Regan v. WaldAnnotate this Case
468 U.S. 222 (1984)
U.S. Supreme Court
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984)
Regan v. Wald
Argued April 24, 1984
Decided June 28, 1984
468 U.S. 222
Treasury Department Regulation 201(b), first promulgated in 1963 as part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, prohibits any transaction involving property in which Cuba, or any national thereof, has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." Regulation 560, which was added to the Regulations in 1977, embodied a general license permitting, for the most part, travel-related economic transactions with Cuba, thus exempting such transactions from Regulation 201(b)'s broad prohibition. But in 1982, Regulation 560 was amended to curtail such general license by permitting only certain types of travel, such as official visits, news gathering, and visits to close relatives, and excluding general tourist and business travel. At the time Regulation 201(b) was promulgated, § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) gave the President broad authority to impose comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries as one means of dealing with both peacetime emergencies and times of war. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations constitute such an embargo. Section 5(b) was amended in 1977 to limit the President's power under the TWEA to times of war, but at the same time, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) was enacted to cover the President's exercise of emergency economic powers in response to peacetime crises, § 203 of that Act granting essentially the same authorities to the President as those in § 5(b) of TWEA. However, rather than requiring the President to declare a new national emergency in order to continue existing economic embargoes, such as that against Cuba, Congress enacted a grandfather clause providing that, notwithstanding the amendment to TWEA, the "authorities conferred upon the President" by § 5(b), which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared by the President before such date, "may continue to be exercised." Respondents, American citizens who are inhibited from traveling to Cuba by Regulation 201(b), brought an action in Federal District Court, challenging the 1982 amendment to Regulation 560 and seeking a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The District Court refused to issue the injunction on the ground that respondents had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The Court of
Appeals, holding that the challenged amendment lacked statutory authority, vacated the District Court's order and remanded with instructions to issue the injunction.
1. The grandfathered authorities of § 5(b) of TWEA provide an adequate statutory basis for the challenged 1982 amendment to Regulation 560. Pp. 468 U. S. 232-240.
(a) The language of the grandfather clause, read in conjunction with § 5(b), supports the conclusion that, in the relevant sense, the "authority" to regulate all property transactions with Cuba, including travel-related transactions, was being exercised on July 1, 1977, and was, therefore preserved. Since the authority to regulate travel-related transactions was among the "authorities conferred upon the President" by § 5(b) that were "being exercised" with respect to Cuba on July 1, 1977, it follows from a natural reading of the grandfather clause that the authority to regulate such transactions "may continue to be exercised" with respect to Cuba after that date. And since the President's authority under § 5(b) to regulate by means of licenses includes the authority to "prevent or prohibit" as well as the authority to "direct and compel," it also follows that the grandfather clause constitutes adequate statutory authority for the 1982 amendment of Regulation 560, the practical effect of which was to prevent travel to Cuba. Pp. 468 U. S. 232-236.
(b) Neither the legislative history of the grandfather clause nor its purpose of keeping IEEPA and the amendments to TWEA from being too controversial supports the view that Congress meant to grandfather only those restrictions actually in place on July 1, 1977. Eliminating the President's authority to modify existing licenses in response to heightened tensions with Cuba would have sparked just the sort of controversy the grandfather clause was designed to avoid. Pp. 468 U. S. 236-240.
2. The restrictions on travel-related transactions with Cuba imposed by the 1982 amendment to Regulation 560 do not violate the freedom to travel protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk,381 U. S. 1. Given the traditional deference to executive judgment in the realm of foreign policy, there is an adequate basis under the Due Process Clause to sustain the President's decision to curtail, by restricting travel, the flow of hard currency to Cuba that could be used in support of Cuban adventurism. Pp. 468 U. S. 240-243.
708 F.2d 794, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and POWELL,