Pierce v. UnderwoodAnnotate this Case
487 U.S. 552 (1988)
U.S. Supreme Court
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)
Pierce v. Underwood
Argued December 1, 1987
Decided June 27, 1988
487 U.S. 552
One of petitioner's predecessors as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development decided not to implement an "operating subsidy" program authorized by federal statute, which was intended to provide payments to owners of Government-subsidized apartment buildings to offset rising utility expenses and property taxes. Various plaintiffs, including respondent members of a nationwide class of Government-subsidized housing tenants, successfully challenged the decision in lawsuits in nine Federal District Courts. After two of the decisions were affirmed by Courts of Appeals, a newly appointed Secretary settled with most of the plaintiffs, including respondents. While the District Court was administering the settlement, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which authorizes an award of reasonable attorney's fees against the Government "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified." Under the EAJA, the amount of fees awarded must
"be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that . . . fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee."
The court awarded fees to respondents under the EAJA, concluding that the decision not to implement the operating subsidy program had not been "substantially justified," and basing the amount of the award, which exceeded $1 million, on "special factors" justifying hourly rates in excess of the $75 cap. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified, and that the special factors relied on by the District Court justified exceeding the $75 cap.
1. In reviewing the District Court's determination that the Secretary's position was not "substantially justified," the Court of Appeals correctly applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, rather than a de novo standard of review. Neither a clear statutory prescription nor a historical tradition requires this choice of standards. However, deferential, abuse-of-discretion review is suggested by the EAJA's language, which
requires a fees award "unless the court finds that" (rather than simply "unless") the United States' position was substantially justified, and by the statute's structure, which expressly provides an abuse-of-discretion standard for review of agency fee determinations. As a matter of sound judicial administration, the district courts are in a better position than the courts of appeals to decide the substantial justification question. Moreover, that question is multifarious, novel, and little susceptible of useful generalization at this time, and is therefore likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion standard will permit to develop. Pp. 487 U. S. 557-563.
2. The statutory phrase "substantially justified" means justified in substance, or in the main -- that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. This interpretation of the phrase accords with related uses of the term "substantial," and is equivalent to the "reasonable basis both in law and fact" formulation adopted by the vast majority of Courts of Appeals. Respondents' reliance on a House Committee Report pertaining to the 1985 reenactment of the EAJA for the proposition that "substantial justification" means "more than mere reasonableness" is misplaced, since the 1985 Report is not an authoritative interpretation of what the 1980 statute meant or of language drafted by the 1985 Committee, which merely accepted the existing statutory phrase. Pp. 487 U. S. 563-568.
3. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government's position was not "substantially justified." Although "objective indicia" can be relevant to establishing "substantial justification," they are inconclusive in this case. The Government's willingness to settle the litigation and the stage in the proceedings at which the merits were decided are not reliable objective indicia here. Neither are views expressed by other courts on the merits, which provide some support on both sides. The Government's arguments on the merits of the underlying issue do not command the conclusion that its position was substantially justified. Pp. 487 U. S. 568-571.
4. The District Court abused its discretion in fixing the amount of respondents' attorney's fees, since none of the reasons relied on by the court to increase the reimbursement rate above the statutory maximum was a "special factor" within the EAJA's meaning. Since the "special factor" formulation suggests that Congress thought that $75 an hour is generally sufficient regardless of the prevailing market rate, the "limited availability" factor must refer to attorneys "qualified for the proceedings" in some specialized sense, such as patent lawyers for patent proceedings, rather than just in their general legal competence. Similarly, in order to preserve the $75 cap's effectiveness, other "special factors"
must be such as are not of broad and general application. Thus, most of the factors relied on by the court -- the "novelty and difficulty of issues," "the undesirability of the case," "the work and ability of counsel," "the results obtained," and "the contingent nature of the fee" -- do not qualify, since they are applicable to a broad spectrum of litigation, and are little more than routine reasons why market rates are what they are. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,483 U. S. 711, distinguished. Pp. 487 U. S. 571-574.
761 F.2d 1342 and 802 F.2d 1107, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in Part I of which all participating Members joined, in Parts II and IV of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, in Part III of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part V of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, J., joined, and WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined except as to the last three lines. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 487 U. S. 574. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 487 U. S. 583. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.