CFTC v. WeintraubAnnotate this Case
471 U.S. 343 (1985)
U.S. Supreme Court
CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub
Argued March 19, 1985
Decided April 29, 1985
471 U.S. 343
Petitioner filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act by Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), and respondent Frank McGhee, acting as sole director and officer of CDCB, entered into a consent decree that resulted in the appointment of a receiver who was ultimately appointed trustee in bankruptcy after he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on behalf of CDCB. Respondent Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, appeared for a deposition pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum served by petitioner as part of its investigation of CDCB, but refused to answer certain questions, asserting CDCB's attorney-client privilege. Petitioner then obtained a waiver of the privilege from the trustee as to any communications occurring on or before the date of his initial appointment as a receiver. The District Court upheld a Magistrate's order directing Weintraub to testify, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Held: The trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications. Pp. 471 U. S. 348-358.
(a) The attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals, and with regard to solvent corporations, the power to waive the privilege rests with the corporation's management, and is normally exercised by its officers and directors. When control of the corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the privilege also passes, and the new managers may waive the privilege with respect to corporate communications made by former officers and directors. Pp. 471 U. S. 348-349.
(b) The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly address the question whether control of the privilege of a corporation in bankruptcy with respect to prebankruptcy communications passes to the bankruptcy trustee or, as respondents assert, remains with the debtor's directors. Respondents' contention that the issue is controlled by § 542(e) of the Code -- which provides that "[s]ubject to any applicable privilege," the
court may order an attorney who holds recorded information relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs to disclose such information to the trustee -- is not supported by the statutory language or the legislative history. Instead, the history makes clear that Congress intended the courts to deal with privilege questions. Pp. 471 U. S. 349-351.
(c) The Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management authority over the debtor, whereas the powers of the debtor's directors are severely limited. Thus, the trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management, and the directors should not exercise the traditional management function of controlling the corporation's privilege unless a contrary arrangement would be inconsistent with policies of the bankruptcy laws. Pp. 471 U. S. 352-353.
(d) No federal interests would be impaired by the trustee's control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications. On the other hand, vesting such power in the directors would frustrate the Code's goal of empowering the trustee to uncover insider fraud and recover misappropriated corporate assets. Pp. 471 U. S. 353-354.
(e) There is no merit to respondents' contention that the trustee should not obtain control over the privilege because, unlike the management of a solvent corporation, the trustee's primary loyalty goes not to shareholders, but to creditors. When a trustee is appointed, the privilege must be exercised in accordance with the trustee's fiduciary duty to all interested parties. Even though, in some cases, the trustee's exercise of the privilege will benefit only creditors, such a result is in keeping with the hierarchy of interests created by the bankruptcy laws. Pp. 471 U. S. 354-356.
(f) Nor is there any merit to other arguments of respondents, including the contentions that giving the trustee control over the privilege would have an undesirable chilling effect on attorney-client communications, and would discriminate against insolvent corporations. The chilling effect is no greater here than in the case of a solvent corporation, and, by definition, corporations in bankruptcy are treated differently from solvent corporations. Pp. 471 U. S. 356-358.
722 F.2d 338, reversed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of Court, in which all other Members joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.