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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–123
_________________
MARVIN D. HORNE, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 10, 2013]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 (AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing
Order or Order) promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, raisin
growers are frequently required to turn over a percentage of their
crop to the Federal Government. The AMAA and the Marketing Order
were adopted to stabilize prices by limiting the supply of raisins
on the market. Petitioners are California raisin growers who
believe that this regulatory scheme violates the Fifth Amendment.
After petitioners refused to surrender the requisite portion of
their raisins, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
began administrative pro-ceedings against petitioners that led to
the imposition of more than $650,000 in fines and civil penalties.
Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the monetary
sanctions were an unconstitutional taking of private property
without just compensation. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners
were required to bring their takings claim in the Court of Federal
Claims and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to review
petitioners’ claim. We disagree. Petitioners’ takings claim, raised
as an affirmative defense to the agency’s enforcement action, was
properly before the court because the AMAA provides a comprehensive
remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over takings
claims brought by raisin handlers. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand to the Ninth Circuit.
I
A
Congress enacted the AMAA during the Great
Depression in an effort to insulate farmers from competitive market
forces that it believed caused “unreasonable fluctuations in
supplies and prices.” Ch. 296, 50Stat. 246, as amended, 7
U. S. C. §602(4). To achieve this goal, Congress declared
a national policy of stabilizing prices for agricultural
commodities.
Ibid. The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate marketing or-ders that regulate the sale
and delivery of agricultural goods. §608c(1); see also
Block
v.
Community Nutrition Institute,
467
U.S. 340, 346 (1984) (“The Act contemplates a cooperative
venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers the principal
purposes of which are to raise the price of agricultural products
and to establish an orderly system for marketing them”). The
Secretary may delegate to industry committees the authority to
administer marketing orders. §608c(7)(C).
The AMAA does not directly regulate the
“producer[s]” who grow agricultural commodities, §608c(13)(B); it
only regulates “handlers,” which the AMAA defines as “processors,
associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling” of
covered agricultural commodities. §608c(1). Handlers who violate
the Secretary’s marketing orders may be subject to civil and
criminal penalties. §§608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14).
The Secretary promulgated a marketing order for
California raisins in 1949.[
1]
See 14 Fed. Reg. 5136 (codified, as amended, at 7 CFR pt. 989
(2013)). In particular, “[t]he Raisin Marketing Order, like other
fruit and vegetable orders adopted under the AMAA, [sought] to
stabilize producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins sold
by handlers in the domestic competitive market.”
Lion Raisins,
Inc. v.
United States,
416 F.3d 1356, 1359 (CA Fed. 2005). The Marketing Order defines
a raisin “handler” as “(a) [a]ny processor or packer; (b) [a]ny
person who places . . . raisins in the current of commerce from
within [California] to any point outside thereof; (c) [a]ny person
who delivers off-grade raisins . . . into any eligible non-normal
outlet; or (d) [a]ny person who blends raisins [subject to certain
exceptions].” 7 CFR §989.15.
The Marketing Order also established the Raisin
Administrative Committee (RAC), which consists of 47 members, with
35 representing producers, ten representing handlers, one
representing the cooperative bargaining associations, and one
member of the public. See §989.26. The Marketing Order authorizes
the RAC to recommend setting up annual reserve pools of raisins
that are not to be sold on the open domestic market. See 7
U. S. C. §608c(6)(E); 7 CFR §§989.54(d) and 989.65. Each
year, the RAC reviews crop yield, inventories, and shipments and
makes recommendations to the Secretary whether or not there should
be a reserve pool. §989.54. If the RAC recommends a reserve pool,
it also recommends what portion of that year’s production should be
included in the pool (“reserve-tonnage”). The rest of that year’s
production remains available for sale on the open market
(“free-tonnage”). §§989.54(d), (a). The Secretary approves the
recommendation if he determines that the recommen-dation would
“effectuate the declared policy of the Act.” §989.55. The
reserve-tonnage, calculated as a percentage of a producer’s crop,
varies from year to year.[
2]
Under the Marketing Order’s reserve
requirements, a producer is only paid for the free-tonnage raisins.
§989.65. The reserve-tonnage raisins, on the other hand, must be
held by the handler in segregated bins “for the account” of the
RAC. §989.66(f ). The RAC may then sell the reserve-tonnage
raisins to handlers for resale in overseas markets, or may
alternatively direct that they be sold or given at no cost to
secondary, noncompetitive domestic markets, such as school lunch
programs. §989.67(b). The reserve pool sales proceeds are used to
finance the RAC’s administrative costs. §989.53(a). In the event
that there are any remaining funds, the producers receive a
pro rata share. 7 U. S. C. §608c(6)(E); 7 CFR
§989.66(h). As a result, even though producers do not receive
payment for reserve-tonnage raisins at the time of delivery to a
handler, they retain a limited interest in the net proceeds of the
RAC’s disposition of the reserve pool.
Handlers have other duties beyond managing the
RAC’s reserve pool. The Marketing Order requires them to file
certain reports with the RAC, such as reports concerning the
quantity of raisins that they hold or acquire. §989.73. They are
also required to allow the RAC access to their premises, raisins,
and business records to verify the ac-curacy of the handlers’
reports, §989.77, to obtain inspections of raisins acquired,
§989.58(d), and to pay certain assessments, §989.80, which help
cover the RAC’s administrative costs. A handler who violates any
provision of the Order or its implementing regulations is subject
to a civil penalty of up to $1,100 per day. 7 U. S. C.
§608c(14)(B); 7 CFR §3.91(b)(1)(vii). A handler who does not comply
with the reserve requirement must “compensate the [RAC] for the
amount of the loss resulting from his failure to . . . deliver” the
requisite raisins. §989.166(c).
B
Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne have been
producing raisins in two California counties (Fresno and Madera)
since 1969. The Hornes do business as Raisin Valley Farms, a
general partnership. For more than 30 years, the Hornes operated
only as raisin producers. But, af- ter becoming disillusioned with
the AMAA regulatory scheme,[
3]
they began looking for ways to avoid the mandatory reserve program.
Since the AMAA applies only to handlers, the Hornes devised a plan
to bring their raisins to market without going through a
traditional handler. To this end, the Hornes entered into a
partnership with Mrs. Horne’s parents called Lassen Vineyards. In
addition to its grape-growing activities, Lassen Vineyards
purchased equipment to clean, stem, sort, and package the raisins
from Raisin Valley Farms and Lassen Vineyards. It also contracted
with more than 60 other raisin growers to clean, stem, sort, and,
in some cases, box and stack their raisins for a fee. The Hornes’
facilities processed more than 3 million pounds of raisins
in toto during the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years.
During these two crop years, the Hornes produced 27.4% and 12.3% of
the raisins they processed, respectively.
Although the USDA informed the Hornes in 2001
that their proposed operations made them “handlers” under the AMAA,
the Hornes paid no assessments to the RAC during the 2002–2003 and
2003–2004 crop years. Nor did they set aside reserve-tonnage
raisins from those produced and owned by the more than 60 other
farmers who contracted with Lassen Vineyards for packing services.
They also declined to arrange for RAC inspection of the rai- sins
they received for processing, denied the RAC access to their
records, and held none of their own raisins in reserve.
On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the
Agriculture Marketing Service (Administrator) initiated an
enforcement action against the Hornes, Raisin Valley Farms, and
Lassen Vineyards (petitioners). The complaint alleged that
petitioners were “handlers” of California raisins during the
2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. It also alleged that
petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order by submitting
inaccurate forms to the RAC and failing to hold inspections of
incoming raisins, retain raisins in reserve, pay assessments, and
allow access to their records. Petitioners denied the allegations,
countering that they were not “handlers” and asserting that they
did not acquire physical possession of the other producers’ raisins
within the meaning of the regulations. Petition- ers also raised
several affirmative defenses, including a claim that the Marketing
Order violated the Fifth Amend-ment’s prohibition against taking
property without just compensation.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded in
2006 that petitioners were handlers of raisins and thus subject to
the Marketing Order. The ALJ also concluded that petitioners
violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order and rejected petitioners’
takings defense based on its view that “handlers no longer have a
property right that permits them to market their crop free of
regulatory control.” App. 39 (citing
Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 244, 246–247 (1994)).
Petitioners appealed to a judicial officer who,
like the ALJ, also found that petitioners were handlers and that
they had violated the Marketing Order. The judicial of-ficer
imposed $202,600 in civil penalties under 7 U. S. C.
§608c(14)(B); $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop years under
7 CFR §989.80(a); and $483,843.53 for the value of the California
raisins that petitioners failed to hold in reserve for the two crop
years under §989.166(c). The judicial officer believed that he
lacked “authority to judge the constitutionality of the various
statutes administered by the [USDA],” App. 73, and declined to
adjudicate petitioners’ takings claim.
Petitioners filed a complaint in Federal
District Court seeking judicial review of the USDA’s decision. See
7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B). The District Court granted
summary judgment to the USDA. The court held that substantial
evidence supported the agency’s determination that petitioners were
“handlers” subject to the Marketing Order, and rejected
petitioners’ argument that they were exempt from the Marketing
Order due to their status as “producers” under §608c(13)(B). No.
CV–F–08–1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, *15 (ED Cal., Dec. 11,
2009). Petitioners renewed their Fifth Amendment argument,
asserting that the reserve-tonnage requirement consti-tuted a
physical taking. Though the District Court found that the RAC takes
title to a significant portion of a California raisin producer’s
crop through the reserve requirement, the court held that the
transfer of title to the RAC did not constitute a physical taking.
See
id., at *26 (“ ‘[I]n essence, [petitioners] are
paying an admissions fee or toll—admittedly a steep one—for
marketing raisins. The Government does not force plaintiffs to grow
raisins or to market the raisins; rather, it directs that if they
grow and market raisins, then passing title to their “reserve
tonnage” raisins to the RAC is the admissions ticket’ ”
(quot-ing
Evans v.
United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554,
563–564 (2006))).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed
that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the Marketing Or-der’s
provisions, and rejected petitioners’ argument that they were
producers, and, thus exempt from regulation. 673 F.3d 1071, 1078
(2012). The court did not resolve petitioners’ takings claim,
however, because it concluded that that it lacked jurisdiction to
do so. The court explained that “a takings claim against the
federal government must be brought [in the Court of Federal Claims]
in the first instance, ‘unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker
Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.’ ”
Id., at 1079 (quoting
Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,
524 U.S.
498, 520 (1998) (plurality opinion)). The court recognized that
7 U. S. C. §608c(15) provides an administrative remedy to
handlers wishing to challenge marketing orders under the AMAA, and
it agreed that “when a handler, or a producer-handler in its
capacity as a handler, challenges a marketing order on takings
grounds, Court of Federal Claims Tucker Act jurisdiction gives way
to section [60]8c(15)’s comprehensive procedural scheme and
administrative exhaustion requirements.” 673 F. 3d, at 1079. But,
the Ninth Circuit determined, petitioners brought the takings claim
in their capacity as producers, not handlers.
Id., at 1080.
Consequently, the court was of the view that “[n]othing in the AMAA
precludes the Hornes from alleging in the Court of Federal Claims
that the reserve program injures them in their capacity as
producers by subjecting them to a taking requiring compensation.”
Ibid. This availability of a Federal Claims Court action
thus rendered petitioners’ takings claim un-ripe for adjudication.
Ibid.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the
Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review petitioners’ takings
claim. 568 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
A
The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling
flowed from its determination that petitioners brought their
takings claim as producers rather than handlers. This determination
is not correct. Although petitioners argued that they were
producers—and thus not subject to the AMAA or Marketing Order at
all—both the USDA and the District Court concluded that petitioners
were “handlers.” Accordingly, the civil penalty, assessment, and
reimbursement for fail-ure to reserve raisins were all levied on
petitioners in their capacity as “handlers.” If petitioners’
argument that they were producers had prevailed, they would not
have been subject to
any of the monetary sanctions imposed
on them. See 7 U. S. C. §608c(13)(B) (“No order issued
under this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his
capacity as a producer”).
It is undisputed that the Marketing Order
imposes duties on petitioners only in their capacity as handlers.
As a result, any defense raised against those duties is necessarily
raised in that same capacity. Petitioners ar-gue that it would be
unconstitutional for the Government to come on their land and
confiscate raisins, or to con-fiscate the proceeds of raisin sales,
without paying just com-pensation; and, that it is therefore
unconstitutional to fine petitioners for not complying with the
unconstitutional requirement.[
4] See Brief for Petitioners 54. Given that fines can only
be levied on handlers, petitioners’ takings claim makes sense only
as a defense to penalties imposed upon them in their capacity
as
handlers. The Ninth Circuit confused petitioners’ statutory
argument (
i.e., “we are producers, not handlers”) with their
constitutional argument (
i.e., “assuming we are handlers,
fining us for refusing to turn over reserve-tonnage raisins
violates the Fifth Amendment”).[
5]
The relevant question, then, is whether a
federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense
raised by a handler seeking review of a final agency order.
B
The Government argues that petitioners’
takings-based defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds.
Brief for Respondent 21–22. According to the Government, be-cause a
takings claim can be pursued later in the Court of Federal Claims,
the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to adjudicate petitioners’
takings defense. In support of its position, the Government relies
largely on
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n
v
. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985). Brief for Respondent 21–22 (“Just compensation
need not ‘be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the
taking; all that is re-quired is that a ‘reasonable, certain and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ exist at the time of
the taking’ ” (quoting
Williamson County, 473
U. S., at 194)). In that case, the plaintiff filed suit
against the Regional Planning Commission, claiming that a zoning
decision by the Commission effected a taking of property without
just compensation.
Id., at 182. We found that the
plaintiff’s claim was not “ripe” for two reasons, neither of which
supports the Government’s position.
First, we explained that the plaintiff’s takings
claim in
Williamson County failed because the plaintiff
could not show that it had been injured by the Government’s action.
Specifically, the plaintiff “ha[d] not yet obtained a final
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations to its property.”
Id., at 186. Here,
by contrast, petitioners were subject to a final agency order
imposing concrete fines and penalties at the time they sought
judicial review under §608c(14)(B). This was clearly sufficient
“injury” for federal jurisdiction.
Second, the
Williamson County plaintiff’s
takings claim was not yet ripe because the plaintiff had not sought
“compensation through the procedures the State ha[d] provided for
doing so.”
Id., at 194. We explained that “[i]f the
government has provided an adequate process for obtaining
compensation, and if resort to that process yields just
compensation, then the property owner has no claim against the
Government for a taking.”
Id., at 194–195 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Stated differently, a
Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is clear that the
Government has both taken property
and denied just
compensation. Although we often refer to this consideration as
“prudential ‘ripeness,’ ”
Lucas v.
South Carolina
Coastal Council,
505 U.S.
1003, 1013 (1992), we have recognized that it is not, strictly
speaking, jurisdictional.[
6]
See
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept.
of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. ___, ___, and
n. 10 (2010) (slip op., at 24, and n. 10).
Here, the Government argues that petitioners’
takings claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords “the
requisite reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining
just compensation that a property owner must pursue.” Brief for
Respondent 22. In the Government’s view, “[p]etitioners should have
complied with the order, and, after a portion of their raisins were
placed in reserve to be disposed of as directed by the RAC, . . .
sought compensation as producers in the Court of Federal Claims for
the alleged taking.”
Id., at 24–25. We disagree with the
Government’s argument, however, because the AMAA provides a
comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act
jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim. As a result, there is
no alternative “reasonable, certain, and adequate” remedial scheme
through which petitioners (as handlers) must proceed before
obtaining review of their claim under the AMAA.[
7]
The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over Tucker Act claims “founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive de-partment.”
28 U. S. C. §1491(a)(1). “[A] claim for just compensation
under the Takings Clause must be brought to the Court of Federal
Claims in the first instance, unless Congress has withdrawn the
Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.”
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U. S., at 520 (plurality
opinion); see also
United States v.
Bormes, 568
U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5) (where “a statute
contains its own self-executing remedial scheme,” a court “look[s]
only to that statute”). To determine whether a statutory scheme
displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction, a court must “examin[e] the
purpose of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the
structure of review that it establishes.”
United States v.
Fausto,
484 U.S.
439, 444 (1988).
Under the AMAA’s comprehensive remedial scheme,
handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and en-forcement
of marketing orders. Pursuant to §§608c(15) (A)–(B), a handler may
file with the Secretary a direct challenge to a marketing order and
its applicability to him. We have held that “any handler” subject
to a mar-keting order must raise any challenges to the order,
including constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings.
See
United States v.
Ruzicka,
329
U.S. 287, 294 (1946). Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the
federal district court where the “handler is an inhabitant, or has
his principal place of business” is “vested with jurisdiction
. . . to review [the] ruling.”[
8] §608c(15)(B). These statutory provisions afford
handlers a ready avenue to bring takings claim against the USDA. We
thus conclude that the AMAA withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over
petitioners’ takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have no
alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not “premature”
when presented to the Ninth Circuit.
C
Although petitioners’ claim was not
“premature” for Tucker Act purposes, the question remains whether a
takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the context of
an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under §608c(14). We
hold that it may. The AMAA provides that the handler may not be
subjected to an adverse order until he has been given “notice and
an opportunity for an agency hearing on the record.” §608c(14)(B).
The text of §608c(14)(B) does not bar handlers from raising
constitutional defenses to the USDA’s enforcement action. Allowing
handlers to raise constitutional challenges in the course of
enforcement proceedings would not diminish the incentive to file
direct challenges to marketing orders under §608c(15)(A) because a
handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for
an enforcement action will be liable for significant monetary
penalties if his constitutional challenge fails.
In the case of an administrative enforcement
proceeding, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an
assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to
pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for
recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See
Eastern
Enterprises,
supra, at 520. We see no indication that
Congress intended this result for handlers subject to enforcement
proceedings under the AMAA. Petitioners were therefore free to
raise their takings-based defense before the USDA. And, because
§608c(14)(B) allows a handler to seek judicial review of an adverse
order, the district court and Ninth Circuit were not precluded from
reviewing petitioners’ constitutional challenge. The grant of
jurisdiction necessarily includes the power to review any
constitutional challenges properly presented to and rejected by the
agency. We are therefore satisfied that the petitioners raised a
cognizable takings defense and that the Ninth Circuit erred in
declining to adjudicate it.
III
The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide
whether the USDA’s imposition of fines and civil penalties on
petitioners, in their capacity as handlers, violated the Fifth
Amendment. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
