1857)
Secombe v. Steele
61 U.S. (20 How.) 94
When a transcript of a record of another court was attached to the answer as an exhibit, and portions of it particularly referred to, and the record of the entire case pleaded, a decree, certified by the clerk, which had been executed by the parties, must be considered as part of the record, although it had not the signature of the judge. The signature of the judge is not the only evidence by which a decree can be authenticated.
Property was agreed to be sold, and the payment was to be made by a deposit of the price in one of two banks in Boston, and a certificate delivered to the vendor. The vendee made the deposit in another bank in Boston, and tendered the certificate to the vendor, within the time limited, and the vendor having refused to receive it, he tendered the purchase money and interest, and that being refused, he filed his bill for a specific performance, and paid the money into court. Held under the circumstances to be sufficient.
Creditors of the vendor, who recovered judgments and sold the property, pending a suit for a specific performance, in which the purchase money had been paid into court, are not necessary parties to the suit, nor are the purchasers at the sheriff's sale under such judgments.
Under a statute of Minnesota, the court of chancery might divest the title of the defendant in the land without requiring him to make a conveyance.
By stipulation of counsel, Secombe was made the representative of numerous other parties engaged in a common cause.
The chronological history of the case was this.
In the latter part of 1851, suits were pending between Steele and Arnold W. Taylor with regard to their respective interests in a parcel of land near St. Anthony's Falls, of which they were tenants in common.
On the 17th of January, 1852, Taylor executed his bond of conveyance of the property to Steele for the consideration of twenty-five thousand dollars, one thousand of which was to be paid in cash, and the remaining twenty-four to be deposited to the credit of Taylor, within sixty days, in the Merchants' or Suffolk Bank, in Boston.
On the 19th of January, 1852, this bond of conveyance was
recorded in the proper office, under the following provisions of the Minnesota Revised statutes, chap. 47, 215:
"SEC. 1. All bonds, contracts, or agreements, concerning any interest in lands in this territory, made in writing under seal, attested by one or more witnesses, and acknowledged before some person authorized by law to take acknowledgments of deeds, may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the land lies."
"SEC. 3. Each and every bond, contract, or agreement, made and recorded according to the provisions of the first section of this chapter, shall be notice to, and take precedence of, any subsequent purchaser or purchasers, and shall operate as a lien upon the lands therein described, according to its import and meaning."
One of the questions which arose in the case was with reference to the import and meaning of the bond.
It was alleged by Steele that on the 17th of March, 1852, he tendered to the Suffolk Bank, and also to the Merchants' Bank, in Boston, the sum of twenty-four thousand dollars, and requested a certificate of deposit therefor, but that each of the banks refused to receive the money. In consequence of such refusal, he deposited the money in the Bank of Commerce, at Boston, and received a certificate of deposit from that bank. On the 5th of May, 1852, he tendered this certificate to Taylor, who refused to receive it or to execute a deed of conveyance.
On the 25th of May, 1852, Steele filed a bill in equity, that form of proceeding not having been then abolished, praying for a specific performance of his contract with Taylor, and paid into court the sum of $24,240. He also obtained an injunction prohibiting Taylor from selling or encumbering the property &c. Taylor answered the bill, and moved to dissolve the injunction, which motion was overruled, and the case stood for hearing upon bill and answer in July, 1852.
During the winter of 1852-1853, whilst the cause was pending as above described, Secombe and other creditors of Taylor obtained judgments against him, sued out executions which were levied upon the property included in his bond to Steele, and at the sheriff's sale the plaintiffs in error became purchasers, receiving deeds for their respective purchases.
In March, 1853, Secombe and the other purchasers, petitioned to be admitted as parties to defend the suit against Taylor, which petition was granted, and a certain time given for the filing of their answers.
In April, 1853, Steele moved to vacate this order and dismiss the petitions.
Affidavits were filed on both sides, and on the 4th of May, 1853, the order was vacated, and the petitions dismissed.
From this order, Secombe took an appeal to the supreme court of the territory.
On the same 4th of May, a decree was made by the court, whereby Taylor was ordered to execute conveyances to Steele, and the sum of $24,240, which had been deposited in court, was ordered to be paid to Taylor. This decree was founded on the consent of Steele and Taylor, filed in court.
Pending the above appeal, Steele instituted the suit now under the consideration of this Court against Secombe and fifty-three other persons, who claimed under the sheriff's sales. It was an action at law, brought under a local statute, by way of petition. The plaintiff was in possession, and brought the suit against the persons who claimed an estate or interest in the property. The petition was constructed like a bill in chancery, and, after reciting the facts in the case, concluded thus:
"Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment, determining the title to the said real estate so conveyed to him by the said Arnold W. Taylor to be in the plaintiff, and requiring the defendants, respectively, to release their said adverse claims to estates or interests therein to the plaintiff,"
The defendants answered; the plaintiff demurred; the court sustained the demurrer, and gave the defendants leave to file an amended answer.
The amended answer introduced the record of the former suit; when the plaintiff moved to strike out all that part of the answer, and demurred to the residue. The court sustained the motion and demurrer, and gave judgment for the plaintiff, which on appeal was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory.
A writ of error brought the case up to this Court.