Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon
498 U.S. 133

Annotate this Case

U.S. Supreme Court

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)

Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon

No. 89-1298

Argued Oct. 9, 1990

Decided Dec. 3, 1990

498 U.S. 133

Syllabus

After petitioner company fired respondent McClendon, he filed a wrongful discharge action under various state law tort and contract theories, alleging that a principal reason for his termination was the company's desire to avoid contributing to his pension fund. The Texas court granted the company summary judgment, and the State Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that McClendon's employment was terminable at will. The State Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that public policy required recognition of an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Therefore, recovery would be permitted in a wrongful discharge action if the plaintiff could prove that

"the principal reason for his termination was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension fund."

In distinguishing federal cases holding similar claims preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the court reasoned that McClendon was seeking future lost wages, recovery for mental anguish, and punitive damages, rather than lost pension benefits.

Held: ERISA's explicit language and its structure and purpose demonstrate a congressional intent to preempt a state common law claim that an employee was unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. Pp. 498 U. S. 137-145.

(a) The cause of action in this case is expressly preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA, which broadly declares that that statute supersedes all state laws (including decisions having the effect of law) that "relate to" any covered employee benefit plan. In order to prevail on the cause of action, as formulated by the Texas Supreme Court, a plaintiff must plead, and the trial court must find, that an ERISA plan exists and the employer had a pension-defeating motive in terminating the employment. Because the existence of a plan is a critical factor in establishing liability, and the trial court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially created cause of action "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan. Cf. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,486 U. S. 825, 486 U. S. 828, and Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,482 U. S. 1, 482 U. S. 12, 23 distinguished. In arguing that the plan is irrelevant to the cause of action because all that is at issue is the employer's improper motive, McClendon misses the point, which is that, under the state court's analysis, there simply is no cause of action if there is no plan. Similarly unavailing

Page 498 U. S. 134

is McClendon's argument that § 514(c)(2) -- which defines "State" to include any state instrumentality purporting to regulate the terms and conditions of covered plans -- causes § 514(a) to preempt only those state laws that affect plan terms, conditions, or administration, and not those that focus on the employer's termination decision. That argument misreads § 514(c)(2), and consequently misapprehends its purpose of expanding ERISA's general definition of "State" to "include" state instrumentalities whose actions might not otherwise be considered state law for preemption purposes; would render § 514(a)'s "relate to" language superfluous, since Congress need only have said that "all" state laws would be preempted; and is foreclosed by this Court's precedents, see Mackey, supra, at 486 U. S. 828, and n. 2, 486 U. S. 829. Preemption here is also supported by § 514(a)'s goal of ensuring uniformity in pension law, since allowing state based actions like the one at issue might subject plans and plan sponsors to conflicting substantive requirements developed by the courts of each jurisdiction. Pp. 498 U. S. 138-142.

(b) The Texas cause of action is also preempted because it conflicts directly with an ERISA cause of action. McClendon's claim falls squarely within ERISA § 510 which prohibits the discharge of a plan participant "for the purpose of interfering with [his] attainment of any right . . . under the plan." However, that in itself does not imply preemption of state remedies absent "special features" warranting preemption. See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co.,496 U. S. 72, 496 U. S. 87. Such a "special featur[e]" exists in the form of § 502(a), which authorizes a civil action by a plan participant to enforce ERISA's or the plan's terms, gives the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of such actions, and has been held to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed by ERISA, including those provided by § 510, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,481 U. S. 41, 481 U. S. 52, 481 U. S. 54-55. Thus, the lower court's attempt to distinguish this case as not one within ERISA's purview is without merit. Moreover, since there is no basis in § 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek "pension benefits," it is clear that the relief requested here is well within the power of federal courts; the fact that a particular plaintiff is not seeking recovery of pension benefits is no answer to a preemption argument. Pp. 498 U. S. 142-145.

779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.1989), reversed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II-B, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-A, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.

Page 498 U. S. 135

Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.