BRECHEEN v. OKLAHOMA - 485 U.S. 909 (1988)
U.S. Supreme Court
BRECHEEN v. OKLAHOMA , 485 U.S. 909 (1988)
485 U.S. 909
Robert A. BRECHEEN
Supreme Court of the United States
February 29, 1988
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
This Court has insisted that an accused be tried by "a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-237, 476-477 (1940). We have recognized that failure to ensure the impartiality of a jury "violates even the minimal standards of due process." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 1642 (1961). The Oklahoma court's denial of petitioner's unopposed motion for change of venue raises serious doubts about whether those minimal standards were met in this case. These doubts demand that we undertake two separate inquiries. First, we must consider whether and to what extent our precedents regarding jury impartiality set constitutional limits on state change of venue standards. Second, we must address the proper application of those precedents to the unique setting of capital sentencings.
On March 23, 1983, Marie Stubbs, wife of Hilton Stubbs, a prominent storekeeper in Ardmore, Oklahoma, was shot and killed in her home. The murder and the subsequent arrest of petitioner Robert Brecheen were the subject of extensive local newspaper and television coverage. Ardmore, which has a population of approximately 25,000, is located in Carter County, which has a population of approximately 40,000. Petitioner's attorney filed a motion, accompanied by affidavits, for change of venue from Carter County. Although the motion was unopposed, the trial judge refused to grant it after conducting voir dire. The jury that was finally empaneled contained one person who knew the victim, one
who knew the victim's daughter, and three who knew the victim's husband. All but one of the jurors were customers at the Stubbs' family store. Three jurors knew the prosecuting attorney and three knew officers who would testify for the prosecution. All of the jurors had heard of the case through pretrial publicity. The jury convicted petitioner of burglary and homicide and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, petitioner challenged, inter alia, the trial court's refusal to grant him a change of venue. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner's claim, holding that "[i]t is only when a criminal defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a fair trial is a virtual impossibility that such a motion should be granted ." App. to Pet. for Cert. 2.
This Court has established that a refusal to grant a motion for change of venue may constitute a violation of due process. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, supra. A defendant seeking to establish such a violation must demonstrate either that his trial resulted in "identifiable prejudice" or that it gave rise to a presumption of prejudice because it involved "such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-543, 1632-1633 (1965). In deciding whether such a presumption of prejudice is warranted, courts must examine "any indications in the totality of circumstances that petitioner's trial was not fundamentally fair." Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 2036 (1975).
We have had little occasion to apply these basic principles to determine whether particular state standards for change of venue comport with the requirements of due process. Most of our precedents regarding due process and jury neutrality consist of careful examinations of the circumstances surrounding specific trials to determine whether they give rise to a presumption of prejudice. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965). Although we did strike down one state venue statute which categorically denied change of venue for misdemeanors, see Groppi v. Wisconsin, supra, we have not considered any other wholesale restrictions on venue change. [485 U.S. 909 , 911]