Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.Annotate this Case
500 U.S. 603 (1991)
U.S. Supreme Court
Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991)
Exxon Corporation v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.
Argued April 15, 1991
Decided June 3, 1991
500 U.S. 603
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Petitioner Exxon Corporation and Waterman Steamship Corporation negotiated a marine fuel requirements contract, in which Exxon agreed to supply Waterman's vessels with fuel when the vessels called at ports where Exxon could supply fuel directly and, when the vessels were in ports where Exxon had to rely on local suppliers, to arrange for, and pay, those suppliers to deliver the fuel and then invoice Waterman. In the transaction at issue, Exxon acted as Waterman's agent, procuring fuel from a local supplier in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a ship owned by respondent Central Gulf Lines, Inc., but chartered by Waterman. Exxon paid for the fuel and invoiced Waterman, but Waterman filed for bankruptcy and never paid the bill's full amount. When Central Gulf agreed to assume personal liability for the bill if a court were to hold the ship liable in rem, Exxon commenced litigation in the District Court against Central Gulf in personam and the ship in rem, claiming to have a maritime lien on the ship under the Federal Maritime Lien Act. The court concluded that it did not have admiralty jurisdiction. Noting that a prerequisite to the existence of a maritime lien based on a breach of contract is that the contract's subject matter must fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, it followed Second Circuit precedent, which holds that Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477 -- in which an agent who had advanced funds for repairs and supplies necessary for a vessel was barred from bringing a claim in admiralty against the vessel's owners -- established a per se rule excluding agency contracts from admiralty. However, the court ruled in Exxon's favor on a separate unpaid bill for fuel that Exxon supplied directly to the ship in New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Because there is no per se exception of agency contracts from admiralty jurisdiction, Minturn is overruled. Minturn is incompatible with current principles of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts. The rationales on which it apparently rested -- that an action cognizable as assumpsit was excluded from admiralty, and that a claimant had to have some form of a lien interest in a vessel to sue in admiralty on a contract -- have been discredited, and are no longer the law of this Court. See Archawski v. Hanioti,350 U. S. 532, 350 U. S. 536; see also, e.g., 249 U. S. S. 604